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I. INTRODUCTION 
Commentators often advocate that the privileges and immunities lan-
guage found in the United States Constitution represents authority for some 
right along the spectrum of natural law, the Bill of Rights, or fundamental 
law in general.1  This Article provides contextual background for the argu-
ment by examining medieval royal privileges and immunities and tracing 
the crown’s charter to the American colonies and the United States Consti-
tution.  This Article goes beyond merely providing a short background for 
the use of the language in revolutionary pamphlets and the U.S. Constitu-
tion; rather, this Article discusses the concept of royal privileges and im-
munities and traces its growth in England and influence on the colonies.  
Along the way, useful comparisons are made between English institutions 
and American institutions. 
During the medieval period, landholders owed customs and services to 
the state, and from these burdens, the crown, by charter, granted privileges 
and immunities.2  Royal privileges and immunities to municipalities and 
merchant associations gave authority, for example, to have markets and 
 
 1. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 15–32, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S.    ––, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/case-
files/cases/mcdonald-v-city-of-chicago/; Brief of Amicus Curiae of Center for Constitution-
al Jurisprudence in Support of Petitioners at 5–33, McDonald, 561 U.S. ––, 130 S. Ct. 3020 
(No. 08-1521); Brief of Constitutional Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Peti-
tioners at 4–20, McDonald, 561 U.S. ––, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (No. 08-1521).  Privileges and 
immunities language is found in Article IV and the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Con-
stitution. 
 2. See infra Part II.A–B. 
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fairs, to trade, and to exercise self-government.3  In Part II, following a 
brief introduction of feudal tenure and royal immunities, the Article exam-
ines the development of mercantile institutions and borough governance. 
Part III discusses adventuring merchants and the extension of munici-
pal institutions overseas.  When Europe expanded its boundaries in the late 
fifteenth century, royal charters permitted explorers such as Christopher 
Columbus and John Cabot to load ships, travel from England, and discover 
foreign lands.4  After discovery and exploration, explorers received privi-
leges to establish trading colonies.5  In this Part, charter privileges and im-
munities to early American proprietors are introduced and discussed.  Un-
like charters to trading associations, grants to proprietors in the latter part 
of the sixteenth century focused on colonization as well as commercial in-
terests.6 
In Part IV, the Article discusses the influence of English institutions in 
colonial America.  Under royal charters, three types of colonies and a va-
riety of English institutions took root in America.7  Among other topics, 
this Part discusses tenure, colonial governance, and the colonial assembly.  
The colonial assembly was an instrumental force in colonial development 
as colonists sought to free themselves from royal and proprietary control.8 
Part V examines the emergence of the “privileges and immunities of 
Englishmen” concept and traces its influence in the colonies.  The seven-
teenth century was a period of revolution and transformation.9  In the first 
part of the seventeenth century, Englishmen invoked the “liberty of the 
subject” to combat royal monopolies.10  Once introduced, the concept 
served advocates and pamphleteers in a variety of ways.11  Revolutionaries 
felt their rights as natural-born Englishmen entitled them to the benefit of 
ancient statutes and fundamental law.12  When this concept, supported by 
similar but distinct clauses in colonial charters,13 reached the colonies, col-
 
 3. See infra Part II.C–G. 
 4. See infra Part III.A. 
 5. See infra Part III.B–D. 
 6. See infra Part III.B–D. 
 7. See infra Part IV.A–C. 
 8. See infra Part IV.D. 
 9. See infra Part V.A. 
 10. See infra Part V.A. 
 11. See infra Part V.A (discussing grievances against royal monopolies, pleas for liber-
ty of the subject, debates on Petition of Right, and Leveller writings). 
 12. See infra note 503 and accompanying text. 
 13. Colonial and explorer charters typically contained clauses that subjects traveling to 
the colony were to enjoy the privileges and immunities of Englishmen.  See infra notes 306–
11 and accompanying text. 
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onists argued that they too enjoyed the privileges and immunities of Eng-
lish subjects and thus enjoyed the same rights and law as subjects resident 
in England enjoyed, including the right to be free from taxation without 
consent.14 
English taxation without colonial representation was a major cause of 
the American Revolution.15  Following Independence, the colonies no 
longer needed to reference the privileges of Englishmen.  Nonetheless, the 
privileges and immunities concept made it into the text of the Articles of 
Confederation16 and the United States Constitution.17  After the Civil War, 
similar language found its way into the Fourteenth Amendment.18  When 
drafting these documents, the Framers provided little comment on what 
“privileges and immunities” meant or how the language should be used.  
Commentators and courts have argued that these provisions are self-
executing grants of natural law, confer specific rights such as the right to 
travel and the Bill of Rights, or protect fundamental law in general.19  
Summarizing the history and concept of the phrase, this article concludes 
by offering a contrary interpretation of the language. 
II. ROYAL PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 
A.  Land, Burdens, and Immunities 
 
 14. See infra Parts IV.D, V.B.  For example, the Colonists stated 
[t]hat the foundation of English liberty, and of all free government, is a right in the 
people to participate in their legislative council: and as the English colonists are 
not represented, and from their local and other circumstances, cannot properly be 
represented in the British Parliament, they are entitled to a free and exclusive 
power of legislation in their several provincial legislatures, where their right of 
representation can alone be preserved, in all cases of taxation and internal polity, 
subject only to the negative of their sovereign, in such manner as has been hereto-
fore used and accustomed. 
October 14, 1774 Declarations and Resolves, in 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL 
CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 68 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1904) [hereinafter 
JOURNALS]. 
 15. See infra notes 502–09 and accompanying text. 
 16. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV (“[F]ree inhabitants . . . shall be enti-
tled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States . . . .”). 
 17. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileg-
es and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”); see also infra Part V.D. 
 18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . .”); see also infra 
Part V.E. 
 19. See infra notes 530–33, 543–44. 
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Following the fall of the Roman provinces, the Anglo-Saxon king, as 
a supreme landholder, granted or gifted large tracts of lands to spiritual 
leaders for remission of sins.20  Distinct from other lands and methods of 
transfer, the conveyance of these privileged lands occurred by written char-
ter (boc, freols-boc, or privilegium).21  This land, sanctioned by church and 
state, was known as bookland (bocland).22  Most grants of bookland went 
to churches, but later kings booked lands to important individuals without a 
spiritual purpose.23 
A grant or gift of land by the king was a two-way street.  In addition 
to giving land, the king as a donor was also receiving some degree of reve-
nue and services from the donee.24  From an early time, predial burdens at-
tached to the occupancy of land.  Landholders might owe customs such as 
rents, royal fines, building services, military services, or agricultural ser-
 
 20. FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, DOMESDAY BOOK AND BEYOND 226–58, 293–318 (Boston, 
Little Brown & Co., 1897) [hereinafter MAITLAND, DOMESDAY]; J.E.A. Jolliffe, English 
Book-Right, 50 ENG. HIST. REV. 1, 5, 8–9 (1935). 
 21. The diploma was the land book (land boc) or charter preceding the use of the An-
glo-Norman writ.  F.E. HARMER, ANGLO-SAXON WRITS 34–35, 129–30, 432 (1952); 2 
WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 24, 68–72 (photo. reprint 1966) (4th 
ed. 1936); 3 id. at 73 (bookland and alienation); id. at 103 (powers of book); id. at 225–26 
(book, charter, and royal writ); MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 226, 230, 257; Jol-
liffe, supra note 20, at 10, 13, 15 (superiority, heritability, and mobility of bookland consid-
ered privileged, libera terra).  The land book, of ecclesiastic origin, carried a threat of ex-
communication and received the consent or witness of the witan, a type of Anglo-Saxon 
council consulted on significant affairs.  MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 230, 247–
52. 
 22. 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 
BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 60 (2d ed., Boston, Little Brown & Co. 1899).  Bookland 
contrasted with other types of land such as folkland and laenland.  Folkland was land held 
by private persons according to the folk or customary law without written book of the grant 
and subject to common royal burdens.  MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 257; 
FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE LAND LAWS 20–24 (3d ed., London, MacMillan and Co. 1896) 
(noting differences between bookland and other types of land); 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, 
supra, at 61–62; FRANK M. STENTON, ANGLO-SAXON ENGLAND 311–12 (3d ed. 1971) (de-
fining folkland as subject to royal burdens of king’s farm).  Laenland or loanland was a 
temporary gift of land, perhaps to common men, in which the grantee may return services or 
rent.  2 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 70–71; MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 
313–16. 
 23. 2 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 74; MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 226, 
229–30, 241–43. 
 24. MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 241–43 (bookland granted in exchange for 
spiritual services); see also infra note 28 (few reserved fundamental burdens on bookland 
but additional common burdens on other non-immune lands such as folkland). 
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vices.25  From these burdens, the king granted immunities.26  During the 
Middle Ages, several types of immunities were granted to lords, their men, 
and their lands.27  In generalized terms, to grant an immunity was to create 
a privilege from a burden otherwise due.  Before the Norman Conquest, 
several grants of bookland to lords and churches allowed the holder to be 
free or immune from all earthly or secular burdens—excepting a few re-
served burdens including military service, repairing bridges, and repairing 
borough walls.28  As a recipient of the king’s grant, the privileged church or 
lord stood in place of the king for all that the king would have received 
from the occupants of the land.29  If a holder of bookland neglected his re-
sponsibility, he could lose possession of the land.30 
With the Norman Conquest, William the Conqueror claimed to inherit 
the kingdom from his predecessors and thus inherited Anglo-Saxon laws in 
 
 25. WILLIAM CUNNINGHAM, THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE 
DURING THE EARLY AND MIDDLE AGES 148–56 (3d ed., Cambridge, Univ. Press 1896) [here-
inafter CUNNINGHAM, ENGLISH INDUSTRY] (identifying sources of royal revenue); 
MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 234–40 (king’s royal farm included fiscal pay-
ments and other dues: profits of justice, agricultural obligations, and structural and military 
services); PAUL VINOGRADOFF, ENGLISH SOCIETY IN THE ELEVENTH CENTURY 141–42 (1908) 
[hereinafter VINOGRADOFF, ENGLISH SOCIETY] (public revenue included both indirect in-
come from tolls, market dues, and forfeitures as well as direct income from customary pay-
ments in kind and in money, ordinary land taxes, and extraordinary impositions). 
 26. See, e.g., 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 60 (describing king’s aliena-
tion of royal profits by book to grantee and suggesting that inhabitants owing their custom-
ary dues to new grantee might not notice change). 
 27. See MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 269–83 (discussing book’s immunity 
(liberty, freols) from all secular obligations with reservation of three fundamental duties); 1 
POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 571–94 (discussing various fiscal and judicial im-
munities). 
 28. Three frequent exceptions to the immunity, which some label the trinoda or trimoda 
necessitas, were bridge building, wall building, and military service.  MAITLAND, 
DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 186–87 (repairing bridge and borough walls); id. at 236, 240 
(grants of bookland contained immunity from all burdens except military service and build-
ing or repairing bridge and borough walls); id. at 270–71, 273 (discussing the term trinoda 
necessitas); STENTON, supra note 22, at 289–90 (criticizing the label trinoda necessitas); see 
also ADOLPHUS BALLARD, THE DOMESDAY BOROUGHS 106 (1904) [hereinafter BALLARD, 
DOMESDAY BOROUGHS].  See generally W.H. Stevenson, Trinoda Necessitas, 29 ENG. HIST. 
REV. 689 (1914). 
 29. STENTON, supra note 22, at 307 (suggesting king’s only concern in grant of book-
land was reservation of fundamental burden (military service, borough and bridge repair), 
leaving grantee free by unwritten custom to collect remaining royal farm and services in 
place of king). 
 30. MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 295 (loss of bookland if grantee failed 
military duty or committed high crime). 
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place of the former king.31  As the lawful king and proprietary owner of 
land, he too could give it away and demand services in return.32  To punish 
those who rebelled against his inheritance, William installed Norman bar-
ons in military service as feudal lords of English estates with jurisdiction 
over the occupants of the land.33  Bookland and other Anglo-Saxon lands 
merged into feudal tenures after the Conquest.34 
The feudal concept was a relationship between lord and vassal.35  The 
tenant received defense, warranty, and heritable possession of land from 
the lord.36  The lord in turn received homage or fealty, and a combination 
of rents, aids, services, marriage and wardship, escheats, and reliefs from 
the tenant.37  The lord owed gelds and services, especially military service, 
 
 31. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 88, 92. 
 32. Id. at 232–40; MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 241, 300 (explaining that 
“all land is held of the king,” directly or indirectly). 
 33. 3 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 38 (photo. reprint 1966) 
(5th ed. 1942) (describing Norman military tenure after Conquest); GEORGE NORTON, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE HISTORY, CONSTITUTION, & CHARTERED FRANCHISES OF THE CITY OF 
LONDON 44–45 (3d ed. Revised, London, Longmans Green & Co. 1869); 1 POLLOCK & 
MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 92; STENTON, supra note 22, at 624–34 (discussing the imposi-
tion of French aristocracy on English estates). 
 34. MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 317–18 (bookland and loanland swept 
into feudum); 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 62–63 (pre-Conquest tenures 
merged into feudal tenure); David Roffe, From Thegnage to Barony: Sake and Soke, Title, 
and Tenants-in-Chief, in 12 ANGLO-NORMAN STUDIES: PROCEEDINGS OF THE BATTLE 
CONFERENCE 1989, at 157, 164–70, 173, 174–76 (1990) (comparing tenure by bookland 
with grants of sake and soke and discussing the transition into feudal tenures post-
Conquest); VINOGRADOFF, ENGLISH SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 255–57, 341 (discussing 
bookland and folkland after Conquest).  The king confiscated folkland as his own terra 
regis, along with forfeitures and confiscations.  POLLOCK, supra note 22, at 37, 43.  The 
crown invented nominal services for those religious houses retaining their extensive immun-
ities.  Id. at 35–36. 
 35. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 66–68. 
 36. Id. at 235–36, 306. 
 37. Id. at 234–40, 296, 307, 318, 349, 351; see also MARSHALL HARRIS, ORIGIN OF THE 
LAND TENURE SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES 25–27 (Greenwood Press 1970) (1953);  3 
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 54–73 (describing different feudal incidents).  Relief and 
primer seisin were payments an heir paid to take the place of the deceased tenant.  3 
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 57–61.  Wardship was the right of the lord to take over the 
land and education of the minor heir upon the death of the tenant in order to preserve a wor-
thy tenant.  Id. at 61; NORTON, supra note 33, at 47 (wardship was right to sell ward to high-
est bidder or receive fine); 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 319.  Marriage was 
the right of the king or oldest lord to have a say in (or receive a fine for lack of permission 
for) the marriage of an infant heir to compensate for loss or to prevent association with en-
emies.  3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 61–65; 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 
319–23 (noting that the lord might sell rights in wardship and marriage to a third party).  
7
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to the king, and when the lord was burdened or taxed, he passed the obliga-
tion to his tenants.38  Lords receiving land and privileges could in turn, per-
haps with license from the king, grant land to other lords and individuals, 
passing some or all of the burdens and services in the exchange.39  As the 
well-known English legal historians Frederick Pollock and Frederic Mait-
land noted, the feudal ladder might have many rungs—a tenant may hold of 
a more powerful lord, who in turn may hold of another or of the king di-
rectly.40 
 
B.  Franchises and Seignorial Jurisdiction 
 
Wardship and marriage, often described as the most burdensome feudal obligations, were 
common in military tenures but not in socage, fee farm, or burgage tenures discussed infra.  
3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 64–65; NORTON, supra note 33, at 48 (explaining that 
wardship and marriage served a military function and thus were not claimed by the lord on 
socage lands).  Escheat was the loss of the estate to the lord for felony or failure of heirs or 
loss to the king for treason.  3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 67–73. 
 38. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 232–33, 236–38, 277.  Geld was a land 
tax.  MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 120–24.  The king typically received geld 
from most, but not all.  BALLARD, DOMESDAY BOROUGHS, supra note 28, at 59, 67; id. at 68–
69 (explaining that full geld was due even if portions of borough became wasteland; some 
French were exempt from geld); VINOGRADOFF, ENGLISH SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 182–84 
(listing examples of classes immune from geld); id. at 326 (finding that tenants of ancient 
demesne did not pay geld). 
 39. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 232–40.  Though a matter of controversy 
prior to the statute of Quia Emptores Terrarum, a high lord enjoying feudal incidents from 
his immediate grantees could suffer a loss in estate quality when his immediate grantees 
subinfeudated to others with few or none of the original incidents.  See id.  With common 
reduction of estate by subinfeudation, the statute of Quia Emptores Terrarum was passed in 
1290.   Quia Emptores Terrarum allowed alienation but provided the subgrantee was to hold 
the same tenure as the grantor, i.e., the subgrantee became a tenant of the high lord of whom 
the grantor originally held.  Quia Emptores Terrarum, 1290, 18 Edw. 1, c. 1, § 1 (Eng.); 3 
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 80–81 (describing effect of statute); 1 POLLOCK & 
MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 337.  For a discussion of Quia Emptores Terrarum in the colo-
nies, see infra Part IV.E (discussing colonial charters and subinfeudation in proprietorships) 
and B.H. McPherson, Revisiting the Manor of East Greenwich, 42 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 35, 
44 (1998). 
 40. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 233.  For lands held of the king directly 
(in capite), the king restricted alienation to those with his license and imposed a reasonable 
fine for unlicensed alienation.  3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 83–85; see also infra notes 
439–49 and accompanying text (discussing charter clauses to colonial promoters that ex-
pressly avoided tenure in capite). 
8
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Feudal tenure provided revenue and services to the king.41  The in-
crease in the needs of the state translated to a greater need of revenue and 
services from the land.42  The king, unable to govern the realm by his own 
hand, often sold immunities and franchises to raise revenue for various 
causes.43  A “franchise” can be defined “as a portion of royal power in the 
hands of a subject.”44  Royal privileges granted to individuals and entities 
included financial and personal immunities as well as jurisdictional immun-
ities from the national system of justice.45 
Common fiscal immunities included exemptions from national and lo-
cal taxation, from fines and assessments, and from various types of tolls.46  
Entities and lords also received royal grants of immunity from military ser-
vice, various personal services, and from the burden of attending commu-
nal courts.47 
Feudal tenure and the management of immunities required a judicial 
relationship between lord and tenant.  Pollock and Maitland described the 
private or seignorial jurisdiction of lord over tenant as composed of two 
strands: the jurisdictional relationship between the lord and tenant arising 
from the relationship itself and a jurisdictional relationship by express grant 
of franchise.48  A lord might have held a court with simple pleas over his 
 
 41. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 232–40. 
 42. MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 240. 
 43. VINOGRADOFF, ENGLISH SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 108.  Throughout English bor-
ough history, see infra Part II.C–G, the controversies of the realm resulted in increased lib-
erties and charter confirmations for burgesses as they bargained for liberties in exchange for 
their support of the king.  1 ALICE S. GREEN, TOWN LIFE IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 237–38 
(New York, MacMillan & Co. 1894) [hereinafter GREEN, TOWN LIFE]. 
 44. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 384. 
 45. Id. at 574–94. 
 46. Id. at 574. 
 47. Id. at 537, 540–42, 544, 574.  Unless exempted, men of the township and county had 
to serve as suitors in the hundreds and county courts.  VINOGRADOFF, ENGLISH SOCIETY, su-
pra note 25, at 97–99, 104 (explaining that the hundred was a territorial unit of townships 
and estates and that free owners and estate representatives served as suitors); id. at 103 
(commenting that the hundred was more than a court, it also served as an administrative and 
police unit); see also 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 529 (“England is divided 
into counties; the county is divided into hundreds; the hundred is divided into vills or town-
ships.”); id. at 529–30, 544, 557 (noting that county court was more important than hundred 
and met less frequently than hundred court); id. at 548–53 (suitors of communal courts).  
Many hundreds were in private hands.  HELEN CAM, LAW-FINDERS AND LAW-MAKERS IN 
MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 59–70 (1962) (discussing the prevalence of private hundreds before 
the Conquest); VINOGRADOFF, ENGLISH SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 105 (noting that feudal-
ism alienated native jurisdiction in hundred courts to private subjects). 
 48. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 43, 531–32, 571–72 (distinguishing 
common feudal courts from franchise courts). 
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tenants by the relationship itself.  Other privileges and franchises, above 
and beyond simple aspects of feudal jurisdiction, varied from those of the 
petty manor, which may have held view of frankpledge and associated po-
lice powers, to those of the palatine earl.49 
The king, before and to a lesser extent after the Conquest, granted or 
confirmed jurisdictional immunities or franchises by granting sake and 
soke to the grantee.50  The full formula often consisted of sake, soke, toll, 
team, infangenetheof, and occasionally utfangenetheof.51  The grant of sake 
 
 49. Id. at 530–32, 570–71, 580–81 (defining view of frankpledge (court leet) as the priv-
ilege of a grantee to hold court to present offenses and punish minor crimes); id. at 571–72 
(commenting that franchises required crown charters).  For an in-depth picture of thirteenth-
century local government before Edward I’s quo warranto proceedings, see HELEN M. 
CAM’s work, THE HUNDRED AND THE HUNDRED ROLLS (1930) [hereinafter CAM, HUNDRED 
ROLLS]  (discussing in detail Edward I’s inquiry into private franchises and usurpation of 
royal rights).  See also HELEN CAM, LIBERTIES & COMMUNITIES IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 173 
(1963) [hereinafter CAM, LIBERTIES] (describing quo warranto proceedings under Edward I); 
DONALD W. SUTHERLAND, QUO WARRANTO PROCEEDINGS IN THE REIGN OF EDWARD I 1278–
1294, at 2–15 (1963) (discussing thirteenth-century franchises in context of Edward I’s quo 
warranto campaign). 
 50. DAWN M. HADLEY, THE NORTHERN DANELAW: ITS SOCIAL STRUCTURE, C.800–1100, 
at 168–69 (2000) (comparing bookland and grants of sake and soke; “bookright,” or sake 
and soke, enjoyed by recipient of bookland); 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 576 
(finding sake and soke granted minor criminal jurisdiction); STENTON, supra note 22, at 
494–95 (noting supplementation of Anglo-Saxon bookland with express jurisdictional privi-
lege of sake and soke for grantee to manage immunities in place of crown).  A grant of im-
munity, sake and soke, relieved the grantee of, or confirmed the grantee’s privileges from, 
certain obligations to the king but also expressly enabled the grantee to collect the profits of 
justice and the royal farm in place of the king.  Roffe, supra note 34, at 164–66 (comparing 
grants of sake and soke to bookland and associated immunities and privileges); see also in-
fra notes 59–60 and accompanying text (discussing grant of immunity as an opportunity for 
the immunized to collect penalties or forfeitures in place of the king).  Grants of sake and 
soke were often judicial references for the collection of the profits of justice, but sake and 
soke might also cover the customs running on land.  C.A. Joy, Sokeright 21–23, 25, 66, 70, 
72, 77, 223–25 (1975) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Leeds), available at 
http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/820/ (discussing non-judicial components of sokeright and 
commenting that sokeright might resemble a grant to collect burdens running on folkland); 
see also CAM, HUNDRED ROLLS, supra note 49, at 161–63 (describing collection of 
hundredal profits by private lords with various privileges); R.H.C. DAVIS, THE KALENDAR 
OF ABBOT SAMSON OF BURY ST. EDMUNDS AND RELATED DOCUMENTS xiv (1954) (listing re-
galia revenues); id. at xxxi–xxxii (suitor fines for failure to render suit or to purchase ex-
emption); id. at xxxii–xlvii (identifying several components of hundred profits that might be 
collected by an immunized grantee); HADLEY, supra, at 183–85 (noting the Abbot’s 
hundredal jurisdiction). 
 51. HARMER, supra note 21, at 73–76 (commenting that the first known use of this for-
mula occurred during the reign of Edward the Confessor); 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra 
note 22, at 576. 
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and soke, perhaps surplusage to the inherent rights of a lord by the thir-
teenth century, was a judicial right over a man or land.52  Sake was the 
cause or right to hold a plea over an individual, and soke was the right to 
seek or collect the fines and profits of that justice.53  Toll was the right to 
collect a toll from those not exempt from toll.54  Team allowed the grantee 
to hear warranties in which the person suspected of theft may prove his 
honesty by providing a witness to the transaction.55  Infangenetheof was the 
right to summarily punish thieves caught in the act within the grantee’s ju-
risdiction, and if a grantee had utfangenetheof, the grantee could punish 
those caught outside his territory.56  A grant of jurisdiction to lords, howev-
er, might be limited by the king’s reservation to protect the peace for cer-
 
 52. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 576–77 (finding that twelfth-century de-
velopments in the national criminal justice system altered the significance of the sake and 
soke formula and that subsequent requests for criminal franchises likely resulted in more 
specific charter language); id. at 579 (noting that by the thirteenth century, the grant of sake 
and soke had lost much of its earlier significance).  In later years, lords held court baron and 
court leet.  Court baron was the right to hear feudal claims; court leet covered minor crimi-
nal claims, similar to the franchise of view of frankpledge.  See supra note 49 and accompa-
nying text.  Though the sake and soke formula may have meant more during earlier periods, 
by the late thirteenth-century sake and soke meant court baron and not view of frankpledge.  
1 F.W. MAITLAND, SELECT PLEAS IN MANORIAL AND OTHER SEIGNORIAL COURTS xix, xxii–
xxiii (London, Bernard Quaritch 1889). 
 53. HADLEY, supra note 50, at 167–68, 183–86 (listing multiple definitions of “soke” 
(socn) and discussing characteristics of sokemen); HARMER, supra note 21, at 74; 
MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 84–88, 259–60; VINOGRADOFF, ENGLISH SOCIETY, 
supra note 25, at 115–16 (explaining that sake and soke concern the men, the claim, and the 
court involved in deciding cases; those under sake and soke had to attend the lord’s tribunal 
and render suitors’ services); id. at 128 (commenting that persons under sake and soke were 
generally removed from the ordinary jurisdiction of the hundred and county and placed un-
der the grantee’s jurisdiction); id. at 131, 133 (describing soke as the jurisdictional unit en-
circling a territory, such as a manor); id. at 322 (soke was a portion of the king’s public ad-
ministration granted to private lord).  The crown’s grant of soke might extend over freemen, 
sokemen, villeins, and other lesser status persons.  Id. at 125, 133 (some sokes might have 
sokemen in majority with lesser status persons as their tenants).  One of the most important 
duties of sokemen was rendering suit as a suitor to the forum court of the soke.  HADLEY, 
supra note 50, at 185. 
 54. ADOLPHUS BALLARD, BRITISH BOROUGH CHARTERS 1042–1216, at liv, lxvi–lxx 
(1913) [hereinafter BALLARD, B.B.C.]; 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 578. 
 55. BALLARD, DOMESDAY BOROUGHS, supra note 28, at 115 (commenting on the im-
portance of witnesses for market transactions); HARMER, supra note 21, at 76–77 (toll and 
team involved the testimony of a witness who witnessed a toll paid at the purchase of the 
disputed chattel; witnesses were required for certain market transactions; grant of team al-
lowed collection of pledges if the accused failed to produce the warrantor); STENTON, supra 
note 22, at 498; FRANK M. STENTON, THE FIRST CENTURY OF ENGLISH FEUDALISM 1066–
1166, at 101 (2d ed. 1961). 
 56. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 577. 
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tain crimes.57 
When the king granted a jurisdictional immunity with a charter stating 
that the land was free of the national system of justice for several crimes, 
the grantee, as a result of the immunity, collected or developed the private 
jurisdiction or court58 to collect the profits of justice from which the grantee 
received immunity.59  To give land free of national justice was not to say 
that the lord could not punish crimes in that land.  Freedom from national 
justice meant that the penalties or forfeitures of criminous tenants would 
not go to the king but rather to the lord with the franchise.60 
 
 57. Id. at 576–78; MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 86–88, 260–61.  While the 
crown granted jurisdictional franchises, it typically reserved jurisdiction and forfeitures over 
several crimes, sometimes labeled major crimes: hamsocn (breaking into a house), grith-
breche/grithbryce (breach of king’s shared peace), foresteal (ambush or attack on the king’s 
highway), murder, fihtwite (fine for fighting), reception of an outlaw, and leyrewite (adul-
tery).  HARMER, supra note 21, at 79–82; VINOGRADOFF, ENGLISH SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 
111–12.  For a discussion on the character of these forfeitures, see Naomi D. Hurnard, The 
Anglo-Norman Franchises, Part I, 64 ENG. HIST. REV. 289, 294–95, 298–301, 310, 322 
(1949) (criticizing the characterization of certain forfeitures as major crimes and comparing 
several reserved forfeitures with grant of sake and soke).  See also Naomi D. Hurnard, The 
Anglo-Norman Franchises, Part II, 64 ENG. HIST. REV. 433 (1949).  See generally T.B. 
LAMBERT, PROTECTION, FEUD AND ROYAL POWER: VIOLENCE AND ITS REGULATION IN 
ENGLISH LAW, C.850–C.1250 (2009) (Ph.D. dissertation, Durham University), available at 
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/2/.  Supplementing common grants of sake, soke, toll, and in-
fangenetheof, the king might, as a special honor, grant additional jurisdiction to collect fines 
from his reserved forfeitures.  HARMER, supra note 21, at 73, 79; STENTON, supra note 22, at 
499–501; VINOGRADOFF, ENGLISH SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 112–14. 
 58. The theory that pre-Conquest grants of sake and soke included the right for the 
grantee to have a court to collect the profits of justice has been questioned.  JULIUS GOEBEL, 
JR., FELONY AND MISDEMEANOR 371, 374, 377 (Edward Peters ed., Univ. of Pa. Press 1976) 
(1937); PATRICK WORMALD, LEGAL CULTURE IN THE EARLY MEDIEVAL WEST: LAW AS TEXT, 
IMAGE AND EXPERIENCE 318, 325 (1999) (challenging the evidence supporting pre-Conquest 
private jurisdiction). 
 59. MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 80–82, 277–79; STENTON, supra note 22, 
at 306–07 (bookland gave immunity; grantee, by unwritten custom, free to collect profits in 
place of the king); id. at 492–95 (discussing the likelihood of a court for a privileged lord to 
handle disputes concerning the collection of customs and profits of justice that the lord col-
lected as part of his bookland immunity).  Granting sake and soke to a lord broke off a piece 
of the king’s native jurisdiction or soke in the hundred court.  1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, su-
pra note 22, at 576.  A lord’s soke might overlap with the king’s jurisdiction in the hundred 
court.  CAM, HUNDRED ROLLS, supra note 49, at 161–63 (describing collection of hundredal 
profits by private lords with various privileges); MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 
90–97 (discussing hundred jurisdiction and manorial soke and overlapping collection of for-
feitures).  The lord with sake and soke might not need a court; lords with soke over crimi-
nals or land might collect their forfeiture profits in the hundred court.  Id. at 95, 102, 259; 
see also supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 60. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 576–78. 
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Far above the basic privileges granted to lords, the crown enfranchised 
the palatine earl with jura regalia.61  Palatine lords, as supreme landholders, 
held privileges and immunities in their district similar to those of the 
king.62  The Bishop of Durham, for example, with his own assembly and 
council, had the ability to appoint officers, protect the peace of the palati-
nate, create fairs and markets, pardon convicts for most crimes, and hear all 
pleas and collect the profits of justice in his jurisdiction.63  The bishop’s 
council had equitable, common law, appellate, and admiralty jurisdiction.64  
Generally, the royal writ did not run in the palatinate and royal officials 
were excluded.65  Grieved inhabitants of the liberty of Durham needed to 
petition the bishop and council similar to the manner in which subjects pe-
titioned the king.66  Before the reforms of Henry II were applied to the pa-
latinate,67 the palatine courts heard all pleas except for perhaps the rare case 
 
 61. The palatinate was a privileged district governed by a palatine earl who enjoyed 
royal rights (jura regalia) similar to the king.  See infra note 62.  Both “palatine” and “palat-
inate” trace back to ancient Rome’s Palatine Hill.  According to Roman mythology, the Pal-
atine Hill was central to the founding of Rome.  Encyclopaedia Britannica, Palatine Hill, 
BRITANNICA ONLINE ENCYCLOPAEDIA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/ 
439237/Palatine-Hill (last visited Oct. 28, 2011). 
 62. GAILLARD THOMAS LAPSLEY, THE COUNTY PALATINE OF DURHAM: A STUDY IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 31, 75, 215–16, 257 (1900).  Within the palatinate, landholders 
held directly or mediately of the bishop, not the king.  Id. at 54–55; see also James W. Alex-
ander, The English Palatinates and Edward I, 22 J. BRITISH STUDIES 1, 2–3 (1983).  Durham 
had privileges from ancient times, reinforced by grants of bookland and confirmed by Henry 
II.  LAPSLEY, supra, at 21–27, 156–58, 295–96. 
 63. LAPSLEY, supra note 62, at 32–33 (bishop’s peace); id. at 33–34 (jail and capital 
punishment); id. at 34 (delegation and appointment powers); id. at 35 (creation of corpora-
tions; Durham had five boroughs which generally received their privileges and immunities 
from the bishop); id. at 40–41, app. II (admiralty jurisdiction); id. at 41, 47–48 (escheat for 
felony and, for a long time, escheat for treason—an unusual franchise typically reserved for 
the king); id. at 58 (grant of mines, wrecks, and treasure-trove); id. at 62 (right to create fairs 
and markets); id. at 68–69 (right to pardon); id. at 71–72 (prerogative to suspend laws); id. 
at 74, 168, 173, 215 (pleas of crown); id. at 106, 114, 136, 149 (assembly and council).  
However, the bishop did not have foreign treaty powers.  Id. at 36, 40. 
 64. Id. at 149, 180 (commenting on the functions and powers of the bishop’s council); 
id. at 186–90 (discussing the bishop’s chancery and its powers). 
 65. Id. at 68, 74–75, 162–64, 166–68, 173, 226.  But see Jean Scammell, The Origin 
and Limitations of the Liberty of Durham, 81 ENG. HIST. REV. 449, 455–56 (1966) (describ-
ing the proposition that royal writs did not run in palatinate as a “half-truth”). 
 66. LAPSLEY, supra note 62, at 68. 
 67. The tenants of the liberty obtained a royal charter extending Henry II’s judicial re-
forms to them notwithstanding the bishop’s liberty.  Id. at 166–68, app. I (noting the Geof-
frey Fitz Geoffrey case and the controversy concerning the effect of Henry II’s grand assize 
in the palatinate); Scammell, supra note 65, at 459–61.  After the royal reclaim, the bishop, 
absent a royal eyre, could hear only a limited number of pleas.  Id. at 461–70. 
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of a direct attack on the king’s person or property.68  By the fourteenth cen-
tury, legislation of Parliament, unless otherwise indicated, applied to the 
palatinate.69 
Above the feudal tenure of the lord, the king was the supreme land-
holder.  Both the king and lord had manors.70  The manor, with its court, 
was a symbol of status and authority.71  Manors were estates of various siz-
es occupied by freeholders, by villeins performing services for the lord of 
 
 68. LAPSLEY, supra note 62, at 27.  The king reserved jurisdiction for defects of justice 
or for matters affecting his person.  Id. at 75, 162, 209, 211–12, 213–15; Scammell, supra 
note 65, at 457–58. 
  Before the sixteenth century, the extensive liberties of palatine lords presented ob-
stacles to royal justice.  In the process and execution of judgments, royal justice encountered 
a second layer of difficulty as courts struggled with summons, inquests, venue, vouching to 
warranty, and execution of judgments crossing the palatinate.  LAPSLEY, supra note 62, at 
216–55.  When a royal court sought process against an inhabitant of the palatinate, the first 
step was to distress the inhabitant’s lands outside of the palatinate.  Id. at 218.  If unsuccess-
ful, royal courts sought to compel the bishop to produce the individual.  Id. at 218–20, 223.  
Royal courts could also outlaw the individual and direct the bishop to arrest him.  Id. at 
220–21, 225, 251–52.  Because of its immunity, the palatinate served as a haven for crimi-
nals.  Id. at 226, 255.  In 1536, King Henry VIII and Parliament removed many of the privi-
leges of territories such as Durham.  Id. at 70, 196–97 (noting that many territories lost the 
powers of pardon and of appointing judicial officials and that all royal writs ran in king’s 
name rather than bishop’s); 2 HERBERT L. OSGOOD, THE AMERICAN COLONIES IN THE 
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 5–7 (1904) (discussing the effect of the 1536 legislation on the pal-
atine lord’s powers). 
 69. LAPSLEY, supra note 62, at 125–26, 189, 256–57.  When the crown or Parliament 
sought revenue, however, the objection was raised that the assembly of the liberty did not 
consent to the tax.  See id. at 117–18, 297–300.  Eventually, the palatinate sent representa-
tives to Parliament.  Id. at 299. 
 70. VINOGRADOFF, ENGLISH SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 323–24, 326 (describing charac-
teristics of royal manors in Domesday Book).  Tenants of the royal manor on ancient de-
mesne might enjoy qualified immunities from toll, freedom from rendering suit at the com-
munal courts, freedom from the sheriff’s interference, and immunities from many common 
fines and taxes.  3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 264.  Tenants of the ancient demesne did 
not pay taxes and fines that others paid but were burdened with heavy food-rents for the 
king’s household.  VINOGRADOFF, ENGLISH SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 326–28, 350. 
 71. 1 E. LIPSON, THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ENGLAND 1–3 (12th ed. 1959) (discussing 
literature on the origin of the manor); id. at 22–25, 27 (describing military, political, admin-
istrative, and jurisdictional features surrounding the manor); VINOGRADOFF, ENGLISH 
SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 305, 311, 316–17, 320–21 (providing definitions, functions, and 
characteristics of English manors); id. at 340–43 (defining the Conquest manor as a function 
of, among other things, a grant of soke in the context of preexisting bookland enfranchising 
lords with privileged lands); id. at 363–64 (commenting on the function of the manor’s 
court). 
14
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol34/iss1/3
BURRELL.DOCX 1/9/12  12:00 PM 
2011] A STORY OF PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 21 
the manor, and by lower classes in unfree tenure.72  Although villeins were 
often landholders, they held an unfree tenure because of the level and char-
acter of the services they performed.73  The villein after the Conquest was 
the aggregate of the slave and the dependent farmer.74  Villeins of a private 
baron did not have access to the king’s courts and were forced to abide by 
the customs of the manor and the lord’s customary court.75 
Common before the Conquest, a third manorial class, sokemen, exist-
ed between the freeholder and the villein.76  Economic and other post-
 
 72. Freemen on the manor were far less common than burdened classes and enjoyed a 
sharply privileged status over the villein and lesser classes.  1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 50 
(noting that, by the thirteenth century, freemen were protected by the king’s courts); id. at 
45–49 (describing classes of unfree below villein); 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, 
at 363 (finding freeholders of manor in socage or military service and villeins in unfree ten-
ure).  Lipson summarized that several fiscal, economic, and governmental forces imposed 
the manor system, with its dependent farming, on free villages.  1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 
12–13, 15–23, 28 (burden of dangeld tax created divisions among classes on farms; eco-
nomic forces and harsh conditions surrounding laenland; jurisdictional forces of commenda-
tion and required suretyship of a lord (nulle terre sans seigneur); bookland with seignorial 
jurisdiction and the imposition of immunized manorial lord collecting royal dues or farm in 
place of king; and military obligations fostering division among the classes with property 
being the currency for political status).  “Thus either by a royal grant placing a district under 
a feudal lordship, or by the submission of individuals, village after village acquired a lord 
and could no longer boast itself a free village community.”  Id. at 22. 
 73. Villeins were neither slaves nor serfs.  One common test of villeinage was the level 
and character of services performed. 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 39–40; 1 POLLOCK & 
MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 372–75.  Villeins performed undefined services at the will of 
the lord.  Those with defined services were of a higher status.  The manorial incidents of 
unfree tenure included amercements at will, merchet, heriot, manuring duties, and miscella-
neous personal services throughout the week (week-work).  1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra 
note 22, at 366–72; see also 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 200. 
 74. 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 491, 493 (explaining the difficulty of imposing 
the Roman classification of unfree on the complex nature of Anglo-Saxon classes).  The vil-
lein of the Domesday Survey had a better status than the serf he would become a century 
later.  See infra note 75. 
 75. 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 30 (examining limitations on the use of courts for 
the unfree); id. at 491 (noting a lord’s absolute power over the bodies and goods of his vil-
leins); id. at 492–93 (observing that a villein’s protection was limited to the customs of 
manor); id. at 495 (finding a villein’s legal disabilities applied to contests between lord and 
villein but not necessarily villein against others).  Villeins of the eleventh century were freer 
and had more access to the national courts than the corresponding rank in the thirteenth cen-
tury.  KEECHANG KIM, ALIENS IN MEDIEVAL LAW: THE ORIGINS OF MODERN CITIZENSHIP 6 
(2000) (discussing the legal disabilities of post-Conquest villeins); 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, 
at 28–29, 38–39 (noting the change in villeins’ status from the time of the Domesday Book 
to Bracton). 
 76. MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 66–107 (describing characteristics of 
sokemen and sake and soke generally); VINOGRADOFF, ENGLISH SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 
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Conquest forces depressed many sokemen into villeinage.77  The sokemen 
on the ancient demesne, protected to a degree from such forces, performed 
services for the crown and held land in privileged villeinage.78 
Eventually a strong central government and the rise of trade and 
commerce transformed the agricultural characteristics of medieval Eng-
land.79 With economic forces making commutation of services for mone-
 
120–25, 320–22, 436 (noting that a grant of soke to a private lord gave private rights over 
sokemen who rendered suit and services to the grantee).  Sokemen, like the absolute villein, 
could be subjected to services and customs, but those dues differed from the dependent 
week-work of the villein.  Id. at 322.  Sokemen generally had a certain degree of restraint on 
the ability to sell their lands. 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 52 (observing that sokemen could 
abandon land if conditions under the lord were poor); SUSAN REYNOLDS, FIEFS AND 
VASSALS: THE MEDIEVAL EVIDENCE REINTERPRETED 338 (1994) (finding that some sokemen 
enjoyed a full set of rights); VINOGRADOFF, ENGLISH SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 432–33, 435 
(commenting that within the category of sokemen there might have been free sokemen with 
greater alienation rights and unfree sokemen without such rights). 
 77. The status of sokemen tempore regis Edwardi (T.R.E.) was reduced considerably 
after the Conquest.  1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 27–28 (describing the reduction of the 
sokemen population in Cambridgeshire after Conquest).  Sokemen who might have been 
mostly free before the Conquest could be dragged into villeinage.  HADLEY, supra note 50, 
at 108–09, 167, 188 (noting oversimplification of Domesday records); VINOGRADOFF, 
ENGLISH SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 133–35 (observing that the distinction between freer 
sokes in north, segregated from the manor, and less free manorial sokes in southern England 
became lost in the Domesday Survey). 
 78. Generally, tenure on the ancient demesne could be freehold and absolute villeinage 
at the ends with sokemen in privileged villeinage in between.  1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, su-
pra note 22, at 406.  Sokemen of the ancient demesne, distinguished from absolute freemen 
and absolute villeins, had some access to the royal courts and some rights of alienation.  3 
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 264–67 (identifying the legal rights available to privileged 
villeins); 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 385–96; VINOGRADOFF, ENGLISH 
SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 432–33, 435, 437 (comparing ordinary sokemen enduring re-
strictions on alienation with sokemen on ancient demesne enjoying greater rights of aliena-
tion).  Even if privileged ancient demesne land (measured from the Conquest and recorded 
in the Domesday Survey) were alienated, the tenants theoretically preserved their privileged 
status vis-à-vis private conditions under the grantee.  VINOGRADOFF, ENGLISH SOCIETY, su-
pra note 25, at 429–30 (discussing the ancient demesne doctrine).  However, this was not 
the case for outside land coming into the king’s hand post-Conquest to be granted away at a 
later time.  1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 384–85 (observing that ancient de-
mesne was immunized and immunity ran with land after alienation); id. at 385 (noting that 
non-ancient demesne land falling into crown’s hand did not enjoy immunity and was alien-
ated by crown with full privileges available to grantee); cf. 1 GREEN, TOWN LIFE, supra note 
43, at 253–55, 270–71, 299–303 (alienated royal towns advocated for privileged status under 
new private lords, though townsmen typically had to fight to retain or regain such privileg-
es). 
 79. 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 202–06 (describing the transformation from an 
agricultural society to a commercial society and noting the effect of this transition on feudal 
services based on the agricultural and military model). 
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tary rents feasible, those outside of heavy feudal obligations, sokemen, es-
pecially sokemen on the ancient demesne, paid money rents in lieu of ser-
vices.80  Landholders paying rent in exchange for most services held their 
land in what would later be termed socage tenure.81 
Within or adjacent to the manor, a typical vill was a small organiza-
tion of homes forming an agricultural village.82  The vill or township might 
have a lord from an adjacent manor and borrow its court.83  Medieval vills 
and townships across the realm were the fundamental units of rural organi-
zation and administration.84  The more organized and privileged vill or 
township with a court was known as a borough.85  Medieval England had 
royal boroughs and baronial boroughs, but most boroughs were under royal 
control.86 
 
 80. PAUL VINOGRADOFF, VILLAINAGE IN ENGLAND 178–183 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 
1892).  The commutation of services was easier where labor service was not important.  
VINOGRADOFF, ENGLISH SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 327–28 (noting that on ancient demesne 
there was more focus on farm-rent than typical manorial services).  Forces like the plague 
also contributed to the commutation of services for money rents.  1 LIPSON, supra note 71, 
at 101–07.  Providing rent payments in exchange for services was not limited to sokemen of 
the ancient demesne.  Id. at 88–91 (manorial lord commuted services and loaned his de-
mesne land to tenants paying rent); see also RICHARD H. BRITNELL, THE 
COMMERCIALISATION OF ENGLISH SOCIETY, 1000–1500, at 36–52 (2d ed. 1996) (discussing 
commutation of services and importance of cash in medieval economy).  Eventually, the 
heavy services of the villein were also commuted into money payments.  1 POLLOCK & 
MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 375 (commutation of villein’s week-work for money rents and 
emergence of copyhold tenure). 
 81. 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 51–54 (describing socage tenure); see also infra 
Part IV.E.1 (discussing socage tenure and colonial charters). 
 82. HADLEY, supra note 50, at 94–101 (examining the characteristics of the vill in me-
dieval England); 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 531, 560–62; VINOGRADOFF, 
ENGLISH SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 265–266 (discussing husbandry from homestead to vil-
lage). 
 83. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 605–08. 
 84. VINOGRADOFF, ENGLISH SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 216, 390–91, 395, 475; 1 
POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 529 (noting that vills and townships formed hun-
dreds, hundreds formed counties, and England was divided into counties). 
 85. 1 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 139 (photo. reprint 1966) 
(7th ed., revised 1956).  The attributes that distinguished a borough from other territories 
were changing by the Domesday Survey as the village tended to have access to a court and 
the king’s peace became commonplace.  MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 184–85, 
217; 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 44–48; see also LAMBERT, supra note 57, at 
149–61 (observing that national criminal legislation replaced Anglo-Saxon system of feud 
and its network of special protections for certain people and certain places). 
 86. 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 202 (remarking that towns existed on ancient demesne, 
on lands of secular lord, and on church lands); MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 218 
(noting that most burgesses held of the king and the king was the only official lord of most 
17
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C.  Lords of the Borough 
Knowledge of royal privileges and immunities granted to boroughs 
and merchant institutions is essential to unlocking the development of 
American colonial institutions as many colonial institutions find their an-
cestry in the royal privileges and immunities of these entities.  Moreover, 
borough privileges advanced principles of community and self-government 
and ultimately became a benchmark for common notions of the liberty of 
Englishmen—a concept with a long history in the American colonies.87  
For these reasons, a detailed discussion of borough privileges and immuni-
ties is necessary. 
Privileges and immunities to boroughs flowed readily as the walls, 
markets, and mints of the medieval borough, burh, or port were royal inter-
ests.88  Serving these interests, English boroughs developed as post-Roman 
fortifications89 and as administrative trading centers of the surrounding ter-
ritory.90  The borough maintained a trading function under the king’s spe-
cial protection.91  The crown protected traders entering and leaving the 
market or borough, and a crime committed in or directly outside the bor-
 
boroughs); STENTON, supra note 22, at 529–30 (same); JAMES TAIT, THE MEDIEVAL ENGLISH 
BOROUGH 141 (Manchester Univ. Press 1968) (1936) (discussing royal boroughs with royal 
reeves); id. at 343 (finding that the extinction of manorial lordship increased the king’s own-
ership of boroughs); see also BALLARD, DOMESDAY BOROUGHS, supra note 28, at 4–9 (clas-
sifying Domesday boroughs by organization rather than by lordship); M.W. BERESFORD & 
H.P.R. FINBERG, ENGLISH MEDIEVAL BOROUGHS: A HAND-LIST 40–47 (1973) (discussing 
data on borough lords).  Royal boroughs enjoyed freedom from the sheriff’s oppressions and 
a privileged status vis-à-vis townsmen of the private borough under a lord.  See infra note 
148. 
 87. See infra note 486 (observing the influence of London’s liberties on Englishmen); 
see also infra Part V (discussing Englishmen’s liberty in American colonies). 
 88. 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 195 (describing royal mints); CARL STEPHENSON, 
BOROUGH AND TOWN: A STUDY OF URBAN ORIGINS IN ENGLAND 17, 66–67, 186–87 (1933); 
TAIT, supra note 86, at 27–29 (noting that boroughs served military and financial function). 
 89. COLIN PLATT, THE ENGLISH MEDIEVAL TOWN 19, 44 (1976) (illustrating the design 
and structure of medieval town walls). 
 90. MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 185–96 (discussing the borough’s military 
purpose but also its more permanent characteristic as a center of trade); STEPHENSON, supra 
note 88, at 52–54, 70, 187–88, 207; TAIT, supra note 86, at 11–14, 26–29, 65–66; CHARLES 
R. YOUNG, THE ENGLISH BOROUGH AND ROYAL ADMINISTRATION, 1130–1307, at 91–121 
(1961) (noting the military function of medieval boroughs). 
 91. After the fall of the Roman Empire, the local markets were poor and in need of spe-
cial protection by the king.  5 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 86–87 
(photo. reprint 1966) (3d ed. 1945).  Burgesses were attracted to the borough for the market 
and the king’s peace.  MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 99 (observing that borough 
peace was similar to house peace); id. at 184–85, 190 (noting that the king’s house peace 
extended to borough); id. at 192–93 (finding that borough peace facilitated trade). 
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ough was a breach of the king’s peace.92 
Like other individuals and entities, medieval English boroughs were 
burdened with obligations and privileged with immunities.93  During this 
period, burgesses’ tenements were assessed various customs.  Domesday 
borough customs might include house and land rents, royal dues, court 
fines, tolls, heriots, merchet, as well as light personal, military, and agricul-
tural services.94 
As a center of trade, markets and fairs authorized by the crown were 
often held in the borough, market town, and village.95  From ancient times, 
the king charged tolls for the benefit of his markets and the peace of the 
borough.96  Most burgesses of the Domesday borough paid tolls, but some 
 
 92. KIM, supra note 75, at 25–29 (noting that the king granted safe passage to foreign 
merchants as if they were king’s men); MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 184–85, 
192–93; 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 44–46 (describing the king’s peace over 
house, highways, and special lands); TAIT, supra note 86, at 36 (observing that breach of 
borough peace was six times the cost of other breaches). 
 93. 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 287.  Many of the privileges enjoyed by boroughs were 
also held by other subjects, entities, and territories.  BALLARD, B.B.C., supra note 54, at 
lxxxviii–lxxxix. 
 94. TAIT, supra note 86, at 86–100, 107 (defining and tracing receipt of or exemption 
from borough customs typically rendered to the king and earl before the Conquest; defining 
burgess as one paying borough customs); see also BALLARD, DOMESDAY BOROUGHS, supra 
note 28, at 63–91 (discussing and listing examples of borough customs and other burdens).  
Merchet was a fine paid upon the marriage of a daughter or son.  1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 
42; 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 368, 372–73.  The ancient heriot, a form of a 
relief paid upon the death of a tenant, consisted of giving the arms or best beast of the dead 
man to his lord.  MORLEY DE WOLF HEMMEON, BURGAGE TENURE IN MEDIAEVAL ENGLAND 
22–24 (1914); 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 312–13, 316–17.  Over time, a 
monetary payment was substituted for most borough customs.  1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 
201; supra notes 79–80 (discussing the commutation of services for rents). 
 95. The king granted the privilege of holding a market or fair to boroughs, to individu-
als, and frequently, to churches. 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 225 (safety of boroughs for 
markets and fairs); id. at 227 (noting that the crown granted markets to boroughs, private 
individuals, and churches); id. at 235–37, 238 (commenting that the duration of a fair was 
limited by charter to protect townsmen’s mercantile privileges); EDWARD MILLER & JOHN 
HATCHER, MEDIEVAL ENGLAND: TOWNS, COMMERCE AND CRAFTS 1086–1348, at 159–60 
(1995) (formation of markets in twelfth and thirteenth centuries); see also 2 GREEN, TOWN 
LIFE, supra note 43, at 26–27 (discussing market privileges).  The king might seize a lord’s 
market and tolls if the lord violated the king’s charter authorizing the market.  1 LIPSON, su-
pra note 71, at 236–237.  On markets and England’s medieval commerce, see generally 
BRITNELL, supra note 80. 
 96. MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 194, 203.  A large portion of borough rev-
enue came from tolls.  Tolls were collected on transactions and from strangers entering and 
leaving the town.  BALLARD, DOMESDAY BOROUGHS, supra note 28, at 73–74 (describing 
customs and tolls); MAURICE BERESFORD, NEW TOWNS OF THE MIDDLE AGES: TOWN 
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burgesses enjoyed the privilege of freedom from toll.97  Only the king 
could grant freedom from toll throughout the realm, but lords who them-
selves were granted such immunities might extend the freedom to the ex-
tent of their immunity.98  The crown’s grant of privileges to have a fair or 
market included jurisdiction for a merchant court (piepowder court) in 
which merchant law applied.99  Merchant courts were light on technical 
procedure as local merchants assembled ad hoc to decide controversies in 
commerce by the customs of merchants.100 
Because of the king’s peace, many boroughs attracted a diverse group 
of traders and military personnel with different statuses and different obli-
gations.101  Some traders held burgage tenements of the king adjacent to 
other traders who held burgages of various lords.102  Maitland articulated 
that the “heterogeneity” of many Domesday boroughs explained the differ-
 
PLANTATION IN ENGLAND, WALES, AND GASCONY 63–64 (1967) (observing that towns had 
market privileges and lords of towns collected tolls from markets).  Burgesses’ collection of 
tolls and the town’s judicial system were slightly different when the lord collected tolls dur-
ing a market or fair on town land; the former was suspended during the latter.  KIM, supra 
note 75, at 24–25; 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 247 & n.7, 248, 284–86 (describing the strug-
gle between a lord’s collection of market tolls and claims of immunities by tenants of an-
cient demesne, Cinque Ports, municipalities, and religious houses). 
 97. TAIT, supra note 86, at 117, 127.  Gildsmen were also privileged from toll.  See in-
fra note 176. 
 98. BALLARD, B.B.C., supra note 54, at lxix; 1 GREEN, TOWN LIFE, supra note 43, at 263 
n.2; 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 279–86 (noting that entities, towns, and lords were often 
free from tolls). 
 99. 5 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 91, at 106; 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 250–57 (observ-
ing that a piepowder court usually outranked other authorities on matters concerning market 
affairs); Charles Gross, The Court of Piepowder, 20 Q. J. ECON. 231, 233–34, 237–38 
(1906) (commenting that merchants had a separate court or part of borough court). 
 100. Many merchant courts did not follow common law procedures.  5 HOLDSWORTH, 
supra note 91, at 106–07.  Common law courts eventually absorbed merchant customs.  Id. 
at 115–16, 145–47. 
 101. A majority of burgesses held of the king, but the king typically shared lordship with 
other lords.  MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 182, 217–18 (noting that older bor-
oughs were typically more diverse but, as a whole, were controlled by the crown).  New 
boroughs, those planted or elevated from vills, were more likely to be fully under a lord or 
the king, thus homogenous rather than heterogeneous.  Id.; see also infra notes 102–03. 
 102. MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 178–82, 191, 217–18 (discussing and 
coining the phrase “tenurial heterogeneity”); 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 191–93; see also 
BALLARD, DOMESDAY BOROUGHS, supra note 28, at 6, 8–9 (noting heterogeneity in compo-
site boroughs not held fully of either king or lord and contrasting homogeneity of simple 
boroughs). 
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ent jurisdictions and different levels of privileges of borough inhabitants.103  
Before the Conquest, borough land was somewhere between custom-land 
liable to the king and land wholly exempt.104  As noted above, one who had 
sake and soke over a house received jurisdiction and the profits of justice 
from the tenants over specified crimes committed therein.105  The king 
might have retained sake and soke over men in the borough who provided 
services and paid rent and customs; alongside the king’s men, a lord may 
have held sake and soke over burgesses and received some or all of the 
rent, customs, and forfeitures of the land.106  Some burgesses, in return for 
performing special services, received sake and soke and freedom from cus-
toms of the borough for themselves.107  Other burgesses may have lost priv-
ileges or burgess status where they were too poor to pay the customs or rent 
due on their burgage tenement.108 
Maitland commented that the heterogeneous characteristics of many 
boroughs marginalized the intermediary lordship standing between the king 
and the burgess for those burgesses holding of an intermediary lord.109  The 
 
 103. BALLARD, DOMESDAY BOROUGHS, supra note 28, at 58–59 (describing the varying 
privileges of burgesses); STEPHENSON, supra note 88, at 107–08, 110, 114, 118; see also su-
pra note 102 (discussing tenurial heterogeneity). 
 104. TAIT, supra note 86, at 91–95; see also BALLARD, DOMESDAY BOROUGHS, supra 
note 28, at 41–43 (observing that before the Conquest, the earl might have received a third 
of borough receipts from some boroughs; after the Conquest, the king might have alienated 
or retained the earl’s third); STENTON, supra note 22, at 530–31 (finding that the king might 
allow a high lord to receive all borough customs or retain part or all for himself); 
STEPHENSON, supra note 88, at 107–08. 
 105. BALLARD, DOMESDAY BOROUGHS, supra note 28, at 48–50 (noting that forfeitures 
for offences go to the holder of sake and soke over land or men); see also supra notes 50–60 
and accompanying text (discussing grant of sake and soke). 
 106. BALLARD, DOMESDAY BOROUGHS, supra note 28, at 36–37, 48–50, 51–52, 58–59, 
81; MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 210; TAIT, supra note 86, at 93–94 (comment-
ing that king’s customs might be granted to lord or church). 
 107. BALLARD, DOMESDAY BOROUGHS, supra note 28, at 81 (discussing exchange of 
shipbuilding services for profits of justice for certain crimes); STEPHENSON, supra note 88, 
at 118–19, 156 (exemption from toll and custom); TAIT, supra note 86, at 93, 125–27 (noting 
that the burgesses of Dover and other towns received sake and soke but performed the addi-
tional services of shipbuilding); VINOGRADOFF, ENGLISH SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 128–29 
(describing grants of soke privileges to townships, manors, and lords). 
 108. TAIT, supra note 86, at 87–88; see also BALLARD, DOMESDAY BOROUGHS, supra 
note 28, at 55, 112 (commenting that some burgesses were too poor to pay customs); 1 
GREEN, TOWN LIFE, supra note 43, at 248 n.3 (noting cases where towns lost privileges for 
arrearages and other reasons); 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 197–98 (describing the effect of 
Norman castlebuilding on burgesses). 
 109. FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, TOWNSHIP AND BOROUGH 72 (New York, Macmillan Co. 
1898) [hereinafter MAITLAND, TOWNSHIP & BOROUGH]. 
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lord never developed a stronghold in such a borough and was not able to 
establish his court because of his inability to form a critical mass.110  The 
powers of the intermediary lord were further reduced by the high mobility 
of burgage tenements and the ability of burgesses to devise tenements 
freely, making escheat to a lord a distant possibility.111  Reliefs, marriage 
and wardship, and heriots owed to the lord upon the death of the tenant 
were abandoned and the intermediary lord was left with a small money 
rent, which eventually became insignificant.112 
D.  Borough Charters 
The crown’s development of borough institutions took place through 
the royal charter.  From the Middle Ages through the Anglo-American pe-
riod, the royal charter authorized much of England’s government—and the 
institutions of the American colonies were no exception.  Charter privileges 
and immunities to boroughs and gilds provided a distant foundation for the 
charters and institutions of the American colonies.113 
The period covering the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was the age of 
borough charters.114  The borough charter was a valuable possession, and 
burgesses paid significant sums for charter franchises, privileges, and im-
munities.115  As noted above, most burgesses held land of the king, and the 
 
 110. Id.; MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 210 (noting an example in which a 
lord might have held enough houses to form a seignorial court to compete with a borough 
court); TAIT, supra note 86, at 207 (commenting on competition between a manorial court 
and a borough court in mesne boroughs with a court). 
 111. MAITLAND, TOWNSHIP & BOROUGH, supra note 109, at 71–72. 
 112. Id.; TAIT, supra note 86, at 102–03 (describing heritable burgage tenure with fixed 
rent as an essential feature of the borough, though occasionally obscured by presence of ad-
ditional personal services); cf. supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text (commenting on 
the commutation of services for money rents); infra notes 136–39 and accompanying text 
(discussing burgage tenure). 
 113. See infra Part IV. 
 114. TAIT, supra note 86, at 154 (noting that the age of borough charters began with 
Henry I); see also 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 215 (noting King John was known as “char-
ter-monger”); SUSAN REYNOLDS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH MEDIEVAL 
TOWNS 105–08 (1977). 
 115. CUNNINGHAM, ENGLISH INDUSTRY, supra note 25, at 211–12 (remarking on the im-
portance of borough’s charter to claim, protect, and confirm immunities); 1 HOLDSWORTH, 
supra note 85, at 87–89, 90 & n.5, 139; 3 id. at 476 (noting that a community needed a char-
ter to possess or claim a franchise); Paul P. Harbrecht  & Joseph A. McCallin, The Corpora-
tion and the State in Anglo-American Law and Politics, 10 J. OF PUB. L. 1, 7 (1961).  Even-
tually, lords and entities were successful in claiming privileges by prescription if held from 
time immemorial. 
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king frequently granted charters to boroughs.116  After the Conquest, the 
crown took a more direct role in granting liberties and franchises to 
townsmen.  William the Conqueror saw the borough as crown land and de-
veloped boroughs with liberties in exchange for rents and services.117 
In many cases, borough charters were merely confirming privileges 
the town already possessed.  Norman and Angevin kings proclaimed that 
no previously granted immunities and privileges were valid unless con-
firmed and confirmation required purchase.118  When granting or confirm-
ing privileges, kings often promised the burgesses that they would have 
their liberties as they had in Edward the Confessor’s day, or in later peri-
ods, as they had in Henry I’s day.119  The royal franchises the king granted 
were the king’s to give and safeguard.120  The king, as owner, was liable to 
revoke or seize liberties that had not been confirmed by him or that had 
been abused or abandoned.121  Borough charters revoked for abuse or for 
other reasons had to be repurchased.122 
At some point in the life of a borough, by prescription or charter, bur-
gesses received immunities and privileges.  As noted above, privileges 
were typically the immunities granted to the individual or community that 
removed common burdens and provided liberty or freedom to the recipi-
ent.123  The privileges section of particular charters varied on factors such 
as who was granting or confirming the privileges, who was receiving the 
 
 116. See supra note 86; infra note 117. 
 117. STELLA KRAMER, THE ENGLISH CRAFT GILDS AND THE GOVERNMENT 13–14 (1905) 
(noting Conqueror’s policy toward boroughs); 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 
638 (burgesses collected liberties from king). 
 118. ADOLPHUS BALLARD & JAMES TAIT, BRITISH BOROUGH CHARTERS 1216–1307, at 
xvii–xviii (1923) (observing that the crown’s inspeximus became common in the thirteenth 
century); 1 GREEN, TOWN LIFE, supra note 43, at 211 & n.1 (noting that new reigns meant 
burgesses had to buy confirmations); 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 574 (re-
marking that the king granted liberties and resumed privileges for abuse or non-use). 
 119. BALLARD, B.B.C., supra note 54, at xlii–xliii, 7–14 (discussing charter confirma-
tions). 
 120. BALLARD & TAIT, supra note 118, at lxxii, lxxiv; 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra 
note 22, at 571–72, 574.  Liberties and privileges belonged to the king, and if seized, resto-
ration became a matter of grace. 
 121. CAM, LIBERTIES, supra note 49, at 173; 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 
572–74; SUTHERLAND, supra note 49, at 9–15. 
 122. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 574; see also 1 GREEN, TOWN LIFE, su-
pra note 43, at  211. 
 123. MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 43, 49–50, 270, 272. 
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privileges, and what privileges had been purchased.124 
Privileges to burgesses, like those to other entities, often included fis-
cal privileges, jurisdictional privileges, mercantile privileges, and privileg-
es from various personal services.125  Many boroughs received some varia-
tion of the generic charter language granting sake and soke, toll, team, and 
infangenetheof.126  The grant of sake and soke to a borough has been de-
scribed as the right to form a borough court if it did not already have one.127  
The borough court exercised administrative and judicial functions.128  Bor-
ough courts were sheltered somewhat from developments in the royal 
courts such as the royal jury system.129  Burgesses also received judicial 
immunities to be free from pleas outside the borough walls.130  Some bor-
 
 124. BALLARD, B.B.C., supra note 54, at xxii, xl–xlii, xlvi–xlvii; TAIT, supra note 86, at 
192.  A new borough needed more definition than an ancient borough.  BALLARD, B.B.C., 
supra note 54, at xxii, xlvi–xlvii. 
 125. BALLARD, B.B.C., supra note 54, at xix, xliv–lxxi; 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra 
note 22, at 642–52. 
 126. BALLARD, B.B.C., supra note 54, at liv; see supra notes 50–57 and accompanying 
text (sake and soke formula). 
 127. BALLARD, B.B.C., supra note 54, at liii–liv, lvi–lx (grant of sake and soke to bor-
ough creates court; grant of sake and soke to individuals or entity within borough creates 
soken: a jurisdictional oasis within larger borough jurisdictional oasis); 1 LIPSON, supra note 
71, at 195 (borough court’s importance).  But see BALLARD, DOMESDAY BOROUGHS, supra 
note 28, at 50 (commenting that not all holders of sake and soke had courts; instead, some 
grantees might merely collect owed forfeitures from another tribunal).  Grants of sake and 
soke began to disappear as the town developed a community status.  3 WILLIAM STUBBS, 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 580 (5th ed. 1903); see also supra note 52 (disap-
pearance of sake and soke grant). 
 128. 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 275 (describing the important functions of borough 
court in collection of revenue, administration of justice, and election of borough officers); 
YOUNG, supra note 90, at 69–91; see also 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 85, at 148–49; 2 id. at 
386 (civil and criminal jurisdiction of borough court); MAITLAND, TOWNSHIP & BOROUGH, 
supra note 109, at 75. 
 129. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 295–96, 643–45; STEPHENSON, supra 
note 88, at 134, 137.  The preferred method of proof in the borough was compurgation, a 
form of an oath of character.  BALLARD, B.B.C., supra note 54, at lxi; 2 MARY BATESON, 
BOROUGH CUSTOMS xxvii (1906).  In most boroughs, the administration of trial by battle 
was prohibited.  BALLARD, B.B.C., supra note 54, at lxi; 2 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 
386, 389–90, 397–400 (examining the influence of common law in boroughs). 
 130. BALLARD, B.B.C., supra note 54, at liv–lvi (jurisdictional immunities); BALLARD & 
TAIT, supra note 118, at lix–lxi (noting, with few exceptions, boroughs could not try pleas of 
the crown); id. at lxi (observing the merchant law exception to pleading within borough’s 
walls); 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 217 (discussing reasons for immunity from external jus-
tice); id. at 256 (stating immunity did not extend to piepowder court during fairs); 1 
POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 643, 676 (burgesses privileged from foreign 
courts; procedure for obtaining jurisdiction of claims involving burgesses in king’s courts); 
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oughs had the privileges of return of writ and non-intromittant, in which 
cases the burgesses were generally free from the sheriff and royal offic-
ers.131  Many charters also provided that burgesses were immune from suit 
in the general hundred and shire courts.132 
As boroughs evolved, similarities developed between borough privi-
leges and immunities.  The crown’s twelfth-century charter accelerated this 
uniformity by granting boroughs the generic liberties and free customs per-
taining to a free borough.133  In the early part of the twelfth century, new 
boroughs were created with grants of burghal privileges in “liberum burg-
agium” (free burgage).134  Toward the end of the twelfth century, crown 
charters used the equivalent term “liber burgus” (free borough) to denote 
the general liberties and free customs of a free  
borough.135 
The free customs of a free borough contrasted with heavy labor ser-
vices of villein tenure.  The basic and most important aspect of a free bor-
ough was holding land by borough or burgage tenure.136  Burgage tenure 
meant holding heritable land and a house in the borough free of most ser-
vices in exchange for burgage money rents, similar to the tenurial charac-
teristics of socage tenure.137  Though aspects of burgage tenure appear be-
 
YOUNG, supra note 90, at 70–72, 86–91 (noting that most burgesses held pleas except for 
pleas of the crown, though some exceptional boroughs also heard pleas of crown). 
 131. BALLARD, B.B.C., supra note 54, at lvi; BALLARD & TAIT, supra note 118, at lxi, 
lxiii–lxiv (discussing return of writ and non-intromittant clauses; noting exceptions to bar on 
sheriff entering borough when the town failed to do its duty); TAIT, supra note 86, at 346; 
YOUNG, supra note 90, at 88. 
 132. BALLARD, B.B.C., supra note 54, at lv. 
 133. See infra notes 134–35 and accompanying text. 
 134. TAIT, supra note 86, at 106–07 (discussing grants of free customs of reference bor-
ough or grants of free burgage generally). 
 135. Id. at 215–17 (noting the migration from “free burgage” to “free borough” language 
and the general equivalence between terms); see also BALLARD, B.B.C., supra note 54, at 
xl–xli. 
 136. TAIT, supra note 86, at 195–96, 211. 
 137. Hemmeon defined burgage tenure as 
a form of free tenure peculiar to boroughs, where a tenement so held might be al-
ienated by gift, sale, or devise to a degree regulated only by the custom of the bor-
ough, unburdened by the incidents of feudalism or villeinage, divisible at pleasure, 
whose obligations began and ended in the payment of a nominal quit-rent, usually 
to an elected officer of the borough. 
HEMMEON, supra note 94, at 5, 62–80, 92, 108, 130; see also BALLARD, B.B.C., supra note 
54, at xliv–xlvii; MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 217 (defining burgage tenure as a 
tenement for money rent in exchange for services); CHARLES I. ELTON, THE TENURES OF 
KENT 152 (London, James Parker & Co. 1867) (discussing burgage tenure and describing it 
as burgage “socage” or “town-socage”); TAIT, supra note 86, at 96–104 (detailing character-
25
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fore the Domesday Book,138 this tenure became more common in the 
twelfth century.139  Both free burgage and free borough grants were generic 
and variable concepts that might extend beyond simple burgage tenure.140  
The concept of free borough status for private boroughs might be basic 
burgage tenure—a lord could enfranchise a manor, abolish villein customs, 
charge money rents, and allow tenants to form a borough court and collect 
profits.141  A free borough for established boroughs may take simple burg-
age tenure for granted and its application of free borough status might in-
clude greater franchises.142 
In addition to the basic grant of free borough status, charters to mesne 
lords or boroughs facilitated the incorporation of the liberties and free cus-
toms of another borough.  Many lords and boroughs crafted their requests 
for charters by expressly referencing a mother charter, or a well-known 
borough with whom the burgesses wanted to associate as the definition of 
their liberties and free customs.143  Other charters might empower a mesne 
 
istics of burgage tenure).  In the evolution of the borough, for a time, burgage tenure was 
more than merely holding land and a house in a borough; it was also an element of burgess 
status and a means for burghal privileges and membership to the borough.  TAIT, supra note 
86, at 103 (vehicle for burghal citizenship before gilds assumed this task); id. at 134, 214–
15, 219 (finding burgage tenure represented a whole body of burghal privileges). 
 138. The Domesday Book was a type of medieval census book collecting demographic, 
economic, and other data for the King in 1086.  The primary purpose of the book was to as-
sist the king in collecting taxes.  MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 1, 3–5. 
 139. TAIT, supra note 86, at 100–03, 106–07, 214–15, 218.  Increased mobility distin-
guished post-Conquest burgage tenure from other tenures.  HEMMEON, supra note 94, at 
107–53; MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 198. 
 140. TAIT, supra note 86, at 211–12, 214–17 (summarizing that free borough status 
might clumsily vary from the privileges of London to the lowly privileges of a seignorial 
borough). 
 141. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 295, 639–40 (abolishing villein customs 
such as heriot and merchet in exchange for money rent). 
 142. TAIT, supra note 86, at 195–97, 206 (observing that burgage tenure was taken for 
granted in more advanced boroughs); id. at 211–17 (summarizing various definitions and 
applications of free borough grants ranging from mere burgage tenure to specified liberties 
above simple burgage tenure).  The free borough clause, though generic and variable, likely 
did not include privileges to have a market or fair, the gild merchant, or exemption from 
tolls throughout the realm which must be specifically granted by charter.  Id. at 195–96, 
198, 209–11, 215 (finding that liberties beyond the concept of free borough status were usu-
ally specified).  But see 1 CHARLES GROSS, THE GILD MERCHANT 5–6 (London, Oxford 
Press 1890) (listing set of privileges which might be associated with free borough including 
independent judiciary, firma burgi, commutation of tolls, markets, self-election of officers, 
judicial privileges, and gild merchant). 
 143. 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at 88, app. E at 242–43; see also BALLARD, B.B.C., supra 
note 54, at xli–xlii (characteristics of affiliation); id. at cviii (describing frequency of bor-
ough affiliation); 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 85, at 140. 
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lord as grantee to choose the reference borough.144  Common mother towns 
included London, Winchester, and Hereford.145  The mother borough be-
came more than a town with a reference charter and often served as counsel 
and support for the child borough.146  In some cases, the child town served 
as the parent of another town.147 
Direct association and free borough status were powerful tools assist-
ing many private boroughs as the liberties of both royal and mesne bor-
oughs converged in favor of the protections of free boroughs.148  Cities 
sought to gain from the struggles of other cities by associating with their 
underlying liberties or with their charters directly and thereby obtaining the 
benefits they had achieved.149  With association and charter, boroughs of 
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries achieved a level of uniformity not pre-
sent in earlier times.150 
 
 144. TAIT, supra note 86, at 197–208.  The grantee might have discretion to choose be-
tween royal and other boroughs, but burgesses of a private borough might prefer association 
with a royal borough for greater judicial privileges.  Id. at 199–200, 200 & n.5; see also in-
fra note 148 (recognizing conditions under the king were better).  A mesne lord would be 
restricted from granting some privileges without the crown’s authorization.  BALLARD, 
B.B.C., supra note 54, at xcii; BALLARD & TAIT, supra note 118, at xlix. 
 145. 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at app. E at 254–57.  The Ipswich charter at the turn of the 
thirteenth century also served as a model for English boroughs.  TAIT, supra note 86, at 270–
72. 
 146. 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at app. E at 242, 259–64 (illustrating procedure and prac-
tice of association with examples); see also BALLARD, B.B.C., supra note 54, at xlii. 
 147. 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at app. E at 243–44. 
 148. See supra notes 134–47 and accompanying text (discussing grants of free borough 
status to mesne (lords) and royal boroughs).  The liberties and free customs of royal towns 
often became the standard for a free town.  1 GREEN, TOWN LIFE, supra note 43, at 197–98 
(observing that private lords imposed heavy burdens, taxes, and imprisonment; controlled 
membership and burgesses’ travel); id. at 227–49 (noting king had more important concerns 
and was less worried about his towns’ privileges and thus was willing to grant privileges to 
royal towns in return for support or revenue); id. at 250–51 (finding private burgesses’ privi-
leges were obtained through weakness of overlord rather than through his goodwill); id. at 
250–55, 270–76 (hardships for townsmen under private lord); id. at 277–308 (comparing 
stark contrast between royal town with ample privileges and oppressed town under ecclesi-
astic control); 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 202–03 (royal town’s superior status); 
STEPHENSON, supra note 88, at 140–41; see also infra note 486 and accompanying text (not-
ing towns’ liberties, especially London’s, not only a reference for other boroughs but also a 
benchmark for liberty of Englishmen). 
 149. 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at app. E at 241–67.  Boroughs under royal control ob-
tained liberties more quickly than those under private rule.  See supra note 148 (contrasting 
free and private towns); infra notes 223–24 (influence of free towns and royal privileges on 
private towns under lord or church). 
 150. BALLARD & TAIT, supra note 118, at xviii–xix (discussing uniformity of borough 
charters while recognizing greater variety of privileges in grants to private boroughs under 
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E.  Firma Burgi 
Borough uniformity was further developed by the crown’s community 
privilege of farming the borough.  The farm of the borough (firma burgi) 
was the lump sum paid from the court fines, market tolls, mints, and other 
sources of royal revenue for which the borough was responsible.151  By the 
compilation of the Domesday Book, the sheriff was farming the revenue of 
the borough and paying a fixed sum to the crown.152  In royal boroughs, a 
royal officer collected the income and accounted to the sheriff for the farm, 
sometimes directly to the king.153  In a private borough, the collection was 
handled by the lord’s officers.154 
The sheriff sometimes leased the borough to a speculator who paid the 
fixed sum and gained what he could from the farm beyond the amount of 
the lease due to the king.155  To acquire independence, burgesses desired to 
pay for their own farming right.156  In exchange for large fees, by the end of 
the twelfth century, kings granted to boroughs the privilege to farm the 
borough perpetually in fee and the right to elect an officer to pay the rent to 
the royal treasury directly.157  Many boroughs were willing to pay oppres-
sive amounts—above the fixed amount for which the sheriff was responsi-
ble—to be free of the sheriff as the financial agent of the borough’s farm.158  
The grant of firma burgi provided a sense of community, reduced the extor-
 
mesne lords); 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at app. E at 243, 257 (pointing out that affiliated 
boroughs shared many features but also retained differences). 
 151. HEMMEON, supra note 94, at 154; 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 215 (observing that 
firma burgi did not cover all royal income); MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 204; 
TAIT, supra note 86, at 141, 146–47. 
 152. TAIT, supra note 86, at 140. 
 153. BALLARD, B.B.C., supra note 54, at lxxxv–lxxxvi. 
 154. Id. at lxxv; cf. CAM, HUNDRED ROLLS, supra note 49, at 93–95, 142–45, 161–64 
(discussing characteristics of and collection procedures for both royal and private hundred 
farms). 
 155. BALLARD, B.B.C., supra note 54, at lxxv; BALLARD, DOMESDAY BOROUGHS, supra 
note 28, at 91–92. 
 156. BALLARD, B.B.C., supra note 54, at lxxvi. 
 157. TAIT, supra note 86, at 123, 139–93, 345–46; see also BALLARD, B.B.C., supra note 
54, at lxxvii, lxxxv–lxxxvii (describing office of elected reeve or bailiff to collect farm); 
YOUNG, supra note 90, at 16–30 (borough officers and firma burgi).  The bailiffs collected 
the fees, and the officers and burgesses of the borough were liable jointly and severally for 
the fixed rent due to the king.  BALLARD & TAIT, supra note 118, at lxxi–lxxii (noting full 
corporate characteristics not yet developed); MAITLAND, TOWNSHIP & BOROUGH, supra note 
109, at 76–77. 
 158. BALLARD, B.B.C., supra note 54, at lxxvi, lxxvii. 
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tion of the sheriff, and helped emancipate the borough.159  The privilege of 
firma burgi, like other privileges, might be seized by the king if a town vio-
lated or abused a privilege or failed to make its payment.160 
With various privileges, franchises, and freedoms, burgesses began to 
develop a community status free of the sheriff and royal management.161  
Because farming the borough treated burgesses as an entity, commentators 
note that the grant of firma burgi, along with the collective influences of 
the gild and borough court, was a leading step in the formation of the mu-
nicipal corporation of the late Middle Ages.162 
F.  Gilds and Gild Merchant 
One of the borough’s most important features for students of Ameri-
can history is the formation and development of the gild.163  After the Con-
quest, burgesses received mercantile privileges to establish a gild merchant, 
a monopolistic union of traders within the borough.164  The gild’s main 
possessions were mercantile and fiscal immunities to buy and sell retail and 
 
 159. TAIT, supra note 86, at 157–58; see also 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 215–17; cf. 
CAM, HUNDRED ROLLS, supra note 49, at 93, 143–44, 163 (similar accounts of oppression 
occurring with collection of hundred farms).  By the beginning of Henry III’s reign, most 
larger towns had farming privileges.  BALLARD & TAIT, supra note 118, at lvi.  Burgesses 
also desired the privileges of non-intromittant and return of writ to rid themselves of the 
sheriff’s judicial powers and royal officers.  See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 160. HEMMEON, supra note 94, at 155; 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 215 (noting occasion-
al revocation of grant of firma burgi).  If the town abused its charter, the king might seize its 
liberties, and restoration became a matter of grace.  See supra notes 120–22 and accompany-
ing text. 
 161. TAIT, supra note 86, at 159, 234, 264, 345–46. 
 162. Id. (suggesting election of royal officers to collect firma burgi was a step in for-
mation of borough community); see also MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 205–06; 
1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 651 (commenting on quasi-ownership with grant 
of firma burgi, but noting town did not have full community status as escheats did not go to 
community); infra Part II.F (illustrating gild’s influence in boroughs). 
 163. The grant of gild merchant typically required a royal charter.  BALLARD & TAIT, su-
pra note 118, at lxxxiii; 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at 91; TAIT, supra note 86, at 210.  For a 
discussion of medieval gilds merchant, see MILLER & HATCHER, supra note 95, at 290–98. 
 164. 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at 4 (monopolistic union); id. at 25–26 (discussing Ips-
wich monopoly on buying and selling certain products).  But see REYNOLDS, supra note 114, 
at 81–82 (noting presence of gild societies before Conquest); 1 WILLIAM R. SCOTT, THE 
CONSTITUTION AND FINANCE OF ENGLISH, SCOTTISH AND IRISH JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES TO 
1720, at 5–6 (1912) (describing gild merchant’s formation from earlier societies and dis-
cussing rationale behind exclusivity in medieval trade); TAIT, supra note 86, at 120–21, 136 
(commenting on gild’s presence before Conquest).  For history on early family and religious 
gilds, see JOSHUA TOULMIN SMITH & LUCY TOULMIN SMITH, ENGLISH GILDS (London, N. 
Trubner & Co. 1870). 
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wholesale without toll and free of other restrictions.165 
Before England saw the governor of the company or the mayor of the 
town, the gild had elected an alderman as its leader.166  Gild aldermen were 
accompanied by assistants of various titles.167  The gild’s business took 
place at a periodic meeting (morning-speech) where the gild admitted 
members, adopted bylaws, and carried out administrative duties.168 
To become a member of the gild, one paid admission to the gild and 
swore an oath to preserve the privileges of the fraternity.169  Foreign mer-
chants who were not members of the borough could join the gild.170  The 
crown perceived the foreign merchant as a source of crown revenue.171  The 
barons, too, felt merchants were useful as they lent money and lowered 
prices.172  But burgesses felt foreign merchants were a threat.173  Locals 
 
 165. 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at 39–52 (summarizing non-gildsmen’s restrictions on 
owning shops, on free trade of certain products, on trade of other products at certain times, 
and restrictions on non-gildsmen’s buying or selling retail); see also infra notes 173, 175 
and accompanying text (noting discrimination against and regulation of aliens and non-
gildsmen). 
 166. Lujo Brentano, Introduction to JOSHUA TOULMIN SMITH & LUCY TOULMIN SMITH, 
ENGLISH GILDS, at xxxviii (London, N. Trubner & Co. 1870); see also infra note 167. 
 167. 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at 24–28 (describing the election of gild alderman and 
assistants); id. at 78–79 (noting the distinction between gild aldermen and ward aldermen of 
town council).  By the sixteenth century, the alderman might be known as “governor” pre-
siding over the governance of the gild house.  1 SCOTT, supra note 164, at 7.  Assistants typ-
ically came in multiples of twelve, e.g., twenty-four assistants to the alderman or governor.  
Id.; see also infra notes 193, 196–205 and accompanying text (commenting on borough 
councils of twelve and twenty-four). 
 168. 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at 32–33; Brentano, supra note 166, at xxxii–xxxiii.  The 
gild recorded customary bylaws as the gild’s particular privileges were not specified in their 
charters.  1 SCOTT, supra note 164, at 7–8. 
 169. 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at 29, 38.  To retain good standing, gildsmen had to be lot 
and scot with the burgesses, i.e., had to pay their town dues alongside burgesses.  Id. at 53–
57. 
 170. Id. at 66–68; 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 276. 
 171. 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 517, 537 (noting payment of higher alien duties and re-
source for loans).  In the early part of the fourteenth century, the crown protected alien mer-
chants’ trading privileges with the Carta Mercatoria in exchange for new alien customs.  
T.H. LLOYD, ALIEN MERCHANTS IN ENGLAND IN THE HIGH MIDDLE AGES 26–28 (1982). 
 172. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 464. 
 173. WILLIAM CUNNINGHAM, ALIEN IMMIGRANTS TO ENGLAND 124–29, 203 (New York, 
Macmillan Co. 1897) [hereinafter CUNNINGHAM, ALIEN IMMIGRANTS] (examining animosity 
toward aliens in late medieval period); 2 GREEN, TOWN LIFE, supra note 43, at 94–95 (identi-
fying conflict over job shortages and foreign merchants); 9 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A 
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 94–95 (photo. reprint 1966) (3d ed. 1944) (noting discrimination 
against aliens and protection of foreigners through national legislation); 1 id. at 540–41 (ob-
serving that burgesses suppressed foreign merchant’s ability to trade in town); 1 LIPSON, 
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complained that they could not compete with outside merchants who were 
free from local expenses but traded freely in the town alongside burdened 
locals.174  Because of the tension, boroughs protected their mercantile privi-
leges by regulating the ability of non-gild foreign merchants to trade, buy, 
sell, set up shop, and hold land in the borough.175 
One of the highly valued privileges of the gild was the grant of free-
dom from toll throughout the realm to members of the gild.176  If a gilds-
man or burgess of a privileged borough went to another fair or market and 
was tolled despite presenting charters of exemption, the gild or borough 
could seek to recover the injury to its privilege by litigation or reprisal.177  
Many foreign merchants were also exempt from certain tolls by a provision 
in their home charter, and in these cases the towns had to sort out the con-
flicting privileges.178 
The privileged trading communities and markets were the driving 
force of the nation’s commerce.179  For many towns, especially private 
towns under a mesne lord, the only town function was commerce through 
the gild.180  Over time, specific craft gilds grew as offshoots to the general 
 
supra note 71, at 499–501, 516–37 (discussing tension between alien merchants and locals); 
1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 464–65. 
 174. 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 466–67 (noting presence of foreign weavers who en-
joyed benefits but did not have to pay royal fees that local weavers had to pay); 
CUNNINGHAM, ALIEN IMMIGRANTS, supra note 173, at 98 (detailing change in policy so that 
aliens residing in city more than forty days had to contribute proportion of taxation that fell 
on denizens). 
 175. 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at 41–42, 45, 46–48, 133, 134; see, e.g., 2 GREEN, TOWN 
LIFE, supra note 43, at 39–50 (explaining relations between foreign merchants and towns; 
burgess could lose citizenship for assisting foreign merchants in evading restrictions); 1 
LIPSON, supra note 71, at 265–69 (emphasizing restrictions placed on foreign competition); 
id. at 499–501, 516–35 (discussing conflict with aliens); see also supra note 173. 
 176. 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at 43–44; 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 279. 
 177. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 666–67. 
 178. BALLARD, B.B.C., supra note 54, at lxix (explaining that some towns were exempt 
in England and some were exempt throughout realm); 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 284–86 
(noting burgesses might carry charter with them to outside fair as proof of immunity).  
Many charters provided a clause saving London’s privileges so there would be no confusion 
in a conflict between privileges.  See, e.g., BALLARD, B.B.C., supra note 54, at 14, 15, 35; 
BALLARD & TAIT, supra note 118, at 29; cf. NORTON, supra note 33, at 67–69. 
 179. 2 GREEN, TOWN LIFE, supra note 43, at 55–56 (finding that commercial community 
privileges of borough or gild were a “great engine” for abolishing restrictions and creating 
national commerce). 
 180. 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at 90–92 (discussing gild’s presence in small mesne bor-
ough as only town function and contrasting gild’s lesser influence in royal boroughs with 
independent court).  London never received the right to form a gild merchant, though crafts 
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mercantile interests of the gild merchant.181  Craft gilds included merchants 
of particular trades and those in various stages of production.182  The in-
crease in craft gilds decreased the power of the gild merchant.183 
G.  Borough Governance and Municipal Incorporation 
A second feature vital to the study of American history is the devel-
opment of local government in the borough.  Medieval borough and gild 
governance provided the seeds for self-government in merchant and adven-
turer societies, ultimately leading to similar features in colonial govern-
ments.  By the time the American colonies had settled, there were three 
forms: the proprietary colony, the royal colony, and the corporate colo-
ny.184  In all three instances, colonies borrowed from medieval institutions, 
especially borough and gild governance.185 
The gild was one of many dynamics influencing borough citizenship 
and governance.  In some boroughs, craft gilds merged with the gild mer-
chant; in other boroughs, the gild merged with the borough’s governing 
body—a characteristic explained by the fact that gild officers composed a 
 
gilds flourished.  Leonard W. Hein, The British Business Company: Its Origins and Its Con-
trol, 15 U. TORONTO L.J. 134, 135–36 (1963). 
 181. 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at 114–16; 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 308 (observing that 
craft gild consisted of masters, journeymen, and apprentices); id. at 328 (concluding that the 
craft gild’s primary function was to control a segment of industry through a network of re-
strictions); id. at 337 (noting craft gilds regulated prices); id. at 349–50 (control of craft re-
sided with assembly and wardens; wardens generally elected by assembly of company); id. 
at 364 (comparing craft gild with gild merchant).  See generally KRAMER, supra note 117 
(describing transition from gild merchant to craft gild).  The craft gild might have a charter 
like the gild merchant but it was not necessary; adulterine craft gilds in twelfth-century 
London that did not purchase charters of association were stigmatized.  3 STUBBS, supra 
note 127, at 585.  But see KRAMER, supra note 117, at 42–43 (observing that many crafts in 
Bristol did not have charter). 
 182. 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at 120–29 (distinguishing gild merchant from crafts and 
crafts from other crafts); 2 GREEN, TOWN LIFE, supra note 43, at 112–13 (describing types of 
crafts). 
 183. 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at 114–23.  Over time, craft gilds merged with gilds mer-
chant and together both merged with the governing body of the borough.  Id. at 107, 115–
26, 158–61; 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 371–75 (noting crafts’ submission to town authority 
and town’s removal of restrictions on crafts accelerated their growth and absorption of gild 
merchant); id. at 423–26 (amalgamation of crafts); 3 STUBBS, supra note 127, at 583, 584–
85. 
 184. See infra note 331, Part IV.A–C. 
 185. See infra note 376, Part IV.D. 
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large proportion of the borough’s leading officials.186  After some time, the 
qualifications for membership or freedom of the town expanded beyond 
burgage tenure to include gild apprenticeship and purchase or inher-
itance.187  Freedom of a craft or gild became synonymous with freedom of 
the city. 
Gild leadership and organization influenced town leadership and or-
ganization.  Ancient communal features of the gild provided the borough 
with a community status—a characteristic further reinforced by the bor-
ough’s community farming privileges discussed above.188  Before the turn 
of the thirteenth century, the king had appointed the official town leader, 
the king’s reeve.189  The gild had elected its leader for some time, but the 
borough did not have an elected leader.  Because of the overlap in the enti-
ties, Professor Tait suggested that the influence of an elected officer in the 
gild facilitated the development of a similar institution in the town.190  
Shortly before the thirteenth century, London received the right to elect its 
 
 186. 2 GREEN, supra note 43, at 145–60 (finding heavy regulation of gild eventually gen-
erated town dependency on gild officers and resources); 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 277–78 
(recognizing that borough governance and gild function merged); TAIT, supra note 86, at 
226–27 (noting that borough and gild shared features and personnel); see also supra notes 
182–83 and accompanying text (interrelationship between gild merchant and craft gilds).  
Though there often was overlap, the gild was not fully interchangeable with the town’s ad-
ministration. 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at 61–63, 65–72, 75, 85, 92, 111–13, 126 (suggesting 
that crafts may have assisted town oligarchies but did not supplant them); 1 LIPSON, supra 
note 71, at 369 (explaining that crafts did not want to be absorbed into taxation and jurisdic-
tion of town and gild merchant). 
 187. 1 FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO THE MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATIONS IN ENGLAND AND WALES 18–19 paras. 18–23 (1835) [hereinafter FIRST 
REPORT] (stating that, in some towns, gild membership was required for town membership); 
1 GROSS, supra note 142, at 71 n.3, 123–26 (membership through birth, apprenticeship, in-
heritance, gift, or purchase); 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 385–86 (town membership through 
gild membership); 3 STUBBS, supra note 127, at 583–84, 585–87, 593, 596 (gilds’ growth 
and interaction with municipal governance and freemanship); TAIT, supra note 86, at 249 
(gild membership occasionally required). 
 188. TAIT, supra note 86, at 234 (farming and associated privileges unified community); 
id. at 263–64 (gild gave semi-corporate status to borough community). 
 189. Id. at 225–28, 255. 
 190. Id. at 225–26 (gild influences enabled community growth); id. at 227 (noting double 
capacity of citizens who were members of both gild and borough).  At times, the gild’s al-
derman, whose authority was generally limited to commercial matters, was considered the 
town leader even on matters outside of trade, as Tait noted “one body with two aspects.”  Id. 
at 227, 231–32, 248.  Burgesses, for example, might borrow gild institutions for town activi-
ty, promoting the eventual linkage between the two institutions.  1 GROSS, supra note 142, at 
82–83, xviii–xvix (borough open-air gatherings borrowed gild’s hall, which eventually be-
came part of town). 
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mayor.191  Following London’s example, several boroughs, especially the 
larger, more advanced boroughs, provided for civic leaders.192 
In the evolution of the English municipality, bodies of assistants, al-
dermen and common councilors, to a greater or lesser degree representative 
of the borough and often in multiples of twelve, grew alongside civic lead-
ers.193  Membership in these councils was reserved to the more important, 
wise and discrete men of the borough (probi homines), from whom the 
councils were chosen or by whom councils were otherwise influenced.194  
Gilds, too, played a role in influencing and providing membership to bor-
ough councils.195 
Accompanying the town’s civic leader, a formal town council of 
twelve or twenty-four good men assembled as a sworn body of aldermen to 
assist the mayor.196  By the thirteenth century, London’s mayor and alder-
men were summoning an assembly from the community to help perform 
the work of the city as a second council assisting the mayor and town 
council.197  By the middle of the fourteenth century, gilds were included in 
the summons.198  As London had election privileges, summoned assemblies 
 
 191. TAIT, supra note 86, at 291, 347 (mayor followed London’s commune). 
 192. 2 GREEN, TOWN LIFE, supra note 43, at 274–76 (election of mayor varied from town 
to town); MILLER & HATCHER, supra note 95, at 307–08; TAIT, supra note 86, at 291 (noting 
examples of boroughs following London’s mayor).  The office of mayor did not always re-
quire a royal charter.  BALLARD & TAIT, supra note 118, at lvii (finding presence of mayor 
without royal charter and observing mayor’s interaction with gild aldermen). 
 193. See infra notes 196–205 and accompanying text.  In the early thirteenth century, to 
help carry the burden of governance or to curb abuse of taxation by the ruling class, London 
elected assemblies to assist in governance.  TAIT, supra note 86, at 267–69. 
 194. 2 GREEN, TOWN LIFE, supra note 43, at 249–53; TAIT, supra note 86, at 244, 264, 
266, 268, 282, 307, 312–13, 317, 323; GWYN A. WILLIAMS, MEDIEVAL LONDON: FROM 
COMMUNE TO CAPITAL 34–37 (1963). 
 195. See supra notes 183, 186–90 and accompanying text (shared officers and merger of 
institutions); infra notes 198–203 and accompanying text (gild influence in election assem-
blies and common council). 
 196. TAIT, supra note 86, at 264, 266–67, 270, 280–81, 284.  London’s twenty-four al-
dermen were nominated by the citizens of their respective wards.  Id. at 281; see also 2 
GREEN, TOWN LIFE, supra note 43, at 277–78 (selection of town council in other towns).  
Aldermen had power ranging from co-management to mere advice.  These elected aldermen 
or assistants, though subordinate to the mayor, grew in election, appointment, and judicial 
responsibilities.  Aldermen at times were restricted to one-year terms but eventually this re-
striction was removed and aldermen were in office for life, removable for reasonable cause.  
TAIT, supra note 86, at 282–84, 311–12, 313. 
 197. TAIT, supra note 86, at 303–05. 
 198. Most of London’s work was done by the town council and aldermen, but if the 
commonalty was needed, the town might summon the crafts.  PAMELA NIGHTINGALE, A 
MEDIEVAL MERCANTILE COMMUNITY: THE GROCERS’ COMPANY & THE POLITICS & TRADE OF 
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had to differentiate between functions—forming administrative assemblies 
for ordinary business and election assemblies for the election of the mayor 
and other officers.199  With London’s 1376 reforms and the amalgamation 
of the two types of assemblies, gilds were able to appoint assembly (com-
mon council) representatives.200  Some felt the gild was a better body than 
the ward for electing the common council because its influence was able to 
reduce the arbitrary rule of the ruling class.201  Gild representatives, at least 
initially, were seen as useful to the commoners to help break up the mo-
nopoly powers of the mayor and aldermen and promote free trade.202  Di-
rect gild election also secured participation by minority gilds.203  Many of 
the 1376 reforms, however, were short lived, and election of the common 
 
LONDON, 1000–1485, at 203 (1995) (gilds provided common council representatives in 1351 
to discuss loss of city’s commercial privileges; gilds helped collect loans for king); GEORGE 
UNWIN, THE GILDS AND COMPANIES OF LONDON 76–77 (1908) (noting presence of gild 
membership in mid-fourteenth century). 
 199. TAIT, supra note 86, at 305.  Election of the mayor in London was initially entrusted 
to the aldermen and nobles.  Later the mayor was elected by the aldermen assisted to some 
degree by an election assembly attended by ward or gild designees.  Id. at 305–10; see also 
NORTON, supra note 33, at 115; WILLIAMS, supra note 194, at 27, 40–41, 43 (tension and 
transformation in procedure for electing mayor).  Elected mayors and bailiffs might be pre-
sented to the king for approval.  3 STUBBS, supra note 127, at 587; TAIT, supra note 86, at 
349.  Until the mid-fourteenth century, men of the ward generally nominated representatives 
for the administrative assembly.  TAIT, supra note 86, at 307–08 (tracing evolution of both 
assemblies and noting ward’s selection of administrative assembly); id. at 310, 311 (distin-
guishing election and administrative assemblies). 
 200. London’s 1376 reforms temporarily combined the election and ordinary assemblies, 
referred to as the “common council,” and required the body meet several times a year rather 
than be summoned.  TAIT, supra note 86, at 309–10 (describing circumstances and gild in-
fluence before and after 1376 change); id. at 311 (merger of assemblies in 1376 reforms); 
UNWIN, supra note 198, at 130–31. 
 201. See infra notes 202–03 and accompanying text. 
 202. TAIT, supra note 86, at 309–10, 311; UNWIN, supra note 198, at 63–64, 130–131, 
135 (abuse by aldermen led to gilds’ involvement in common council); see also 2 GREEN, 
TOWN LIFE, supra note 43, at 167–68 (commoners looked to gild resources to fight ruling 
party); id. at 170–77 (privileged gild in Exeter mobilized commonalty against arbitrary gov-
ernment and taxation by municipal authority until king revoked gild’s privileges in favor of 
municipality).  Tait noted that confidence in the gild was further confirmed by the fact that 
legislation with only gild approval was acceptable but legislation of mayor and aldermen 
alone was void and needed further support.  TAIT, supra note 86, at 310–11. 
 203. Gild representation might have also served lesser gilds seeking to gain a voice 
among the larger trading companies.  CAROLINE M. BARRON, LONDON IN THE LATER MIDDLE 
AGES: GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE, 1200–1500, at 130–31 (2004); NIGHTINGALE, supra note 
198, at 245–46. 
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council returned to the wards.204  Following London’s example, many 
towns added a common council to their governing body.205 
A brief review of medieval town governance highlights a few trends.  
On the one hand, arbitrary rule by a select ruling class during the fourteenth 
and fifteenth centuries, especially concerning taxation, resulted in the for-
mation of councils, more or less representative of the wards, or at times, the 
gilds.206  On the other hand, there was a common perception that the com-
 
 204. TAIT, supra note 86, at 312–13.  During this period, election of the common council 
volleyed back and forth between men of the wards and the companies.  Shortly after the re-
forms of 1376, other probi homines who were not members of the gild were added to the 
common council, a change that soon became a permanent substitution for gild designees.  
Id. at 313.  Within a decade of the 1376 reforms, the assemblies again differentiated and the 
election of the common council (administrative assembly) returned to the wards.  
NIGHTINGALE, supra note 198, at 284; TAIT, supra note 86, at 313–14.  With the separation, 
the election assembly became a larger body attended by the common council and the gilds.  
Id. at 313–14. 
  London’s representatives to Parliament were also selected by the larger election 
body.  NORTON, supra note 33, at 114–15, 116; 3 STUBBS, supra note 127, at 596.  The 
crown frequently sought burgesses’ support and input on the great affairs of the realm, and 
borough representatives became a regular part of Parliament by 1300.  YOUNG, supra note 
90, at 151–54.  The idea behind the Model Parliament is captured in the famous phrase, 
“quod omnes tangit, ab omnibus aprobetur” (what touches all, shall be approved by all).  
GEORGE L. HASKINS, THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 72 (1960).  
The related principle that no taxation should be raised without common consent became 
commonplace in England with the statutes Magna Carta (1215), De Tallagio Non Con-
cedendo (1297), and subsequent taxation statutes of 1340.  2 STUBBS, supra note 127, at 
148–49, 401–02; see also supra note 69 (palatinates and representation in Parliament).  For 
criticisms of the authenticity of De Tallagio Non Concedendo, see J.H. Round, The House of 
Lords and the Model Parliament, 30 ENG. HIST. REV. 385, 396 (1915). 
 205. TAIT, supra note 86, at 315–16 (describing London’s influence on other towns add-
ing common councils and noting that London remained representative while many other 
towns became closed oligarchies). 
 206. The community, as distinguished from the mayor, aldermen, and sometimes from 
the common council, fought with the ruling body.  TAIT, supra note 86, at 241–47.  Lack of 
participation was a frequent grievance concerning municipal taxation.  BARRON, supra note 
203, at 133–34 (by fifteenth century, London’s common council consented to taxation); 
JENNY KERMODE, MEDIEVAL MERCHANTS: YORK, BEVERLEY AND HULL IN THE LATER 
MIDDLE AGES 56–60 (1998) (noting rioting by discontented commoner seeking greater ac-
cess to town governance in late medieval period); MILLER & HATCHER, supra note 95, at 
358–61 (abuse of taxation by ruling class led to greater involvement by community); 3 
STUBBS, supra note 127, at 588 (lack of participation and unfair assessments by governing 
class prompted rise in commons); TAIT, supra note 86, at 267, 303, 317, 319, 332–33 (de-
tailing popular resentment against arbitrary taxation and explaining how perceptions of arbi-
trary rule by powerful individuals (potentiores) in various towns prompted creation of coun-
cil); id. at 319 (burgesses and lesser inhabitants petitioned king over taxation without 
representation and as a result obtained a more representative committee including both 
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monalty in many towns went too far, was of poor quality, and elected un-
suitable officers to run the town.207  In response, Parliament and the crown 
limited participation to stifle the agitation and democracy of the multi-
tude.208  Though gilds were once regarded as a liberating force in breaking 
up elite ruling classes,209 by the end of the medieval period, wealthy gilds 
were viewed as detrimental to the town’s general welfare and came under 
heavy regulation.210  Eventually the governing body, perhaps aided by 
 
common and lesser inhabitants); Charles W. Colby, The Growth of Oligarchy in English 
Towns, 5 ENG. HIST. REV. 644–46 (1890) (arbitrary taxation and abuse of government by 
few burgesses roused greater borough community); see also supra note 204 (borough repre-
sentation in Parliament and principle of no taxation without common consent); cf. BALLARD 
& TAIT, supra note 118, at lxxiii–lxxiv (commenting on examples of towns’ citation to 
Magna Carta against excessive amercements but also noting Magna Carta’s limited effect as 
crown granted privileges by grace and could resume privileges when burgesses abused 
them).  Charter provisions requiring some degree of “common consent” and “better govern-
ance” were common themes in borough and merchant charters in the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries.  See infra notes 210, 243–47 and accompanying text. 
 207. TAIT, supra note 86, at 323–24.  In the latter part of the fourteenth century, officers 
of Norwich were of the opinion that the commonalty had been disruptive, and they success-
fully petitioned the king to allow the bailiffs and twenty-four aldermen to make ordinances 
for the good of government as needed without the addition of the commonalty in the pro-
cess.  Id. at 317.  In the first half of the fifteenth century, though, the commonalty to some 
degree was added back in the form of a common council.  Id. at 317–18. 
 208. Id. at 322–24 (regulations closed council membership to oligarchical body of dis-
crete and wise men); see supra note 194.  Despite earlier victories for representative gov-
ernment, Lynn, by a 1524 charter, became closed in the hands of the mayor, twelve alder-
men, and eighteen common councilors.  TAIT, supra note 86, at 321; Stephen Rigby, Urban 
‘Oligarchy’ in Late Medieval England, in TOWNS AND TOWNSPEOPLE IN THE FIFTEENTH 
CENTURY 68 (J.A.F. Thomson ed. 1988); Jennifer I. Kermode, Obvious Observations on the 
Formation of Oligarchies in Late Medieval English Towns, in TOWNS AND TOWNSPEOPLE IN 
THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY, supra, at 87–106.  The crown chose Lynn aldermen for life in the 
first instance, but vacancies were filled by common councilors.  The common council elect-
ed one of the aldermen to serve as mayor each year.  From a pool of burgesses, councilors 
were chosen at will with full removal power by the mayor and aldermen.  Burgesses were 
admitted by the closed body.  TAIT, supra note 86, at 321. 
 209. See supra notes 200–03. 
 210. MILLER & HATCHER, supra note 95, at 365 (grievances against gilds’ price-fixing); 
id. at 365–66 (crown prohibited establishment of gilds detrimental to city in late thirteenth-
century charters; gilds placed under city’s supervision in late thirteenth century; gilds and 
town bid against each other for royal support and charter); id. at 366 (fourteenth-century 
gilds operated for their own profit and to the detriment of the general community); id. at 367 
(town complained of defective products); id. at 368–69 (by mid-fourteenth century, gilds 
were under town authority and the town approved gild ordinances and gild officers). 
  In 1437 and 1504, Parliament passed legislation restricting self-interested gilds 
from operating to the detriment of the common people.  UNWIN, supra note 198, at 160–62, 
170 (noting London procured parliamentary legislation to combat wealthy crafts enfran-
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gilds, formed oligarchies in the boroughs, and the governance of most bor-
oughs became closed to select bodies—often to the disadvantage of the rest 
of the town.211 
 
chised by crown’s privileges of incorporation).  The 1437 act strengthened municipal super-
vision of gilds.  1437, 15 Hen. 6, c. 6; KRAMER, supra note 117, at 29–37, 47–48 (gilds in 
Bristol and other towns presented their bylaws to municipal authorities for approval); id. at 
41–59 (gild’s royal charter presented obstacle to municipal control of gilds, resulting in par-
liamentary legislation); 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 372–84 (town’s powers over gilds with 
submission of gild bylaws for approval; town’s nomination of gild officials; town’s control 
over gild assembly and ordinances); id. at 418–19 (noting that 1437 legislation did not cre-
ate new conditions but merely addressed variance created by royal charters granted to cer-
tain gilds and not to others); see also 2 GREEN, TOWN LIFE, supra note 43, at 130–31 (rela-
tionship between gild oligarchies and town oligarchies); id. at 137–40 (regulation of 
merchants to control prices); id. at 142–60 (merchants subordinated to common benefit and 
supervision of town; gilds rose from public regulation to seize control of municipality). 
  The 1504 Act renewed earlier legislation and added a national element that approval 
of gild ordinances (ordinances not “unreasonable”) must be received favorably by a combi-
nation of the chancellor, treasurer, chief justices of either bench, or royal justices.  1504, 19 
Hen. 7, c. 7; KRAMER, supra note 117, at 60–63 (1504 legislation enhanced earlier legisla-
tion regulating gilds); 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 338–39 (unreasonable ordinances in-
volved price-fixing); id. at 420–21 (contrasting 1504 legislation with 1437 legislation).  By 
the mid-seventeenth century, courts struck down gild ordinances even though they had been 
approved by the authorities under the 1504 act.  3 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 349–50. 
 211. TAIT, supra note 86, at 302–03, 316, 321, 323, 338; see also FIRST REPORT, supra 
note 187, at 17, 18 (exclusion of common freemen from corporation and governance); 2 
GREEN, TOWN LIFE, supra note 43, at 118–19 (gild oligarchies); id. at 240–46 (town oligar-
chy taxed arbitrarily, deprived commoners of free trade, and used town finances for personal 
use); id. at 247–49 (general town assembly initially was no cure to town oligarchy); id. at 
249–53 (town governance remained in few worthy men, sometimes in leading families from 
generation to generation); 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at 109–10 (oligarchies in boroughs); id. 
at 126 (craft oligarchies assisted town oligarchies; “burgess” status frequently restricted to 
members of select governing body); REYNOLDS, supra note 114, at 132–38 (discussing fac-
tions in medieval towns, noting influences of crafts in town governance, and describing 
town division into greater and lesser burgesses); UNWIN, supra note 198, at 217 (oligarchies 
of sixteenth-century companies); cf. infra notes 381–84 and accompanying text (describing 
restricted political systems in New England). 
  London’s leading gild companies, the twelve great livery companies, influenced the 
governance of English municipalities and overseas merchants.  The “livery” denotes a par-
ticular piece of clothing or uniform bestowed upon liverymen—a select body of influential 
freemen within the greater company of freemen.  W.J. ASHLEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
ENGLISH ECONOMIC HISTORY AND THEORY, PART II, END OF THE MIDDLE AGES 126, 131 (2d 
ed., London, Longmans, Green, & Co. 1893).  Senior wardens and a court of assistants gov-
erned the livery company.  GEORGE UNWIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION IN THE SIXTEENTH 
AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES 41–42 (1904).  The court of assistants was itself a select rul-
ing body within the livery and chose liverymen from freemen.  ASHLEY, supra, at 131–32; 
UNWIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra, at 43.  Unwin noted that the livery company’s 
oligarchy and the town’s oligarchy shared many similarities.  UNWIN, INDUSTRIAL 
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Municipal incorporation further reinforced oligarchical forces in Eng-
lish towns.212  During the Middle Ages, there were various types of com-
munities including counties, hundreds, villages, boroughs, gilds, churches, 
colleges, and hospitals.213  Some of these communities became formal cor-
porations.214  Incorporation of the English borough was the concept of 
forming an entity separate from its burgesses where, when fully realized, 
the assets and obligations of the corporation belonged to the community of 
burgesses and not to individual citizens.215  In an oligarchical town, the 
corporation might refer to a select body of burgesses who incorporated and 
owned town property.  In these towns, municipal incorporation formalized 
the select body at the expense of the original powers held by burgesses.216 
Generally, incorporation of a borough was the crown’s formal recog-
nition of preexisting municipal privileges.217  In many cases, before the 
borough became recognized as a formal corporation, it had “a natural cor-
porate existence” as all of the features of a corporation were enjoyed by 
 
ORGANIZATION, supra, at 73–74; see also ASHLEY, supra, at 125.  The burgess with voting 
rights resembled the livery member, the common council resembled the court of assistants, 
and the town’s aldermen shared similarities with the livery company’s governing wardens.  
UNWIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra, at 73. 
 212. See generally MARTIN WEINBAUM, THE INCORPORATION OF BOROUGHS (1937). 
 213. 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at 98–101 (gild a “communitas” along with villages, coun-
ties, hundreds, and others); 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 469 (listing examples); 9 id. at 
45–72 (creation, powers, limitations, and dissolution of corporations); 1 POLLOCK & 
MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 486, 494, 564, 620. 
 214. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 495, 534. 
 215. 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 482–89 (discussing realization of corporate per-
sonality from individual liability); 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 488; TAIT, su-
pra note 86, at 234 (beginning of municipal incorporation). 
 216. FIRST REPORT, supra note 187, at 17 para. 13 (observing that municipal incorpora-
tion took away from community’s power as governing class became independent of greater 
community); id. at 34 (ruling class of corporation might abuse its power by monopolizing 
privilege of electing borough representatives to Parliament); 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at 96 
(by Tudor and Stuart period, “corporation” referred to select body); 3 STUBBS, supra note 
127, at 606–07 (oligarchic corporations acquired property and town governance to the ex-
clusion of burghers); TAIT, supra note 86, at 240–41 (noting burgesses included in concept 
of incorporation but probably not borough-wide concept); id. at 323 (example of incorpora-
tion of small body of individuals in name of community (official “burgesses”), reducing rest 
of town to mere inhabitants).  Conditions in English towns generally remained the same un-
til the nineteenth century.  Parliament overhauled borough governance in 1835.  Municipal 
Corporations Act, 1835, 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76. 
 217. 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 475–79 (describing creation of corporation by 
king, Parliament, church, and by implication). 
39
Burrell: A Story of Privileges and Immunities: From Medieval Concept to th
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2011
BURRELL.DOCX 1/9/12  12:00 PM 
46 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:7 
boroughs.218  Corporations in their full form elect a leader, have a seal, 
make bylaws, enjoy the power to sue and be sued, contract, and can own 
and transfer property.219  In the fifteenth century, the number of grants of 
incorporation to burgesses and other communities began to increase.220 
The crown’s grant of incorporation, joined with fiscal, mercantile, and 
jurisdictional privileges discussed above—though not always reaching all 
borough members—provided a convenient capstone and substitute for the 
earlier block of privileges and immunities of free boroughs.221  Before the 
close of the Middle Ages, the borough had achieved an independent identi-
ty through the collective influences of the gild, firma burgi, and borough 
self-governance.  While the crown frequently granted privileges and im-
munities to its boroughs, towns on private estates struggled for freedom.222  
Nonetheless, through association and assimilation, gild and community 
forces helped liberate the private town from the restrictive forces of the 
lord and church.223  The late medieval period provided many examples of 
 
 218. 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at 95; 3 STUBBS, supra note 127, at 596–97, 604–06; TAIT, 
supra note 86, at 234–37, 263–64 (features of corporateness in firma burgi, gild, and com-
mune). 
 219. 1 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 802–03 (7th ed., London, A. 
Strahan 1832) (Tit. “By-laws”); 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 482, 487–88; MARTIN 
WEINBAUM, BRITISH BOROUGH CHARTERS 1307–1660, at xxiv (1943) (five points of corpo-
rate powers).  The 1835 Report of the Commissioners lists admission of members as a right 
of the municipal corporation, particularly the Mayor, with or without a requirement for resi-
dence or property.  FIRST REPORT, supra note 187, at 18–19, 35. 
 220. 3 STUBBS, supra note 127, at 606.  One likely explanation for the increase is the 
1391 legislation extending the statute of mortmain to gilds and towns.  PLATT, supra note 
89, at 143–44.  Gilds sought royal incorporation and license to hold in mortmain, but selec-
tive incorporation led to petitions requesting that Parliament intervene with legislation regu-
lating crafts in the fifteenth century.  BARRON, supra note 203, at 208–10; UNWIN, supra 
note 198, at 158–63, 170–72; see also supra note 210 (discussing Parliament’s regulations 
of gilds in fifteenth and sixteenth centuries). 
 221. 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at 96–97 (concept of incorporation served as substitute for 
variable concept of liber burgus); 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 476–77 (communities 
incorporated to receive and protect franchises). 
 222. See supra note 148 (comparing freer royal towns with private towns). 
 223. See supra notes 143–50 (association of borough charters to leverage liberties of fre-
er towns).  Community forces freed the town from the restrictive forces of the baron and 
eventually from the church.  In many cases, the gild was a powerful liberating force for bor-
oughs under private lords.  1 GREEN, TOWN LIFE, supra note 43, at 251–53 (merchants stayed 
away from arbitrary baronial boroughs; observing gild’s influence upon private towns); id. 
at 286–87, 300 (gild’s influence on towns under churches); id. at 296–98 (efforts by mem-
bers of gild to free town); id. at 302–03 (summarizing gild as only outlet and identity for 
burgesses under mesne lord); 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 204–10 (baronial burgesses pur-
chased charter privileges and liberties, converging toward a free or royal borough); id. at 
278–79 (gild’s corporate unity felt more in mesne borough struggling for liberty and self-
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the mesne town struggling to free itself from customs, rents, and arbitrary 
taxation of the lord.  The privileges and immunities of neighboring free 
towns served as a leverage point for the task.224 
An examination of medieval royal privileges and immunities reveals 
dependence on the crown for the basic institutions of government.  Before 
the Conquest, the church and crown, by royal charter, created privileged 
lands superior to other lands in alienability and heritability.225  Throughout 
the period under review, the crown granted fiscal, mercantile, and jurisdic-
tional privileges and immunities to lords and entities.226  The crown ex-
tended its peace to boroughs, clothed burgesses with rights of governance, 
and nurtured urban mercantile associations.227  As a cohesive unit, govern-
mental and administrative privileges and immunities granted to gilds and 
boroughs provided a ready model for advancing mercantile activity outside 
of the borough walls.  These English institutions, transplanted by royal 
charter to voyaging merchant associations and explorers, provided the germ 
for similar institutions in the American colonies. 
III. MERCHANTS, EXPLORATION, AND COLONIZATION: THE BEGINNING OF 
THE AMERICAN COLONIES 
By the late medieval period, mercantile activity of English towns had 
expanded beyond the borough and local market to include a thriving inter-
national trade between English merchants and neighboring countries.228  
 
government); MILLER & HATCHER, supra note 95, at 296–98; TAIT, supra note 86, at 228, 
234 (gild’s influence in private boroughs); see also supra note 180 (gild might be only for-
mal community in small private borough). 
 224. 1 GREEN, TOWN LIFE, supra note 43, at 237–38 (royal privileges developed bor-
oughs, liberated burgesses from pleas outside city, and gave burgesses self-governance 
rights and right to farm their own revenue); id. at 246 (noting that liberties of royal towns 
served as model for other towns); id. at 251 (merchants disfavored arbitrary taxation in 
mesne boroughs); 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 206–10; MILLER & HATCHER, supra note 95, 
at 317–18 (rise of burghal privileges in private towns); see also supra notes 148, 223 (gild 
privileges, common in royal boroughs, provided liberating influence on private boroughs).  
The king occasionally granted privileges to private townsmen to the disfavor of a particular 
lord.  1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 208 (gild, market privileges, and a borough court in pri-
vate town). 
 225. See supra Part II.A. 
 226. See supra Part II.B. 
 227. See supra Part II.C–G. 
 228. E.M. CARUS-WILSON, MEDIEVAL MERCHANT VENTURERS: COLLECTED STUDIES xv, 
xxx–xxxiv, 1 (2d ed. 1967) (noting influence of London and Bristol merchants in overseas 
exploration and trade); see also 1 CHARLES M. ANDREWS, THE COLONIAL PERIOD OF 
AMERICAN HISTORY 28–52 (Yale Univ. Press 1964) (1934) [hereinafter ANDREWS, 
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Charter privileges and immunities to boroughs and gilds provided a tem-
plate for charters to merchant trading associations engaging in foreign trade 
and exploration.229  In many instances, the institutions of these overseas 
traders were mere extensions of those of the urban mercantile communi-
ty.230 
Merchants forming a trading association might receive rights to form a 
gild-based company.231  Gilds trading beyond England’s natural boundaries 
were prevalent throughout the medieval, Tudor, and Stuart periods.  A 
common type of gild was the regulated gild.  The regulated gild, with its 
governor and assistants, was a descendant of the craft or gild merchant with 
its aldermen, wardens, and assistants.232  In the regulated gild, similar to the 
gild merchant, members enjoyed exclusive privileges and traded freely for 
their own profit subject to the regulations of the company.233 
The crown’s formation of the joint-stock company replaced the regu-
 
COLONIAL PERIOD] (trading companies and merchant adventurers); infra note 230 (mer-
chants trading overseas). 
 229. See infra notes 230, 240–42 and accompanying text (merchant associations follow-
ing municipal and gild governance models); see also 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at 155–57 
(discussing gilds and merchant companies, noting contrasting characteristics).  The term 
“merchant adventurer” came into use late in the fifteenth century and often refers to a for-
mal company.  DOUGLAS R. BISSON, THE MERCHANT ADVENTURERS OF ENGLAND: THE 
COMPANY AND CROWN 1474–1564, at 2–3 (1993); CARUS-WILSON, supra note 228, at xv–
xvi, 143–45 (defining term “merchant adventurer”).  For purposes of this Article, “merchant 
association” might refer to generic merchant adventurers, merchant societies and fellow-
ships, or a formal body of incorporated adventurers. 
 230. CARUS-WILSON, supra note 228, at xxx–iv (York, Bristol, London, and other cities 
had merchants trading overseas); id. at 147, 150, 151–56, 163–64 (role of London Mercers); 
id. at 175–76 (London’s influence regulating merchants overseas); 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, 
at 573 (London Mercers and other merchants formed merchant adventurers company).  By 
the close of the sixteenth century, several cities had branches of merchant adventurers.  2 id. 
at 254–58. 
 231. GEORGE CAWSTON & A.H. KEANE, THE EARLY CHARTERED COMPANIES (A.D. 1296–
1858), at 9–10, 13 (London, Edward Arnold 1896) (describing features of regulated gild). 
 232. CECIL T. CARR, SELECT CHARTERS OF TRADING COMPANIES A.D. 1530–1707, at xii 
(1913) (noting presence of municipal institutions in merchant charters); 1 SCOTT, supra note 
164, at 7 (describing evolution of regulated company from gild merchant); id. at 152 (joint-
stock and regulated companies share many of same governance features); see also infra 
notes 240–42 (describing governance functions shared by gild, regulated company, and 
joint-stock company). 
 233. CARUS-WILSON, supra note 228, at 162–64 (merchant adventurers amalgamated 
into regulated gild with members trading individually); CAWSTON & KEANE, supra note 231, 
at 10; 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 574, 575–76 (merchant associations were regulated com-
panies; restrictions against interlopers); 2 id. at 195–96. 
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lated gild.234  In the joint-stock company, subscribers bought and sold sub-
scriptions to the company in exchange for a proportionate share of the 
company’s profits.235  As a shareholder of the corporation, the owner had 
limited liability and could transfer his shares more freely.236 
Whether a regulated gild or a joint-stock company, merchant associa-
tions traveling abroad needed privileges and jurisdictional rights as they 
left their home ports.  Traveling merchants needed protection from inter-
lopers infringing on their trade monopoly and some form of authority from 
the king to travel and trade in a foreign land.237  The crown clothed these 
entities with privileges in exchange for services.238  Under similar condi-
tions, merchant associations also required and received privileges from the 
foreign state.239 
In the latter part of the thirteenth century, merchants were traveling 
abroad and receiving self-governance privileges similar to those received 
by gilds and boroughs.240  Charters allowed merchants to assemble, elect a 
 
 234. CARR, supra note 232, at xx–xxi (noting distinction between regulated gild and 
joint-stock company); CAWSTON & KEANE, supra note 231, at 9–10, 13 (comparing and con-
trasting the two types of companies); 2 LIPSON, supra note 71, at lvi–lx (case for and against 
regulated companies).  The Russia Company (Muscovy) founded in 1553 and chartered in 
1555 was the first formal joint-stock company for English merchants.  1 SCOTT, supra note 
164, at 17–18.  The joint-stock model was thought to be more suitable to adventurers far 
from port.  2 id. at 36 (discussing formation of Russia Company modeled on regulated com-
pany but with joint-stock rather than individual capital). 
 235. CAWSTON & KEANE, supra note 231, at 12. 
 236. Id. (full liability in regulated company but liability limited to amount of shares in 
joint-stock company).  Joint-stock corporations may have been more difficult to establish, 
but succession was easier and transfer of ownership was free of alienation, division, and in-
heritance issues accompanying a gild company or proprietorship. 
 237. CARR, supra note 232, at xv (noting royal permission was required to travel, trade 
overseas, and take resources out of realm).  The crown on occasion forbade merchants from 
traveling to certain countries.  GEORGE LOUIS BEER, THE ORIGINS OF THE BRITISH COLONIAL 
SYSTEM 1578–1660, at 16–17, 43 n.2 (1908) (citing body of law prohibiting English from 
traveling without license and noting adventurers’ desire for charter); id. at 328–29 (license 
required to migrate to colonies); CARUS-WILSON, supra note 228, at 137, 167. 
 238. CAWSTON & KEANE, supra note 231, at 2, 10–11; see also CARUS-WILSON, supra 
note 228, at xxvi (noting value of foreign merchants to crown); CUNNINGHAM, ALIEN 
IMMIGRANTS, supra note 173, at 197–98 (creation of civil status for merchant adventurers in 
foreign lands). 
 239. 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 511–12, 525–26, 535–40 (discussing treaty privileges 
and reciprocity between foreign hosts and England in trading privileges concerning mer-
chant adventurers); ANNE F. SUTTON & LIVIA VISSER-FUCHS, THE BOOK OF PRIVILEGES OF 
THE MERCHANT ADVENTURERS OF ENGLAND 1296–1483, at 1 (2009) (collection of privileges 
granted to merchant adventurers from leaders of Low Countries). 
 240. Characteristics of gild evolved into a form used by other merchant associations.  1 
SCOTT, supra note 164, at 7–9; C.P. LUCAS, THE BEGINNINGS OF ENGLISH OVERSEAS 
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governor, and exercise jurisdiction over themselves with leave of the host 
country.241  Clothed with royal privileges and immunities, the governor and 
court of assistants of the merchant association served as a legislative body 
with the power to make statutes, ordinances, and customs.242 
Whether reviewing domestic or overseas charters, concern for the wel-
fare of the greater body was a frequent theme of the era, and this concern 
manifested itself in merchant charters.243  Charters frequently added provi-
sions requiring merchants act “for better government.”244  Many felt that 
monopolistic conduct by merchants and gilds was detrimental to the com-
mon welfare of Englishmen and violated principles of English law.245  The 
crown and Parliament responded with regulations requiring that gild by-
 
ENTERPRISE: A PRELUDE TO THE EMPIRE 20 (1917) (overseas merchants received privileges 
similar to borough privileges); id. at 58, 142–43 (overseas trading company grew from mu-
nicipal gild); supra note 167. 
 241. In the late thirteenth century, a foreign host conceded to English merchants privi-
leges to associate, hold courts, and form assemblies.  1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 570–71.  
Shortly thereafter, overseas merchants received authority to elect a mayor.  CARR, supra 
note 232, at xi–xii (discussing a group of charters granting governance rights to overseas 
merchants at the turn of the fifteenth century); CARUS-WILSON, supra note 228, at xviii; 1 
LIPSON, supra note 71, at 571–72 (thirteenth- through fifteenth-century charters to mer-
chants allowing them to organize under mayor or governor).  Merchant adventurers trading 
in the Low Countries received a charter granting self-governance by common consent in 
1407.  LUCAS, supra note 240, at 149–51, 184–87 (under charter merchants may freely and 
lawfully assemble and elect among themselves fit governors and deputies to govern by 
common consent and reasonable statutes with authority over all English merchants in those 
parts); see also CARUS-WILSON, supra note 228, at xx; 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 571–72; 
1 SCOTT, supra note 164, at 8–9.  A subsequent 1505 charter placed governance of the mer-
chants in the Low Countries in a fixed body, removing government by common consent.  
See infra note 247. 
 242. See supra note 241. 
 243. The crown had a watchful eye on municipal and merchant corporations.  The crown 
often received complaints that membership to the merchant association was restricted and 
the company was operating to the disadvantage of the towns or a larger body.  2 GREEN, 
TOWN LIFE, supra note 43, at 136–39 (exploitation of poor commoner by merchants); Mary 
Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. 502, 518–26 (2006) 
(describing limitations on gild bylaws). 
 244. The phrase “for better government” (pro meliori gubernatione) was common in 
merchant and municipal charters.  CARR, supra note 232, at xi–xii (discussing charters se-
curing better governance for merchant associations traveling abroad).  Such a phrase was 
included in Richard II’s 1391 charter to the merchants of Prussia.  7 THOMAS RYMER, 
FOEDERA, CONVENTIONES, LITERAE 693–94 (1709); 1 SCOTT, supra note 164, at 8–9 (de-
scribing king’s grant to Prussian merchants and noting grantee’s expanded authority for 
governance of English merchants in jurisdiction but also highlighting restriction that ordi-
nances be “for better government”). 
 245. See supra notes 210, 243–44 and accompanying text. 
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laws serve the common profit of the people and dominant adventurers open 
trade to other merchants.246  A charter to merchant adventurers in 1505 
provided that no merchant statute, custom, or ordinance “shall be or may be 
contrary to us our Crowne, Honor, Dignity Royall or Prerogative or to the 
deminution of the Commonweale of our Realme.”247  These charter clauses 
for common welfare were representative of later colonial provisions requir-
ing that enacted colonial laws be agreeable and not repugnant to the laws of 
England.248 
With thriving foreign trade, England expanded its boundaries.  The 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were years of exploration as European in-
vestors and explorers were looking to new lands for new trade.249  Mer-
chants from Bristol and other ports frequently traded with Iceland and 
Greenland among other nations.250  Many voyagers had their sights set on 
exploring new waters for better fishing.251  Though uncertain of lands fur-
 
 246. LUCAS, supra note 240, at 68–70 (discussing late fifteenth-century legislation ad-
dressing intergild conflict within merchant adventurers trading overseas); see also supra 
note 210 (describing regulations that required gilds submit bylaws to town authorities for 
approval). 
 247. CAWSTON & KEANE, supra note 231, at 253; 1 SCOTT, supra note 164, at 10 (noting 
significance of this charter in granting expanded authority to regulate conduct of its mem-
bers).  The 1505 charter placed governance in an elected governor and “Four and Twenty of 
the most sadd discreet and honest Persons of divers Fellowships of the said Merchants Ad-
venturers” as assistants to rule for better government.  CAWSTON & KEANE, supra note 231, 
at 250−51.  While merchants’ 1407 charter established governance by common consent, the 
1505 charter placed better governance with an elected governor and assistants.  LUCAS, su-
pra note 240, at 71−73; see also SUTTON & VISSER-FUCHS, supra note 239, at 178−79, 
182−84 (discussing the king’s 1462 confirmation of merchants’ right to elect governors, rule 
the fellowship, and make regulations by common assent and for better governance—as long 
as such statutes and ordinances were not contrary, rebellious, or disobedient).  The griev-
ance that the company had fallen into neglect and disobedience because of non-attendance 
at assembly contributed to the change in government from common consent to the elected 
body.  LUCAS, supra note 240, at 72−73; see also CAWSTON & KEANE, supra note 231, at 
249−50, 252. 
 248. See infra notes 303, 312, 373 (providing examples of authority for colonial promot-
ers to pass laws provided they were agreeable or not repugnant to English laws). 
 249. DAVID B. QUINN, NORTH AMERICA FROM EARLIEST DISCOVERY TO FIRST 
SETTLEMENTS 41−70 (1977) [hereinafter QUINN, NORTH AMERICA]. 
 250. CARUS-WILSON, supra note 228, at 98 (Iceland); CARR, supra note 232, at xxvii 
(discussing modification of traditional merchant model to include discovery, conquest, and 
colonization of foreign lands); see also infra notes 251−52. 
 251. QUINN, NORTH AMERICA, supra note 249, at 60−64 (discussing English expansion 
overseas for fishing and discovery); see also CARUS-WILSON, supra note 228, at 97 (remark-
ing that Bristol merchants were pioneers of discovery; search for Isle of Brasile in 1480); 
JAMES A. WILLIAMSON, THE CABOT VOYAGES AND BRISTOL DISCOVERY UNDER HENRY VII, 
at 3 (1962). 
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ther west, explorers experimented with long-distance travel in search of re-
sources and treasures.252 
Exploring unknown lands was a mutually beneficial relationship be-
tween the explorer and the crown.  Explorers, at great risk, sought riches in 
discovered lands and received extensive privileges modeled on medieval 
feudal institutions.253  The crown, in turn, received new lands, increased 
trade, and a direct kickback of the profits of the venture.254  In the search 
for the New World, Spain claimed first place; Christopher Columbus suc-
cessfully discovered and documented his discovery of the West Indies in 
1492.255  Based in part upon this discovery, Spain attempted to claim exclu-
sive rights to a large portion of the Americas.256 
A.  1496 Charter to John Cabot 
King Henry the VII was not far behind Spain and Columbus when he 
authorized John Cabot to voyage and discover new lands for England.257  
Cabot, with the backing of Bristol merchants, received permission for ex-
ploration in the 1490s.258  The crown’s March 1496 charter to Cabot and 
 
 252. WILLIAMSON, supra note 251, at 3, 19, 29 (commenting on merchants from Bristol 
trading with Iceland and extending their voyages westward); see also CARR, supra note 232, 
at xxviii (western expansion of traditional merchant routes). 
 253. CHARLES VERLINDEN, THE BEGINNINGS OF MODERN COLONIZATION 167−69, 
189−90, 192, 196−97 (1970). 
 254. VERLINDEN, supra note 253, at 167−69, 189−90; see infra Part III.A–D. 
 255. QUINN, NORTH AMERICA, supra note 249, at 108−10. 
 256. Spain sought protection of its right with a papal donation.  QUINN, NORTH AMERICA, 
supra note 249, at 105; see infra note 258 (English exploration despite papal bull); see also 
HARRIS, supra note 37, at 62−64 (discussing doctrine that land which country discovered 
belonged to it). 
 257. Typical of British bureaucracy, exploration, especially exploration involving set-
tlement, required permission from the crown.  See QUINN, NORTH AMERICA, supra note 249, 
at 104–05; supra note 237. 
 258. See CARUS-WILSON, supra note 228, at xv (observing that Bristol merchants spon-
sored Cabot); QUINN, NORTH AMERICA, supra note 249, at 114−15, 121. 
  Henry VII, in granting the charter to Cabot, minimized the papal bull and the treaty 
between Spain and Portugal concerning discovered land.  1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, 
supra note 228, at 13−15 (England sent explorers despite papal bull); QUINN, NORTH 
AMERICA, supra note 249, at 105, 110−11, 127; WILLIAMSON, supra note 251, at 51−52 (set-
ting out for discovery of lands in North America despite Spain’s claim for exclusivity).  
England felt the papal bull did not prevent English colonization as colonization was author-
ized by the law of nations.  Following Cabot’s discovery, England claimed possession of 
North America.  E.G.R. TAYLOR, THE ORIGINAL WRITINGS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF THE 
TWO RICHARD HAKLUYTS (1935); id. at 423−24 (Doc. No. 72. Notes of R. Hakluyt); id. at 
487, 488 (Doc. No. 84, Richard Hakluyt’s 1603 note discussing right of English to explore 
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his sons, with the purpose of discovering land unknown to Christians, gave 
permission to travel from England with proper fittings and personnel.259  
The Cabots were given license to set up in the towns and cities of discov-
ered lands and to conquer their inhabitants.260  Cabot and his heirs would 
hold land as vassals and lieutenants—taking title, dominion, and jurisdic-
tion for the king and paying the king one-fifth the profits gained when they 
returned to the port of Bristol and sold their goods.261  On pain of interlop-
ers’ ships and provisions, Cabot, like typical merchant associations, had an 
exclusive monopoly of trade in the discovered lands.262 
Cabot found land in the New World and returned to England with the 
news.  Given his success, he planned a second voyage.  His second voyage, 
however, was unsuccessful, and he lost his life.263  Cabot’s son inherited 
his rights and continued exploration under the charter.264  Early explorer 
charters like Cabot’s did not provide significant means for internal govern-
ance, but subsequent charters addressed the defect and added the ability for 
merchants to establish laws for personnel and others. 
B.  1501 Charter to Richard Warde and Others 
Shortly after Cabot’s voyages, in March 1501, Henry VII granted to 
Richard Warde, Thomas Ashehurst, and John Thomas, of Bristol, and to 
John Fernandez, Francis Fernandez, and John Gonzales, of Portugal, unre-
stricted authority to sail with masters, mates, pages, and necessities to find 
and discover lands of heathens and infidels and to seize their castles, towns, 
and lands for the king.265  Warde and his group were to take and hold pos-
session of the castles and towns, maintaining the lands for the king in per-
 
and trade in Indies despite Spain’s presence); id. at 62, 497−99 (Doc. No. 88, Hakluyt advo-
cated for free seas). 
 259. 1 FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL 
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 45−47 (1909) (reproducing 1496 Cabot charter).  
Several statutes and royal proclamations forbade exporting specified items from England, 
but charters to explorers allowed travel with the necessary material and resources for colo-
nization.  BEER, supra note 237, at 105−06. 
 260. The fact that Cabot’s charter granted the right to conquer and subdue infidels re-
flects the general state of affairs during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.  WILLIAMSON, 
supra note 251, at 53; 1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 12−13 (discussing 
fifteenth-century papal authorization to conquer pagan countries). 
 261. 1 THORPE, supra note 259, at 46−47. 
 262. Id. 
 263. WILLIAMSON, supra note 251, at 95, 102. 
 264. Id. at 124, 145. 
 265. H.P. BIGGAR, THE PRECURSORS OF JACQUES CARTIER 1497–1534, at 50–51 (1911) 
(reproducing charter). 
47
Burrell: A Story of Privileges and Immunities: From Medieval Concept to th
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2011
BURRELL.DOCX 1/9/12  12:00 PM 
54 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:7 
petuity by fidelity alone without any other compensation being rendered 
but the dignity, dominion, regality, jurisdiction, and suzerainty of the 
crown.266 
Warde’s charter had a greater focus on settlement than Cabot’s.  In the 
discovered land, 
all and singular as well men as women of this our kingdom and the rest of 
our subjects, wishing and desiring to visit these lands and islands thus new-
ly found, and to inhabit the same, shall be allowed and have power to go 
freely and in safety to the same countries, islands, and places with their 
ships, men and servants, and all their goods and chattels . . . under the pro-
tection and government of [Warde and others.]267 
Warde and other voyagers had the ability to set up government and 
make laws, statutes, and proclamations for the “good and peaceful rule . . . 
of the said men, masters, sailors and other persons.”268  Warde had full 
power to appoint deputies for the administration of justice under the rule 
and government of the subjects according to the tenor and import of the or-
dinances, statutes, and customs they adopted.269 
As with the patentees of Cabot’s charter, Warde and others were given 
a monopoly of trade in discovered lands.270  Subjects traveling to the dis-
covered lands needed leave of Warde and the king.271  Warde and patentees 
were given permission to bring whatever was grown or found in discovered 
lands back to England to sell and distribute for their own gain notwith-
standing any statute, ordinance, or other restriction.272 
Warde’s charter specifically named foreign patentees from Portugal.273  
 
 266. Id. at 55. 
 267. Id. at 51.  Charters to future American colonies also granted the right for subjects, 
and aliens willing to become subjects, to travel to the colonies.  7 THORPE, supra note 259, 
at 3786 (1606 Virginia charter, subjects); id. at 3799 (1609 Virginia charter, subjects and 
strangers); 3 id. at 1855 (1629 Massachusetts charter, subjects and strangers). 
 268. BIGGAR, supra note 265, at 51.  Early sixteenth-century charters allowed grantees to 
exercise the Office of Admiral in the discovered territory with jurisdiction as in England.  
WILLIAMSON, supra note 251, at 125.  Warde and other patentees had “full power and au-
thority to do, exercise and carry out all and singular the things which pertain to the office of 
Admiral, according to the law and the naval custom obtaining in this our realm of England.”  
BIGGAR, supra note 265, at 55. 
 269. BIGGAR, supra note 265, at 55. 
 270. Id. at 52. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. at 52−54.  Under the patent, Warde and company had a relationship of trade with 
other merchants.  Merchants could bring imports back to England, paying customs and a 
fraction to the patentees.  Id.; 1 J.A. DOYLE, ENGLISH COLONIES IN AMERICA: VIRGINIA, 
MARYLAND, AND THE CAROLINAS 27 (New York, Henry Holt & Co. 1889). 
 273. BIGGAR, supra note 265, at 50, 56−57. 
48
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol34/iss1/3
BURRELL.DOCX 1/9/12  12:00 PM 
2011] A STORY OF PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 55 
Aliens would not fall under the protection of the crown, and their posses-
sions in foreign lands were vulnerable to pirates and natives.274  By English 
law at this time, aliens faced restrictions in ownership and inheritance of 
land, use of courts, and trading privileges.275  Only English subjects with 
license could carry goods to and from the new land, and aliens attempting 
to land without permission could be punished at the discretion of the pa-
tentees.276  Addressing these disabilities, Warde’s charter contained a deni-
zation clause.277  Henry VII’s Charter granted to 
born subjects of the king of Portugal, and to any one of them whomsoever, 
that they and any one of them and all their children, as well born as to be 
born, are for ever subjects and lieges of us and of our heirs, and in all law-
suits, quarrels, affairs and matters whatsoever are to be considered, treated, 
held, esteemed and governed as our true and faithful lieges born within our 
realm of England, and not otherwise nor in any other way.  And that they 
and all their children aforesaid, and any one of them whomsoever, may car-
ry on and bring real, personal and mixed actions in all courts, places and ju-
risdictions of ours whatsoever in all ways, and may use and benefit by the-
se, and may sue and be sued in the same, answer and be answered to, 
 
 274. Without the crown’s protection, patentees and their possessions overseas were lia-
ble to be plundered at will by foreigners and others.  See infra notes 310−11 and accompa-
nying text (pirates and Gilbert’s charter). 
 275. CLIVE PARRY, NATIONALITY AND CITIZENSHIP LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND 
OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND 29−30 (1957) (commenting that aliens faced limitations in 
holding and inheriting land, limitations in use of courts, and discrimination in trade); 1 
POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 459 (discussing alienage in England); see also 
NORMAN SCOTT BRIEN GRAS, THE EARLY ENGLISH CUSTOMS SYSTEM 66−77, 79−80, 82−83, 
110, 131−32 (1918) (discussing different customs for aliens and denizens); 9 HOLDSWORTH, 
supra note 173, at 93−94, 98 (examining alienage in England); JAMES H. KETTNER, THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 1608−1870, at 5−6, 30−31 (1978) (noting that 
alien discriminations first began with hostilities toward other nations; most important ele-
ment of denization was removal of property disabilities); WILLIAM A. SHAW, LETTERS OF 
DENIZATION AND ACTS OF NATURALIZATION FOR ALIENS IN ENGLAND AND IRELAND 1603–
1700, at v–vi (1911) (observing that alien customs were double what natives paid).  Restrict-
ing alien trade in the colonies was a theme throughout the colonial experience.  See general-
ly 4 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228 (discussing England’s commercial poli-
cies toward colonies); BEER, supra note 237, at 220−27, 237, 272, 374, 384−400 (following 
merchant charters granting exclusive monopoly privileges in specified territories, England 
granted monopoly privileges in colonies and excluded or restricted foreigners from trade 
with colonies). 
 276. BIGGAR, supra note 265, at 54 (aliens without leave of patentees could be expelled 
or punished at discretion of patentees); 1 DOYLE, supra note 272, at 27. 
 277. Technically, at least as the rule of law developed, only the crown was authorized to 
grant denization.  By the seventeenth century, an act of Parliament was needed to naturalize 
or give an alien full citizenship.  9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 173, at 76–77; 1 POLLOCK & 
MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 460. 
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defend them and be defended in all things and everywhere as our true and 
faithful lieges born within our realm aforesaid.  And that they, and any one 
of them whosoever, may examine, take, receive, own, hold, possess and in-
herit for himself, his heirs and assigns, in perpetuity or in any other way 
whosoever, lands tenements, rents, . . . and other possessions.278 
In other words, those endenized by the charter and their children 
may and can have and possess all things and all other liberties, privileges, 
franchises and customs, and may use and enjoy them, and any one of them 
may so do, within our said realm of England, our jurisdictions and domin-
ions whatsoever, as freely, quietly, fully and peacefully as the rest of our 
lieges, born within our said realm generally hold, use and enjoy them, or 
ought and should hold, possess, use and enjoy them; any statute, act, ordi-
nance, or any other cause, affair or matter notwithstanding.279 
These Portuguese individuals were granted citizenship throughout the 
realm and freed from most alien disabilities.280  By charter, the foreign pa-
tentees trading with Warde were not to be forced or compelled to pay, give, 
or render anything other than the taxes or tallages the faithful lieges born 
within the realm pay.281  In line with a custom also present in English mu-
nicipalities, the crown’s charter further required that the endenized Portu-
guese pay homage and be lot and scot with other dues and customs payable 
in the realm in the same manner as other lieges born in the kingdom.282  
The crown, cognizant of revenue needs and abuse by foreign merchants, 
often retained limitations in its denization charters.  Under the 1501 charter, 
the endenized Portuguese had to pay alien customs and other dues on goods 
brought into the realm as foreigners would pay.283 
 
 278. BIGGAR, supra note 265, at 56−57.  Common alien disabilities included restrictions 
on the ability to hold lands and limitations on the ability to use the courts for certain actions.  
See supra note 275. 
 279. BIGGAR, supra note 265, at 57. 
 280. During the late medieval period, the crown often granted group denizations to those 
in a particular industry of service to the crown.  PARRY, supra note 275, at 37−38. 
 281. BIGGAR, supra note 265, at 57. 
 282. Id. at 57−58; see also supra note 169 (discussing lot and scot requirement for 
gildsmen in boroughs). 
 283. BIGGAR, supra note 265, at 57; SHAW, supra note 275, at v−viii (examining early 
instances where king’s patent created distinctions between naturalization and denization by 
reserving alien customs to punish denizens for cheating the king of customs by entering 
goods for non-denizens).  Following royal precedents, Parliament provided in 1485 that den-
izens, despite generic charter language, should pay aliens customs and subsidies unless ex-
pressly exempted.  1485, 1 Hen. 7 c. 2; GEORGE HANSARD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW 
RELATING TO ALIENS, AND DENIZATION AND NATURALIZATION 10−12 (London, V. & R. Ste-
vens & G.S. Norton 1844); KETTNER, supra note 275, at 34; see also infra note 284 (noting 
that denizations should contain express rather than generic exemptions). 
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After specifying certain rights for foreign patentees, Henry VII’s char-
ter bestowed the liberties, privileges, and customs (within England and the 
dominions) as “freely, quietly, fully and peacefully as the rest of our lieges, 
born within our said realm.”284  Both clauses appear to be a basic grant of 
denization for foreign patentees and their children.285  The patentees were 
to be English subjects, specifically with rights to hold and enjoy land and to 
use the courts.  Independent and conceptually separate from the privileges 
and immunities clauses, the crown granted, among other rights, the right to 
travel, monopolies in trade, and the right to exercise self-governance in the 
newly discovered lands.286 
Henry VII’s 1501 Charter to Warde, granting rights to travel, discover, 
set up government, and enjoy exclusive trading rights, served as a model 
for charters to explorers in the sixteenth century.287  The year following the 
issue of the 1501 charter, Henry VII granted a similar charter to mostly the 
same patentees with a few material changes, one of which was the removal 
of the obligation for the Portuguese patentees to pay alien customs.288 
With the loss of Cabot and failed explorations thereafter, England re-
treated some from pursuits of discovery.289  Henry VII was interested in 
discovery but Henry VIII was less interested.  During the middle of the six-
teenth century, England faced bigger problems and did not fully take ad-
 
 284. BIGGAR, supra note 265, at 57.  Broad denization language should not be presumed 
to have removed all alienage disabilities unless the crown expressly provided such exemp-
tions in the charter.  In 1540, Parliament expressed its concern over denizens avoiding cer-
tain restrictions by claiming generic exemptions.  1540, 32 Hen. 8 c. 16 (denizations remov-
ing particular alienage disabilities should contain express rather than generic exemptions). 
 285. This form of denization follows a form common in the sixteenth century.  WILLIAM 
PAGE, LETTERS OF DENIZATION AND ACTS OF NATURALIZATION FOR ALIENS IN ENGLAND 
1509–1603, at ii−iv (Lymington, Chas. T. King 1893) (including denizens’ right to sue and 
be sued; to buy, sell, hold, and enjoy real estate; not to be compelled to pay more taxes, tal-
lages, customs, or subsidies for merchandize exported out of or imported into England; and 
to enjoy all liberties, franchises, and privileges as freely and peacefully as other lieges born 
in England, any statute to the contrary notwithstanding). 
 286. See supra notes 262, 268−69, 271−72 and accompanying text. 
 287. CARR, supra note 232, at xxix−xxx (discussing 1501 and 1502 charters as precur-
sors to 1555 charter to Fellowship of English Merchants for Discovery of New Trades 
(Muscovy or Russia Company)). The Russia Company enjoyed similar municipal privileges 
as other merchant associations.  Id. at xxx−xxxi; see also supra notes 234, 242.  Kingsbury 
described the Russia Company’s charter as the transition point between the explorer model 
and the colonial model.  1 SUSAN MYRA KINGSBURY, THE RECORDS OF THE VIRGINIA 
COMPANY OF LONDON 11−16 (1906). 
 288. BIGGAR, supra note 265, at 81; CARR, supra note 232, at xxix (noting expanded 
rights of discovery and conquest in 1502 charter); 1 DOYLE, supra note 272, at 28; 
WILLIAMSON, supra note 251, at 132−33 (discussing changes in 1502 charter). 
 289. QUINN, NORTH AMERICA, supra note 249, at 135. 
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vantage of the colonization of the New World.290  Any lapse by the English 
was made up by the efforts of other European nations, especially Spain.291 
C.  1578 Charter to Sir Humphrey Gilbert 
Events in Ireland in the latter half of the sixteenth century reinvigorat-
ed England’s colonization efforts.292  Developing a colonization philosophy 
in Ireland fueled similar efforts in North America.293  The initial objective 
for colonization of the New World was not to create the United States but 
rather a means of trade and revenue and restraining the power of the Span-
ish overseas.294  Many of the figures leading American colonization had a 
start in the colonization of Ireland.295 
Sir Humphrey Gilbert recognized the value of colonization, and from 
his significant experience in Ireland, he devised a scheme for colonization 
of America.296  Colonization, like exploration, was mutually beneficial for 
 
 290. 1 DOYLE, supra note 272, at 29, 31−32. 
 291. The early and middle parts of the sixteenth century were filled with other European 
successes and failures in exploration and discovery.  Spain and other European nations made 
major inroads into the exploration of Florida, Mexico, and South America. 
 292. During this period, England was forced to deal with the Irish, and colonization was 
offered as a means of adding stability.  NICHOLAS P. CANNY, THE ELIZABETHAN CONQUEST 
OF IRELAND: A PATTERN ESTABLISHED 1565–1576, at 49−52 (1976) (English officials in-
stalled presidencies in Ireland with the hope of undermining Irish palatinates).  This system 
had been successful in Wales to reduce the power of the Marcher Lords.  Id. at 51, 93, 
97−99; J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW 59−60 (1987). 
 293. CANNY, supra note 292, at 92; David B. Quinn, Sir Thomas Smith (1513−1577) and 
the Beginnings of English Colonial Theory, 89 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC. 543, 548 n.19, 558 
(1945) (noting similarities between Sir Humphrey Gilbert’s efforts in America and his ef-
forts in Ireland). 
 294. TAYLOR, supra note 258, at 163−64 (letter from Hakluyt the younger discussing 
break up of Spain’s power). 
 295. Howard Mumford Jones, Origins of the Colonial Idea in England, 85 PROC. AM. 
PHIL. SOC. 448, 457, 463−65 (1942); see also MARY DEWAR, SIR THOMAS SMITH 158, 
169−70 (1964); Hiram Morgan, The Colonial Venture of Sir Thomas Smith in Ulster 
1571−1575, 28 HIST. J. 261, 275 (1985). 
 296. 1 DAVID B. QUINN, THE VOYAGES AND COLONISING ENTERPRISES OF SIR HUMPHREY 
GILBERT 9, 12–19 (1940) [hereinafter QUINN, VOYAGES]; see also DEWAR, supra note 295, 
at 157 (Gilbert in Ireland).  Efforts at colonizing a foreign land were expensive.  The crown, 
interested in reducing public debt, did not want to pay the cost for colonization.  Colonial 
promoters willing to put up their own costs wanted something in exchange, and they peti-
tioned for monopolies and privileges to this end.  CANNY, supra note 292, at 80–82; id. at 82 
(while seeking privileges in Ireland, colonists were looking to retain their rights as English-
men so they could return at will to England and not be considered banished men); see also 
supra notes 253–54 (land and privileges in exchange for discovery and colonization); infra 
note 308 (concerns over retaining English allegiance for property and inheritance rights). 
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the crown and promoter.  Promoters were out for adventure and profit, and 
the crown was interested in sharing profits and siphoning the success of 
other European nations in foreign trade.297 
Following advances by other explorers, in 1578, Queen Elizabeth 
granted a charter or letter patent to Gilbert for discovery and colonization 
of North America.298  Similar to the charters granted to voyagers before 
him, the crown granted Gilbert the right to discover and conquer lands, 
countries, and territories not possessed by Christian princes.299  Gilbert’s 
charter followed a similar homage and one-fifth payment of discovered ore 
in exchange for services as found in Cabot’s charter.300  Expanding upon 
earlier charters to Cabot and Warde, Gilbert and his assigns were granted 
all rights, royalties, and jurisdictions of discovered lands, castles, and vil-
lages.301 
Gilbert and assigns, and others so licensed by Gilbert and the crown, 
had permission to travel and occupy the discovered lands, other laws pro-
hibiting or limiting the travel of would-be colonists notwithstanding.302  
Gilbert enjoyed all royalties and jurisdictions of the soil and was permitted 
to settle lands to persons and subjects in allegiance to the crown, with full 
power to dispose “in fee simple or otherwise, according to the order of the 
laws of England, as near as the same conveniently may be, at his, and their 
will and pleasure.”303  Gilbert was given the right to defend his possession 
and exclusive rights of controlling settlement, both to the exclusion of Brit-
ish subjects and others within 200 leagues of his location.304  Gilbert had 
authority and power to seize vessels and possessions of those infringing 
upon his monopoly.305  To promote amity and unity, the Queen declared 
 
 297. Jones, supra note 295, at 460 (thwarting Spain’s success motivated American colo-
nization). 
 298. 1 THORPE, supra note 259, at 49 (letter patent to Sir Humfrey Gylberte, June 11, 
1578).  Sir Humphrey Gilbert had long been interested in seeking out the Northwest Pas-
sage.  See 1 QUINN, VOYAGES, supra note 296, at 129−64 (Gilbert’s pamphlet on Northwest 
Passage).  As early as 1567, Gilbert sought privileges to establish an American trading post 
and serve as governor.  1 SCOTT, supra note 164, at 71. 
 299. 1 THORPE, supra note 259, at 49 (using the broader language “not actually pos-
sessed” as opposed to narrower “unknown” from earlier explorer charters). 
 300. Id. at 50; 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 6−7. 
 301. 1 THORPE, supra note 259, at 49−50. 
 302. Royal charters permitted travel notwithstanding several laws restricting English 
from traveling.  See supra notes 237, 257, 267. 
 303. 1 THORPE, supra note 259, at 50. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. (discussing monopoly in charter).  The seizure power did not apply to subjects 
and others in amity lost by shipwreck, etc.  Id. 
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that the lands and territories discovered by Gilbert and heirs would be in 
allegiance with England.306  By the Queen’s charter 
wee doe graunt to the sayd sir Humfrey his heires and assignes, and to all 
and every of them, and to all and every other person and persons, being of 
our allegiance, whose names shall be noted or entred in some of our courts 
of Record, within this our Realme of England, and that with the assent of 
the said sir Humfrey, his heires or assigns, shall nowe in this journey for 
discoverie, or in the second journey for conquest hereafter, travel to such 
lands, countries and territories as aforesaid, and to their and every of their 
heires: that they and every or any of them being either borne within our 
sayd Realmes of England or Ireland, or within any other place with our al-
legiance, and which hereafter shall be inhabiting within any the lands, 
countreys and territories, with such license as aforesayd, shall and may 
have, and enjoy all the priveleges of free denizens and persons native of 
England and within our allegeaunce [in suche like ample manner and four-
me as if they were borne and personally resiaunte within our said realme of 
England] any law, custome, or usage to the contrary notwithstanding.307 
This was a guarantee of denization status for Gilbert, his crew, and 
any who traveled to the discovered lands, and their heirs, provided they 
were in allegiance with the crown.308  This section of Gilbert’s charter 
might have been a modification of the denization section in Warde’s char-
ter.309  Warde’s grant seemed to have the objective of granting denization to 
the Portuguese for the purpose of residing in England.  In addition to the 
trading privileges accompanying denization, Gilbert’s charter seemed to 
have the intention of safeguarding English citizenship overseas.310  This 
 
 306. Id.  The Spanish applied the theory of granting conquered natives allegiance (like 
Rome to other provinces) to help reduce conflict.  VERLINDEN, supra note 253, at 40−41 (as-
similation strategies of Spanish conquerors).  Conquered Indians were subjects of the crown 
and were guaranteed certain freedoms such as travel and protection of goods.  Id. at 41. 
 307. 1 THORPE, supra note 259, at 51.  Quinn observed that the version used by Thorpe 
omitted a few words from the last clause. 1 QUINN, VOYAGES, supra note 296, at 190−91. 
 308. Inheritance rights of children born overseas historically presented a problem for 
English subjects and authorities.  KIM, supra note 75, at 103−25; PARRY, supra note 275, at 
30−34.  Retaining allegiance with England was important for the colonies as a number of 
influential colonists owned land in England or expected to inherit land and wanted to retain 
English citizenship for inheritance purposes.  BEER, supra note 237, at 325−28 (noting dis-
advantages of independence in early seventeenth century); see also supra note 296 (con-
cerns of English colonists losing Englishmen status in Ireland). 
 309. See supra Part III.B (Warde’s alien patentees). 
 310. Following charters securing the privileges and immunities of denizens and English 
citizenship to Warde and Gilbert, subsequent royal charters to most of the American colo-
nies contained similar language.  The 1606 Virginia Charter included language that subjects, 
and children born of such subjects, dwelling in the colonies shall have the “Liberties, Fran-
chises, and Immunities, within any of our other Dominions, to all Intents and Purposes,” as 
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might be because Gilbert’s colonization effort was intended to be more 
permanent.  Also, Gilbert and company probably required heightened pro-
tection of English citizenship from the pirates of the era.311 
After securing denization privileges, Gilbert’s charter, like charters to 
other merchant associations, provided that Gilbert and his company may 
establish government and enact laws as necessary for the safety of the men.  
Gilbert and company 
have full and meere power and authoritie to correct, punish, pardon, 
governe and rule by their, and every or any of their good discretions and 
 
if they had been born in England or any of the other dominions.  7 THORPE, supra note 259, 
at 3788 (1606 Charter); id. at 3800 (1609 Charter).  Massachusetts’s 1629 charter provided 
that all “the Subjects of Vs . . . which shall goe to and inhabite within the saide Landes . . . 
and every of their Children which shall happen to be borne there, or on the Seas in goeing 
thither, or retorning from thence, shall have and enjoy all liberties and Immunities of free 
and naturall Subjects within any of the Domynions of Vs.”  3 id. at 1857 (1629 Massachu-
setts Charter).  Similarly, Baltimore’s 1632 Charter, to encourage settlement and protect the 
colonists from savages and pirates, granted to Baltimore the ability to allow settlers to trav-
el, form a colony, and build forts to defend themselves.  3 id. at 1681.  Those traveling to 
Maryland under Baltimore’s charter, and their children, were  “Natives and Liege Men of 
Us . . . of our Kingdom of England and Ireland; and in all Things shall be held, treated, re-
puted, and esteemed as the faithful Liege-Men of Us . . . born within our Kingdom of Eng-
land” and permitted to inherit, buy, possess, sell, use and enjoy lands, tenements, revenues, 
and services “within our Kingdom of England, and other our Dominions” and enjoy “all 
Privileges, Franchises and Liberties of this our Kingdom of England” as other liege men.  
Id. (Baltimore’s 1632 charter).  Similar language is found in the New England Council’s 
1620 charter.  3 id. at 1839 (stating that subjects going to inhabit the colony, and their chil-
dren born there, shall have the liberties, franchises, and immunities of free denizens and 
natural subjects within any English dominion as if born in England or the dominions). 
 311. 1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 25; BEER, supra note 237, at 
18−25 (difficulties in colonization effort because of constant threat of foreign attack); 1 
SCOTT, supra note 164, at 49, 71–73 (describing frequent plunders and seizures by Spanish 
and English privateersmen).  Non-English, not in allegiance and treated as aliens, were not 
protected as subjects.  Gilbert’s charter contained a threat of being cast out of allegiance if 
Gilbert abused his charter.  1 THORPE, supra note 259, at 52 (“free for all princes and others 
to pursue with hostilitie as being not our Subjects, nor by us any way to be advowed, main-
tained or defended, nor to be holden as any of ours, nor to our protection, dominion or alle-
giance”).  Because the patentees of Gilbert’s voyage were denizens and treated as subjects, 
they received protection and were free of alien disabilities.  Hakluyt, in his Discourse on 
Western Planting, described an attribute of exploration and colonization: 
ffynally their shippes, their goodds, and their persons shoulde not be subjecte to 
soodden arrestes of straungers as they are in all other trades of Christendome: but 
shoulde enjoye as greate freedome, libertie, and securitie as they usually doo in 
their native Contrie, the havens, Townes, and villages in those partes being occu-
pied and possessed by their fellowe subjects. Wch freedome and libertie will 
greatly incourage them to contynewe constantly in this newe traficque. 
TAYLOR, supra note 258, at 273. 
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policies, as well in causes capitall or criminal, as civill, both marine and 
other, all such our subjects and others, as shall from time to time hereafter 
adventure themselves in the sayd journey . . . according to such statutes, 
lawes and ordinaces, as shall be by him the said sir Humfrey, his heirs and 
assignes, or every, or any of them, devised or established for the better 
government of the said people as aforesayd: so always that the sayd stat-
utes, lawes and ordinances may be as neere as conveniently may, agreeable 
to the forme of the lawes & policy of England.312 
Gilbert’s first voyage was unsuccessful.313  For his second voyage, 
Gilbert and subpatentees planned the colonization effort in more detail.  
Gilbert raised funds by selling interests and forming a company of mer-
chant adventurers, the “Merchant Adventurers with Sir Humphrey Gilbert,” 
who would receive membership and land for their contributions.314  Under 
Gilbert’s scheme, grants varied in privileges ranging from those of a palati-
nate to those of simple manors depending upon the amount of the contribu-
tion.315  Gilbert planned to reward his friends and investors by allowing 
them to create subordinate proprietorships with ample jurisdictions but sub-
ject to a quit rent payable to Gilbert.316  The colonization scheme also pro-
vided instructions for government.  Gilbert’s plan included a governor and 
council chosen by members.317  Following examples imposed on gilds and 
merchant associations, judgments were to follow as near as possible to the 
laws of England.318  Gilbert set sail a second time in 1583.  After landing in 
Newfoundland, Gilbert claimed the lands for the crown and sailed back 
 
 312. 1 THORPE, supra note 259, at 51. 
 313. 1 QUINN, VOYAGES, supra note 296, at 40, 44. 
 314. 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 9−11 (Gilbert’s colonization scheme granting land and 
jurisdiction for contributions); see also CARR, supra note 232, at xxxiv−v (discussing Gil-
bert voyages); 1 QUINN, VOYAGES, supra note 296, at 7−11 (noting early suggestions for 
colonizing America and request for extensive privileges in attempt to discover Northwest 
Passage); id. at 55−62 (describing commercial uses for Gilbert’s charter privileges). 
 315.  Gilbert and assigns divided out seignories based on the amount of contribution: 
100£ and ten men would get 10,000 acres with powers and jurisdictions as large as exist in 
England; 50£ and 20 men would receive 1,000 acres with the same privileges; those con-
tributing lesser amounts received rights of court baron and court leet.  1 QUINN, VOYAGES, 
supra note 296, at 258−60. 
 316. 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 10−11; 1 QUINN, VOYAGES, supra note 296, at 59−60, 
245−57 (agreements between Gilbert and assigns for land and rights in North America un-
der Gilbert’s patent). 
 317. 1 QUINN, VOYAGES, supra note 296, at 59 (councilors chosen by members). 
 318. Id. at 259 (agreements of Gilbert’s subpatentees); see also supra notes 210, 243−48 
and accompanying text (concern for better government and welfare of larger body). 
56
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol34/iss1/3
BURRELL.DOCX 1/9/12  12:00 PM 
2011] A STORY OF PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 63 
home.319  He lost his life in the return voyage.320 
D.  1584 Charter to Sir Walter Raleigh 
Sir Walter Raleigh, a one-half brother of Gilbert, inherited Gilbert’s 
rights under his charter.321  Raleigh’s 1584 charter authorized him to have, 
hold, occupy, and enjoy all prerogatives, commodities, jurisdictions, royal-
ties, privileges, and franchises both by land and sea, “whatsoeuer we by our 
letters patents may graunt, and as we or any of our noble progenitors haue 
heretofore graunted to any person or persons, bodies politique or corpo-
rate.”322  Raleigh sought confirmation of his charter privileges by Parlia-
ment.  Parliament initially supported the charter, but then drew grievances 
concerning granting licenses to convicts to leave the country to settle the 
new land.323  Eventually, Parliament dropped consideration of the bill, and 
Raleigh and his adventurers were forced to rely solely on the royal preroga-
tive.324 
Raleigh landed at Roanoke Island, which he named Virginia in honor 
of the Queen.325  The government was to be run like a borough, and those 
free of the company could trade with Raleigh’s other settlements free of 
 
 319. Gilbert landed in Newfoundland, took possession of the land in the presence of the 
other nations, and, having produced his commission, enacted three laws:  (1) public exercise 
of religion should be according to the Church of England; (2) if anything be done prejudicial 
to her Majesty, the offender shall be executed as in a case of high treason, according to the 
laws of England; (3) if any person utter words to the dishonor of her Majesty, he should lose 
his ears, and his ships and goods should be confiscated.  1 DOYLE, supra note 272, at 50.  
After foreigners and English swore obedience, Gilbert granted large tracts of land in New-
foundland in fee farm for a yearly rent.  Id. at 50; 1 QUINN, VOYAGES, supra note 296, at 86. 
 320. 1 DOYLE, supra note 272, at 51–52. 
 321. CARR, supra note 232, at xxxvi−vii; 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 14; 1 QUINN, 
VOYAGES, supra note 296, at 95–96.  Raleigh did not receive Gilbert’s monopoly in New-
foundland.  Id. at 96. 
 322. 1 THORPE, supra note 259, at 53 (1584 letter patent to Sir Walter Raleigh).  Similar 
to later grants, Raleigh essentially received privileges as extensive as the privileges granted 
to the Bishop of Durham.  See supra notes 62–69 (palatinate of Durham); infra Part IV.C 
(discussing Durham references in colonial charters to proprietors). 
 323. David B. Quinn, Preparations for the 1585 Voyage, 6 WM. & MARY Q. 3d 208, 
228−32 (1949).  Raleigh may have been persuaded to seek parliamentary confirmation 
based on the Russia Company’s confirmation, which had the additional effect of discourag-
ing infringement upon Russia Company’s privileges.  2 SCOTT, supra note 164, at 41.  Early 
rationales for colonial settlement included reducing overcrowding and ridding England of 
excess poor and criminals.  BEER, supra note 237, at 42 n.2; 1 DOYLE, supra note 272, at 47, 
146, 201−02; QUINN, NORTH AMERICA, supra note 249, at 537. 
 324. Quinn, supra note 323, at 232. 
 325. 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 15; Quinn, supra note 323, at 232. 
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rents, subsidies, duties, and customs.326  Raleigh’s colonization efforts 
failed; several attempted to settle under Raleigh’s charter, but settlers either 
returned to England or were lost to the Indians.327 
IV. COLONIAL AMERICA 
Following the exploration and settlement efforts of Gilbert and Ra-
leigh, colonization of America was a permanent fixture of England’s state 
policy.  By charter, the crown authorized colonial promoters, investors and 
proprietors, to organize and establish colonies and bear the risk and reward 
of the venture.328  Borrowing from English institutions, the model Tudor 
charter to adventurers was the feudum or fief to a proprietor.329  Under the 
Stuarts, for a time, colonization took place through the “Governor and 
Company” of the trading company before returning to the proprietorship.330  
When the colonies became settled, there were three general forms: the pro-
prietary colony, the corporate colony, and the royal colony.331  With few 
exceptions, these colonies were managed by the crown or a promoter resid-
ing in England.332 
A.  Virginia and Royal Colonies 
Tracing the progress of earlier efforts by Gilbert and Raleigh, several 
influential nobles and merchants pooled interest in North America and 
 
 326. 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 21. 
 327. Quinn, supra note 323, at 208. 
 328. 3 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 167−69 (discussing financing of colonization efforts); 1 
OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 3−4, 25 (discussing the same).  Spain colonized directly; France 
and England colonized through companies.  QUINN, NORTH AMERICA, supra note 249, at 
105−06. 
 329. BEER, supra note 237, at 299−300 (listing several colonial proprietorships); 1 
OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 3−4; see also infra Part IV.C (return to proprietorship). 
 330. 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 3–4 (discussing temporary use of trading companies as 
promoters).  For a detailed account of joint-stock companies in English trade and coloniza-
tion, see SCOTT, supra note 164; 1 id. at 150−51 (noting standard “governor and company” 
nomenclature of joint-stock company). 
 331. Some historians categorize the colonies into two classes, the provincial and corpo-
rate—the province consisting of royal colonies and proprietorships.  ALPHEUS H. SNOW, THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF DEPENDENCIES 96 (1902). 
 332. The mother corporation or body of investors provided resources and instructions for 
the management of colonial affairs.  1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 141; see also 1 ANDREWS, 
COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 390 (pointing out that Massachusetts was an exception 
to the class of trading corporations resident in England).  Governance over companies and 
proprietors residing in England was easier because of the proximity to English authority.  
See 3 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 25. 
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formed a company for trade and colonization.333  In 1606, King James I 
granted the investors a charter.334  The location of the venture focused pri-
marily on the middle route of Raleigh’s Roanoke settlement, but there was 
also interest in the northern route for fishing (New England).335 
Under the 1606 charter, investors colonizing Virginia formed two 
companies, the London and Plymouth Divisions.336  These divisions were 
under the control of a dual council system: a superior council in England 
and a local council residing in each of the divisions.337  Because of harsh 
conditions, minimal colonization, factionalism, and the fact that grants of 
additional land required additional charters, the dual council system even-
tually failed.338  In 1609, the planters and adventurers of Virginia, influ-
enced by and obtaining investment from London companies, received a se-
cond charter incorporating as a joint-stock company, the “Treasurer and 
 
 333. QUINN, NORTH AMERICA, supra note 249, at 403 (discussing Virginia Company’s 
formation by those interested in North America); WESLEY FRANK CRAVEN, DISSOLUTION OF 
THE VIRGINIA COMPANY: THE FAILURE OF A COLONIAL EXPERIMENT 25−26 (1964) [hereinaf-
ter CRAVEN, DISSOLUTION] (commenting on Virginian adventurers’ ties to London mer-
chants and other merchant associations).  For documents on planting in Virginia, see 
ALEXANDER BROWN, THE GENESIS OF THE UNITED STATES (Boston, Houghton Mifflin & Co. 
1890). 
 334. The Virginia charter followed closely on the success of the Governor and Company 
of Merchants of London trading in the East Indies (East India Company).  2 SCOTT, supra 
note 164, at 91−93.  The East India Company was formed by London merchants as an in-
corporated joint-stock company in 1600.  Id. 
 335. The London division was interested in the South, and the Plymouth division was 
interested in the North.  QUINN, NORTH AMERICA, supra note 249, at 403. 
 336. The two divisions were forbidden to settle next to each other but were to share fish-
ing privileges within each other’s limits.  7 THORPE, supra note 259, at 3785 (100 mile buff-
er between divisions); 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 98; see also supra note 335.  The Plym-
outh adventure faced setbacks and did not successfully plant a colony under the charter.  1 
ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 90−94. 
 337. BROWN, supra note 333, at 66−67 (1606 instructions discussing council system un-
der charter); 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 28.  The supreme council consisted of royal nomi-
nees with a great deal of authority over the colony.  Local councils retained some control 
over internal affairs, but the king gave directions on how those powers should be imple-
mented.  In a sense, the 1606 charter formed a mixed type of government: part proprietary 
through company, part royal through instructions.  1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 28−29.  For 
more detail on Virginia’s initial settlement, see the instructions accompanying the 1606 
charter.  BROWN, supra note 333, at 64−75. 
 338. 1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 100−03 (harsh conditions, fac-
tionalism, and mismanagement prompted 1609 charter); 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 26 
(under 1606 charter the company could not grant land, instead king granted lands through 
additional grants); id. at 56 (defects under 1606 charter); 2 SCOTT, supra note 164, at 249 
(explaining that lack of colonization results provided reason for 1609 charter of incorpora-
tion as joint-stock company). 
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Company of Adventurers and Plantations of the City of London, for the 
First Colony in Virginia.”339  The 1609 charter helped some, but the colony 
still faced problems.  A follow up charter in 1612 granted more self-
governance to the Virginia Company, which met in periodic courts 
throughout the year.340 
Despite these modifications, the company’s existing scheme was no 
longer adequate.341  Redefining its governance, the Virginia Company add-
ed to the colony’s local administration and established uniform government 
throughout the territory.342  Under its new government, Virginia’s local as-
sembly consisted of the governor, a council, and a representative assembly 
of burgesses chosen by the planters of the towns, cities, hundreds, and plan-
tations.343  In 1619, the first Virginian assembly met pursuant to instruc-
tions from the Company.344 
The many changes made to the Virginia Company in its early years 
were ultimately unsuccessful.  Following general mismanagement and con-
flict with the Indians, in 1623 the Privy Council recommended the king re-
sume Virginia’s charter privileges, and thereafter the crown brought quo 
 
 339. 7 THORPE, supra note 259, at 3795; see also 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 57−59 
(full incorporation as joint-stock company with power to grant lands); SNOW, supra note 
331, at 54−55 (discussing 1609 charter and influence of London companies in incorporated 
company). 
 340. 7 THORPE, supra note 259, at 3802, 3805.  The Treasurer met with a small number 
of the Council and generality once a week or more often as needed to handle routine affairs.  
The Company met in four great general courts throughout the year to handle major affairs.  
Id.; see also 1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 103−04, 107, 116−17 (not-
ing 1612 charter placed governance in general company whereas 1609 charter left govern-
ance with treasurer and council); 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 57−58 (discussing charter). 
 341. MICHAEL KAMMEN, DEPUTYES & LIBERTYES: THE ORIGINS OF REPRESENTATIVE 
GOVERNMENT IN COLONIAL AMERICA 14 (1969) [hereinafter KAMMEN, DEPUTYES & 
LIBERTYES] (commenting on changes motivating representative government). 
 342. 1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 181−84 (examining authoriza-
tion for changes to Virginia’s local government); CRAVEN, DISSOLUTION, supra note 333, at 
61−65, 117−18 (private plantations made internal organization difficult and lack of uni-
formity prompted change to restrict private plantations’ powers in colony-wide matters); 1 
OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 91−93 (parties in control of mother corporation desired more uni-
form control over colony); SNOW, supra note 331, at 58−60. 
 343. 1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 180–84 (describing changes in 
colony and Sandys’s influence in obtaining representative government); 1 OSGOOD, supra 
note 68, at 90−92 (discussing addition of burgesses to General Assembly). 
 344. KAMMEN, DEPUTYES & LIBERTYES, supra note 341, at 13−19 (growth of representa-
tive government in Virginia and Bermuda); id. at 90−92 (reproducing 1621 ordinance con-
cerning changes in Virginia’s local government). 
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warranto proceedings against the corporation.345  As a result of the proceed-
ings, the crown resumed Virginia’s privileges and thereby transformed the 
colony into a royal colony.346  A step in converting the Virginia Company 
to a royal colony was the substitution of royal officials for elected or ap-
pointed officials of the promoter.347  As a royal colony, the governor and 
council received commissions and instructions from the crown for the ad-
ministration of the colony.348  Virginia remained a royal colony until the 
American Revolution. 
B.  New England and the Corporate Colonies 
In addition to proprietorships and royal colonies, there was also the 
corporate colony.  The colonies of New England were unique; corporate 
colonies were not like proprietorships run by an individual holding all land 
and government and were not run like a royal colony under the instructions 
and governance of the crown.  The corporate colony was managed like a 
corporation or gild, and if that corporation was residing in the colony itself, 
there was little royal influence or control over internal affairs.349  In early 
colonial history, corporate colonies enjoyed more local government given 
the lack of effective control by the crown.350  In contrast to the proprietor-
 
 345. 1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 165−179; 1 DOYLE, supra note 
272, at 176−81 (discussing litigation against colony and noting colonists supported company 
and did not feel there was mismanagement); infra notes 362, 471−73 (quo warranto and 
scire facias proceedings against colonies); see also supra note 121 (Edward I’s quo warranto 
proceedings). 
 346. 3 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 47−49, 51.  Following the quo warranto proceedings, 
colonists requested to keep their assembly.  3 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 50.  But the assem-
bly was not called for several years.  1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 
198−200; 3 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 87−88. 
 347. 3 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 22−23, 72.  A royal commission was established to run 
Virginia.  BEER, supra note 237, at 307−13 (1623 and 1631 commissions); LEONARD W. 
LABAREE, ROYAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA: A STUDY OF THE BRITISH COLONIAL SYSTEM 
BEFORE 1783, at 37, 121−24, 134−35 (1930) (royal governor with commission, instructions, 
and royal colonial council appointed by king); see also infra note 470 (British commissions 
managed colonial affairs for the crown). 
 348. See generally LEONARD W. LABAREE, ROYAL INSTRUCTIONS TO BRITISH COLONIAL 
GOVERNORS, 1670-1776 (1935). 
 349. SNOW, supra note 331, at 66 (commenting on gild features of Massachusetts’s 1629 
charter); see also supra note 332 (crown’s control over mother corporation residing in Eng-
land); supra notes 167, 211, 232, 241−42 (describing briefly governance of gilds and regu-
lated companies with governors, aldermen, wardens, and bodies of assistants of various ti-
tles). 
 350. 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 436 (explaining distance from England as factor in 
New England’s self-governance); 3 id. at 8, 25 (noting the same). 
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ship and royal colony, the officers, assistants, and freemen of the corporate 
colony held their own political power secured by incorporation and char-
ter.351  For these reasons, the corporate colony enjoyed a degree of inde-
pendence not present in the other colonies.352 
Grantees of the Plymouth Division of the Virginia Company set out to 
form a colony in the North, the Popham Colony, but those efforts failed.353  
Scattered grantees reassembled, and in 1620, James I formed the Plymouth 
Council of New England (New England Council).354  The New England 
Council was a holding entity for distributing lands.355  Under the design of 
the Council, land would be settled in the form of counties, baronies, hun-
dreds, manors, and incorporated towns similar to settlement in England.356  
In 1635, facing quo warranto proceedings, the New England Council sur-
rendered its charter.357 
During its short existence, the New England Council granted land to 
many New England colonial promoters.358  The Council, for example, 
granted land in 1628 to the settlers of the “New England Company” (Mas-
 
 351. Compare infra notes 381−82 and accompanying text (governance of corporate col-
ony), with infra notes 390−99 and accompanying text (proprietorship and royal colony). 
 352. The corporate colony was more democratic than other types of colonies.  2 
ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 111−13, 142−43 (clarifying popular theo-
ries of New England democracy by emphasizing restricted powers of voting members and 
limitations on eligibility itself); 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 425. 
 353. 1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 90−94; 1 OSGOOD, supra note 
68, at 98. 
 354. 1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 320−27, 405 (discussing efforts 
by grantees of Plymouth Division to obtain new charter as corporation of proprietors); 1 
OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 102−03. 
 355. 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 123; SNOW, supra note 331, at 63 (describing New 
England Council as impotent to do anything but grant land). 
 356. 1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 326 (divisions into counties, 
hundreds, and baronies with court baron and court leet); 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 104, 
126 (identifying schemes which authorized populating New England with feudalism and 
other English institutions); see also infra Part IV.E (aspects of tenure clauses in charters); 
infra note 434 (settlement mimicked settlement in England). 
 357. 1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 417; 1 ROBERT NOXON TOPPAN, 
EDWARD RANDOLPH 16−17 (Boston, John Wilson & Son 1898). 
 358. Many settlements received land from the New England Council.  See, e.g., 1 
OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 123−24 (proprietorships of Maine and New Hampshire); see also 
infra note 359 (grant to Massachusetts Bay Colony).  Lacking authorization from the king, 
land grants from the New England Council did not grant full governance powers.  See 1 
OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 126, 130; cf. infra note 412 (Duke of York, without authoriza-
tion, could not grant governance rights to New Jersey proprietors). 
62
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol34/iss1/3
BURRELL.DOCX 1/9/12  12:00 PM 
2011] A STORY OF PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 69 
sachusetts).359  In 1629, Charles I confirmed the Council’s land grant and 
further granted the colony a royal charter of incorporation with governance 
rights similar to other English corporations.360  Borrowing from municipali-
ties and merchant associations, “The Governor and Company of the Matta-
chusetts Bay in Newe-England” had a governor, deputy governor, and 
eighteen assistants.361  In the specific language of the charter, however, 
there was no provision requiring that the corporation remain in England, 
and the corporation removed itself to New England to become both the lo-
cal and parent body of the corporate colony.362 
The independence of the corporate colony was an essential character-
istic for many New England immigrants.  A significant number of New 
England settlers were interested not in trade but rather ideological free-
dom.363  Given the religious turmoil in England, many pilgrims and puri-
tans fled England to New England.  Arriving in New England, immigrants 
had to interface with existing colonies on many levels.  Several New Eng-
land settlements began as a body of self-assembled squatters branching out 
from other colonies without any authority from England or other patent 
holders but later receiving such authority or a royal charter.364 
 
 359. 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 130; see also 1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra 
note 228, at 359−62 (New England Company receiving land from Council did not have abil-
ity to appoint governor absent royal authorization). 
 360. 3 THORPE, supra note 259, at 1852 (incorporation rights for grantees of Massachu-
setts’s 1629 charter: perpetual succession; sue and be sued; buy, hold, enjoy, and sell prop-
erty); see also 1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 365−66; 1 OSGOOD, supra 
note 68, at 131, 142 (Massachusetts’s government modeled on Virginia’s charter). 
 361. 3 THORPE, supra note 259, at 1852; see also 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 131, 142, 
162 (describing Massachusetts’s governance; noting similarity to London division of Vir-
ginia Company; governor did not have veto power, nor power to adjourn or dissolve, and 
governor cast vote for tie). 
 362. 1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 390−93; 1 OSGOOD, supra note 
68, at 142−50.  Massachusetts’s removal to the colony caused royal rebuke and a quo war-
ranto proceeding.  1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 420−23 (failure to en-
force quo warranto); SNOW, supra note 331, at 67−68 (noting charter-revocation powers of 
king’s commission in light of Massachusetts’s obstinacy). 
 363. 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, 107, 145, 200−01, 290, 321−22 (discussing migration and 
motivation of New England religious groups). 
 364. Id. at 105, 108−09, 290−91 (Plymouth, without royal charter, settled outside of orig-
inal grant from Virginia Company); id. at 301−02, 309−13, 321−22, 327−28 (settlers mi-
grating from Massachusetts formed Connecticut without charter); id. at 332−34, 354−57, 
369−70 (settlers banished from Massachusetts formed plantations that eventually became 
Rhode Island); id. at 438 (settlers branched out from Massachusetts, formed quasi-
corporations, and distributed their land to form villages).  Eventually Rhode Island and 
Connecticut received formal charters.  1 id. at 327−28 (Connecticut); id. at 332, 369−70 
(Rhode Island). 
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C.  Return to the Proprietorship 
Following a few colonization efforts by trading corporations, the 
crown returned to the feudum and several of the original thirteen colonies 
were settled as proprietorships.365  Royal privileges and immunities to pro-
prietors such as Gilbert and Raleigh gave broad powers to establish gov-
ernment.366  Similar to early proprietors’ privileges, Charles I granted a 
charter to Lord Baltimore to hold Maryland as a palatine fief.367  By char-
ter, Baltimore held his land “with . . . ample Rights, Jurisdictions, Privileg-
es, Prerogatives, Royalties, Liberties, Immunities, and royal Rights, and 
temporal Franchises whatsoever . . . to be had, exercised, used, and en-
joyed, as any Bishop of Durham.”368 
Under royal charters, proprietors to a greater or lesser degree were au-
thorized to create courts; to hear all pleas; to appoint officials and commis-
sions in their name; to pardon; to establish cities, towns, corporations, and 
boroughs with privileges and immunities; to grant fairs or markets; and to 
coin money.369  Lord Baltimore had full executive power to raise armies, 
declare war, and institute martial law.370  To further the trading interests of 
the proprietorship, proprietors had the right to form monopolies and ex-
clude trespassers.371  Proprietors had full executive authority and permis-
 
 365. See infra note 375. 
 366. See supra Part III.C–D. 
 367. 3 THORPE, supra note 259, at 1679.  Lord Baltimore, George Calvert, received the 
Avalon charter in 1623 for settling in Newfoundland but later moved to Virginia and re-
ceived a second charter to settle Maryland.  See 2 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 
228, at 275−82; Bernard C. Steiner, The Maryland Charter and the Early Explorations of 
that Province, 16 SEWANEE REVIEW 148, 150−52 (1908) (discussing Avalon charter).  Cal-
vert died and his son inherited his title and Maryland. 
 368. 3 THORPE, supra note 259, at 1679; see also 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 12−13 
(noting differences between American proprietorships and other colonies); id. at 59, 76 
(proprietors’ powers and relationship with local assemblies); supra notes 62−69 and accom-
panying text (discussing palatine lordships in England); infra note 375 (palatinate references 
in other proprietorships). 
 369. See, e.g., 1 THORPE, supra note 259, at 45−47 (1496 Cabot grant); id. at 49−52 
(1578 Gilbert grant); 3 id. at 1677−1686 (1632 Baltimore grant).  Later proprietors often 
delegated powers to a governor and council.  2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 61, 65−68 (com-
menting that proprietor’s council might function like Privy Council); see also 2 ANDREWS, 
COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 299−300, 329 (Baltimore’s administration). 
 370. 3 THORPE, supra note 259, at 1682; see also CARR, supra note 232, at lxxxvii−viii 
(observing that 1632 charter left indictments, process, and appointments with Baltimore); 2 
OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 10 (Baltimore was clothed with, among other things, authority to 
establish courts, appoint officers, and bestow titles). 
 371. See BEER, supra note 237, at 220−28 (discussing colonial monopolies and charter 
privileges excluding foreigners); id. at 227−28 (Baltimore did not have monopoly rights in 
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sion of the proprietor was necessary for holding land and exercising politi-
cal power.372  Proprietors were able to make any ordinance or bylaw need-
ed for good government as long as such provisions were not repugnant to 
the laws of England.373  This last clause was one of the few restrictions 
found in the proprietor’s charter.  In a proprietorship, there might be an as-
sembly of freemen joining the proprietor’s governor and council, but the 
proprietor held control of the colony’s main powers notwithstanding.374  
Following Baltimore’s charter, proprietorships arose in Maine, New Hamp-
shire, New York, Carolina, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Georgia.375 
D.  Colonial Governance 
Having introduced the different types of colonies, we can move on to 
discuss aspects of colonial governance.  Because the history and organiza-
tion of English towns, corporations, and gilds provided ready precedents 
for colonial affairs, American colonial government shared many similari-
ties with English local government.376  Both English towns and colonies of-
ten suppressed widespread participation in local government.  Many colo-
nies, for example, restricted political privileges based on property 
 
Maryland); supra Part III.A–C (exclusive monopolies in charters to Cabot, Warde, and Gil-
bert). 
 372. 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 12−13 (origin of power placed in proprietorship; pro-
prietor was considered miniature king). 
 373. See, e.g., 1 THORPE, supra note 259, at 51 (1578 Gilbert); 7 id. at 3801 (1609 char-
ter to Virginia); 3 id. at 1680−81 (1632 charter to Baltimore); see also JER. DUMMER, A 
DEFENCE OF THE NEW-ENGLAND CHARTERS 65−71 (London, J. Almon 1765) (1721) (de-
scribing examples of colonial laws repugnant or not repugnant to laws of England).  For 
similar restrictions on merchants, see supra notes 210, 242−48 and accompanying text (gild 
and merchant association charters and parliamentary statutes limiting governance to serve 
common weal and “better governance”). 
 374. See infra notes 390−97 and accompanying text. 
 375. 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 4−5; 1 id. at 123.  Maine and Carolina proprietorships 
were similar to Maryland with slight variation.  Maryland and Carolina had the privileges of 
the Bishop of Durham at any time, but Maine’s proprietor held as the Bishop of Durham in 
the seventeenth century.  3 THORPE, supra note 259, at 1627; 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 5 
n.1; cf. 3 id. at 248−50 (powers of Northern Neck proprietors).  Penn’s charter did not refer 
specifically to the Bishop of Durham.  Henry VIII abolished many of the regalities of the 
palatinate.  1536, 27 Hen. 8 c. 24; see also supra note 68 (Henry VIII’s legislation removing 
special jurisdictions). 
 376. 2 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 105 n.1 (detailing similarities 
between local government in England and local government in New England colonies); see 
also KAMMEN, DEPUTYES & LIBERTYES, supra note 341, at 52−54 (summarizing influence of 
trading corporations on assemblies and representative government in colonies). 
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qualifications, similar to laws in England.377  Governance of English mu-
nicipalities was influenced by gilds and restricted to probi homines.378  A 
large portion of English boroughs eventually became oligarchies closed to 
common townsmen.379  Likewise, participation in several colonial govern-
ments was limited to desirable inhabitants.380  In other colonies, political 
power resided in or was otherwise influenced by church membership.381  
Massachusetts, for example, was designed to be an open corporation with 
participation by freemen and ruled by popular vote to some degree, but for 
 
 377.  At times, as was the law in England, suffrage in the colonies was restricted to 
freemen holding land valued at a set figure.  See generally 3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, 
supra note 228, at 115 n.1; ALBERT E. MCKINLEY, THE SUFFRAGE FRANCHISE IN THE 
THIRTEEN ENGLISH COLONIES IN AMERICA (1905). 
 378. See supra note 194 (probi homines); supra notes 179−90, 198, 200−03 (gild influ-
ence). 
 379. See supra notes 208–11 (town oligarchies). 
 380. The selection of freemen and “admitted inhabitants” in the New England colony 
resembled the wise, discrete, and honest probi homines of medieval borough councils.  2 
ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 104–06 & nn.3–4 (noting selection in early 
Connecticut of freemen from admitted inhabitants excluded certain offensive and unworthy 
classes); id. at 115–16 (inhabitants became “admitted” by criteria which might filter wanton 
dalliance, fornication, lying, drunkenness, blasphemy, criminal activity, etc.). 
 381. In the New Haven settlement, the governing body voted to select free burgesses 
from church members.  One man objected that free planters should retain power of election, 
but government officials replied in analogy that many English entities limit burgess mem-
bership.  1 THORPE, supra note 259, at 525; 2 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, 
at 157–58, 194; 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 313–15 (Church political power in River Town 
and effort by crown to open government); id. at 322–23 (Church political power in New 
Haven); id. at 464 (restrictions on becoming free of town).  Other New England colonies 
(Plymouth, early Connecticut, and Rhode Island), did not require official church member-
ship.  Early Connecticut, for example, extended some political power to admitted inhabit-
ants without regard to formal church membership, though religion might play a role in offi-
cial recognition as “admitted.”  2 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 78, 89–
91, 101, 104–08, 117; see also supra note 380 (selection of admitted inhabitants in early 
Connecticut). 
  Though it did not require church membership, early Connecticut limited participa-
tion in civil affairs.  The General Court, as opposed to the general population, approved 
freemanship.  Freemen had greater power and constituted the body of eligible officers.  2 
ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 104–05 (distinguishing between admitted 
inhabitants and freemen; freemen selected from admitted inhabitants by General Court or 
group of magistrates; freemen eligible to become deputies or magistrates; freemanship re-
quired to attend election assembly to vote for major candidates); id. at 107–08 (gulf between 
freemen and people at large); id. at 108, 111, 115–17 (qualified freemen elect magistrates; 
admitted inhabitants could elect deputies (from freemen) to cure neglect of government if 
summoned by freemen); David H. Flower, Connecticut’s Freemen: The First Forty Years, 
15 WM. & MARY Q. 3d 312, 314–15 (1958).  Over the course of the next several decades, 
Connecticut relaxed restrictions on political rights. 
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a long time, the colony restricted power to the church.382  Shortly after re-
ceiving its charter, Massachusetts made a law that no man would be admit-
ted as a freeman, and thus would be without a significant voice in military 
and civil elections, holding office, or serving on juries, unless he was certi-
fied by the church after having become a member and taken the prescribed 
oath.383  Restrictions on political rights in Massachusetts presented a strug-
gle for the colony throughout a large portion of the seventeenth century.384 
As part of the British Empire, colonial governance, like borough gov-
ernance, depended on and was governed by royal privileges and immuni-
ties.385  Beyond the charter, colonial promoters further regulated admin-
istration of the colonies.  English boroughs were generally under royal or 
private lordship; colonies were royal, proprietary, or corporate.386  As with 
borough governance under different lords, different types of colonial pro-
moters translated to different characteristics of colonial governance.387  But 
most colonies shared one essential feature, the colonial assembly—an insti-
 
 382. 1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 435–37 (freemanship limited to 
church members).  After some experimentation limiting government and the General Court 
to a select body of assistants and officers, freemen gained greater rights in government.  Id. 
at 433–34, 438 (1630 oligarchy); id. at 440 (by 1632, general election of officers by freemen 
with church membership; governor selected from court of assistants); id. at 441–43 (powers 
of General Court; charges of arbitrariness resulted in freemen from towns receiving privi-
lege to elect deputies to attend General Court and authorize taxes).  By 1634, the General 
Court had the power to admit freemen, make laws, raise money, and grant lands.  1 
ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 441–43; 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 153–
56.  For a discussion of Massachusetts’s General Court and its officers, assistants, and free-
men, see Herbert L. Osgood, The Corporation as a Form of Colonial Government, Part II, 
11 POL. SCI. Q. 502 (1896).  One of the grievances motivating change in Massachusetts’s 
governance was taxation by a body of assistants without the consent of the freemen.  1 
ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 439–40, 442–43.  Andrews estimated that a 
couple hundred freemen ruled the colony of 20,000 inhabitants.  Id. at 443. 
 383. 1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 435–37, 459 (freemen, one of 
four categories of Massachusetts inhabitants, was limited to church members under local 
oath); 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 211–13 (freemanship restrictions in Massachusetts); B. 
Katherine Brown, Freemanship in Puritan Massachusetts, 59 AM. HIST. REV. 865 (1954) 
(discussing freemanship in Massachusetts). 
 384. Brown, supra note 383, at 869–77, 879 (Massachusetts reduced restrictions on po-
litical rights in 1647 and again in 1664); see also 1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 
228, at 459, 460 (same). 
 385. Parliament, too, could legislate for the colonies.  See infra notes 461, 466. 
 386. See supra Parts II.C, IV.A–C. 
 387. See supra notes 86, 148, 223–24 and accompanying text (conditions under different 
governments varied; royal boroughs were freer). 
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tution tracing back to medieval borough councils and gild assemblies.388 
Following Virginia’s 1619 representative assembly and changes in 
England, colonial assemblies took root in most colonies.389  The charter-
based right for colonists to have an assembly of freemen was a significant 
limitation on proprietors.390  Proprietors like Baltimore frequently fought 
with the assembly or lower house.391  The proprietor’s assembly differed 
from the assemblies or courts of other colonies.392  The assembly in the 
proprietorship, at least initially, was weak.  Freemen under Baltimore’s 
charter participated in the legislative process, but the proprietor retained 
control and could pass reasonable ordinances absent the freemen.393  The 
proprietor generally had the ability, through its agents, to summon and pro-
rogue the meeting of the assembly.394  Even initiation of legislation was 
typically reserved for the proprietor.395  Maryland under Baltimore also had 
 
 388. See supra Part II.G.  The institutions and privileges of Parliament also influenced 
the colonial assembly, though the borough council and gild assemblies were likely closer 
relatives. 
 389. Not all colonies had assemblies.  New York colonists and the Duke of York, or 
James II as King, fought over the right to have full assembly privileges.  2 OSGOOD, supra 
note 68, at 160–62 (New York colonists wanted privileges of other colonies including elec-
tion and tax-granting assembly); see also infra notes 408–29 (struggle for full assembly 
rights under Duke’s rule).  The Duke’s charters did not mention an assembly for the colo-
nists.  Nonetheless, New York enjoyed an assembly for a brief period.  But when the Duke 
became James II, he gave instructions omitting the local assembly.  Id. 
 390. See, e.g., 3 THORPE, supra note 259, at 1679 (1632 charter to proprietor of Mary-
land); 3 id. at 1628 (1639 charter to proprietor of Maine); 5 id. at 2745 (1663 charter to pro-
prietors of Carolina); 5 id. at 3037 (1681 charter to Penn).  In 1681, Charles II granted to 
William Penn a large proprietorship with extensive privileges similar to Baltimore’s charter.  
Unlike other colonies, Penn, from the start, was a strong advocate for representative gov-
ernment.  2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 256 (Frames of Government and Charter of Privileg-
es established government in Pennsylvania); id. at 257 (Frames submitted to the settlers for 
approval; elected council as opposed to appointees); cf. 3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, su-
pra note 228, at 167, 273–74 (detailing Penn’s work in 1670s as West New Jersey proprie-
tor ensuring representative government with ample legal and individual rights). 
 391. See infra notes 418–28, 432, and 493. 
 392. 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 58–59, 75 (contrasting power in corporate colony with 
power and assembly in proprietorship). 
 393. A proprietor had the ability to pass emergency ordinances, but those emergency or-
dinances could not deprive any person of member, life, freehold, goods, or chattels.  3 
THORPE, supra note 259, at 1680–81 (Baltimore’s emergency ordinance provision); 5 id. at 
3038 (Penn’s emergency legislation provision). 
 394. 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 13 (governmental authority in proprietor); id. at 59, 
75–77, 80 (proprietor and governor summon, prorogue, and dissolve assembly and initiate 
and veto legislation); see also 2 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 334–35. 
 395. 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 80.  As in other colonies, Penn and the assembly 
fought over initiation power.  Penn worried the assembly’s legislation would go beyond the 
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a governor and council.396  If the governor and council approved the legis-
lation, the proprietor could then veto the legislation.397 
Despite the assembly’s initial weakness under proprietors, settlers 
wanted assemblies for greater self-government.  Proprietors distributed 
land to settlers and made agreements concerning governance through “con-
cessions” or “conditions of plantation.”398  These agreements, if covering 
governance as well as land, served as miniature constitutions between the 
proprietor and settler.399  In 1663, Charles II granted Carolina to a board of 
eight proprietors composed of London merchants, nobles, and other influ-
ential men.400  Promoters and London merchants with ties to Barbados and 
New England were interested in settling Carolina but wanted to retain cor-
porate freedoms and government by consent.401  The bargain between the 
two resulted in the proprietors’ adoption of the Concessions and Agree-
ments of 1665.402  The 1665 Concessions granted various freedoms, pro-
 
charter, upset the crown, and cause a forfeiture of Penn’s charter.  KAMMEN, DEPUTYES & 
LIBERTYES, supra note 341, at 41–42, 64 (discussing shift in initiation power in Pennsylva-
nia); 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 260; cf. LABAREE, supra note 347, at 219–23, 429 (initia-
tion in royal colonies given to assembly). 
 396. 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 61 (commission for governor and council); id. at 74–75 
(assembly of deputies). 
 397. Id. at 62, 76.  By the turn of the eighteenth century, the crown also had power to 
disallow colonial legislation in several colonies.  E.B. GREENE, PROVINCIAL AMERICA 1690–
1740, at 49–50 (1905) [hereinafter GREENE, PROVINCIAL AMERICA] (Virginia, New York, 
New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Maryland, and New Jersey).  See generally 
ELMER BEECHER RUSSELL, THE REVIEW OF AMERICAN COLONIAL LEGISLATION BY THE KING 
IN COUNCIL (1915). 
 398. 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 20–29 (describing contracts between settlers and pro-
prietors); id. at 60 (concessions for government); see also 2 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, 
supra note 228, at 293 (“conditions of plantations” in Maryland); 3 id. at 167 (Penn’s 1677 
Concessions for West New Jersey). 
 399. 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 20 (Baltimore’s land agreements for settlers); id. at 60, 
205 (most proprietors issued these agreements, but Maryland’s agreements limited to land 
and not to rights of government); id. at 211 (agreements served as constitutions). 
 400. 5 THORPE, supra note 259, at 2743. The grant to Carolina followed liberal charters 
to Connecticut and Rhode Island.  3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 182–
83, 186 (influence of London merchants and nobles in securing charter). 
 401. 3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 192–93 (groups of adventurers 
from New England and Barbados interested in settling Carolina); id. at 194–95 & n.3 (inves-
tors sought to secure commercial privileges, free trade, liberty of conscience, and repre-
sentative assembly); 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 202–05. 
 402. Investors desired the Concessions be modeled on the corporate freedoms of certain 
English towns, but proprietors followed their own plan.  3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, 
supra note 228, at 143, 192–96 (noting Barbadians’ influence in drafting document); 
WESLEY F. CRAVEN, THE COLONIES IN TRANSITION 1660–1713, at 89 (1968) [hereinafter 
CRAVEN, COLONIES IN TRANSITION]; 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 205, 210–12 (concessions 
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tected liberty of conscience, and provided ample assembly privileges with 
execution of local assembly legislation rather than executive initiation 
common in other proprietorships.403  The generosity of the 1665 Conces-
sions, however, was short lived.  Facing problems with the liberal agree-
ments, proprietors reversed course and followed a feudal scheme beginning 
with the Fundamental Constitutions of 1669.404  With these efforts to avoid 
democracy, Carolina proprietors returned the colony to a palatine lordship 
with initiation power in the proprietors and reduced assembly rights.405  
The settlers never fully adopted the change, and the Carolinas ended up in 
the crown’s hands in the first half of the eighteenth century.406 
With the help of representative assemblies, local government, though 
meandering at times through feudal or royal control, gravitated back to the 
people paying taxes and participating in commerce.  The more community 
features a locality obtained, the more independence it sought.  Communal 
gild and corporate forces, for example, helped liberate the townsmen of the 
private borough under a lord or church.407  Similar community and com-
mercial features motivated colonial autonomy and eventually reduced pro-
prietary and royal control in the colonies—often by analogy to English in-
stitutions or assimilation of a neighboring colony’s privileges.408 
 
in colonies); Richard Waterhouse, England, the Caribbean, and the Settlement of Carolina, 
9 J. AM. STUDIES 259, 264–65 (1975) (settlers from Barbados and agreements of settlement). 
 403. 5 THORPE, supra note 259, at 2756, 2757–58; 3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra 
note 228, at 196. 
 404. 3 ANDREWS, supra note 228, at 212–13 (feudal nature of 1663 charter clothed pro-
prietors with powers of palatinate of Durham); id. at 213–14 (promoters distributed land 
among classes to ensure balance between aristocracy and democracy); id. at 215–16 (gov-
ernance under proprietors); CRAVEN, COLONIES IN TRANSITION, supra note 402, at 99–101; 2 
OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 208–09. 
 405. 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 205, 208–10, 212–13.  Similar characteristics occurred 
in the boroughs where participation was limited to probi homines and eventually closed off 
to a select body to avoid undesirable aspects of democracy.  See supra Part II.G. 
 406. 3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 266–67 (South Carolina fol-
lowed by North Carolina); HARRIS, supra note 37, at 135–36 (discussing rebellion and strife 
in Carolinas; noting conflict between feudalism and representative institutions in colonies). 
 407. See supra notes 223–24 and accompanying text. 
 408. See supra notes 401–02 (London merchants and corporate freedoms of other colo-
nies influenced colonization under Carolina charter as would-be settlers in Carolina wanted 
to retain their corporate freedoms); infra note 412 (noting influence of Carolina Concessions 
on New Jersey Concessions); infra note 423 (Duke of York’s grant of privileges of neigh-
boring colonies); infra note 498 (observing convergence toward citizenship status of freer 
societies through charter association directly or by claims for generalized free customs, lib-
erties, privileges, and immunities of freer entity); see also 4 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, 
supra note 228, at 423 n.1 (commenting in reflection that colonies might not be seeking 
“democracy” in its strictest definition but were constantly seeking to free themselves of ex-
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The history of seventeenth-century New York illustrates these dynam-
ics and provides an example of a colony struggling for self-government, 
initially under a proprietorship and later under the crown.  In the early part 
of the seventeenth century, the Dutch formed the colony of New Nether-
land in northeastern North America—a colony that eventually became 
home to both Dutch and English local settlements.409  At the Restoration, 
the Dutch and English were temporarily at peace but that would soon 
change as England initiated plans to retaliate against the Dutch for various 
injuries.410 
On the eve of England’s conquest of New Netherland, in March 1664, 
Charles II granted the territory of New York (still New Netherland under 
the Dutch) to his brother, the Duke of York.411  A few months later, the 
Duke conveyed a portion of his grant, New Jersey, to loyal friends.412  
Meanwhile, Colonel Richard Nicolls, the Duke’s future appointee for Gov-
ernor of New York who did not know of the grant to New Jersey proprie-
tors, presided over a commission to hear grievances and restore order in the 
territory in anticipation of the conflict.413  As part of his commission, 
Nicolls appeased English settlers by promising them some degree of self-
government and the privileges of English subjects.414  Specifically, Nicolls 
promised settlers and Long Island promoters equal privileges as those en-
joyed in other New England colonies.415 
 
ternal proprietary, royal, and parliamentary control); Herbert L. Osgood, The Proprietary 
Province as a Form of Colonial Government, Part I, 2 AM. HIST. REV. 644, 652–54 (1897) 
(comparing democratic forces in proprietary colonies with similar democratic forces in me-
dieval England). 
 409. 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 153–54, 157; see also infra note 420. 
 410. 3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 56. 
 411. Id. at 57. 
 412. CRAVEN, COLONIES IN TRANSITION, supra note 402, at 83–84.  The Duke’s convey-
ance of New Jersey did not authorize governance rights because the Duke was not author-
ized to grant such authority.  The absence of formal authority for governance plagued New 
Jersey proprietors.  3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 142, 145 & n.1.  
Nonetheless, New Jersey grantees, also Carolina proprietors, adopted almost verbatim the 
Carolina Concessions for their Concessions.  3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 
228, at 140, 143, 196; CRAVEN, COLONIES IN TRANSITION, supra note 402, at 88–89; 2 
OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 169–70, 173–74 (1665 agreements granted broad rights). 
 413. 3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 56, 59, 63. 
 414. See infra note 415. 
 415. AARON LEAMING & JACOB SPICER, GRANTS, CONCESSIONS, AND ORIGINAL 
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE PROVINCE OF NEW JERSEY 661–63, 671–73 (2d ed., Philadelphia, W. 
Bradford 1881) (Monmouth and Elizabethtown grants); 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 159; cf. 
3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 320 (similar promise in Penn’s 1701 
charter of liberties). 
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Overwhelmed by English forces, leaders of New Netherland surren-
dered to the English and New Netherland became New York.416  Assisted 
by Nicolls’s leadership, the Duke established his laws for New York in ear-
ly March 1665.417  The Duke’s law was a vast code of provisions assem-
bled from various sources.418  Under the Duke’s rule, however, New York 
colonists were not participating in essential components of the legislative 
process, and they grieved for full privileges of representative govern-
ment.419  When the Duke’s laws reached the English on Long Island, a 
community long accustomed to self-government,420 they petitioned the king 
 
  Nicolls promised settlers and local promoters (including those in the Duke’s grant 
of New Jersey) “equal freedom, immunities and privileges with any of his majesties’ sub-
jects in any of his colonies in America.”  LEAMING & SPICER, supra, at 663, 672.  Under the 
authority of Nicolls’s grant, assembled settlers enacted laws and established courts to try 
minor causes.  Nicolls, however, did not have authority under the commission to grant a full 
legislative assembly for authorizing taxes.  3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, 
at 141–42, 145 (Nicolls’s grants of liberal, but limited self-government to towns and pro-
moters in area of New York and New Jersey); id. at 144–45 (settlers under grants held town 
meetings, enacted laws, formed courts and held trials; enjoyed exemption from taxation for 
seven years; settlers promised privileges of neighboring colonies); CRAVEN, COLONIES IN 
TRANSITION, supra note 402, at 80, 84–85. 
  The rule of law under New York and New Jersey proprietors eventually conflicted 
with Nicolls’s earlier grants of self-government, or perceptions thereof, and Nicolls’s grants 
would prove problematic for the proprietors throughout the latter half of the seventeenth 
century.  3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 144–50, 155–56 (assemblies in 
New Jersey towns met under two authorities: one more autonomous under Nicolls’s grant, 
the other under New Jersey proprietors’ rule); id. at 156–57 (contrast between freer self-
governance in New England and Long Island and governance under proprietary govern-
ment; proprietors viewed Nicolls’s patents as illegitimate). 
 416. 3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 60–63. 
 417. 1 CHARLES Z. LINCOLN, THE COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK FROM THE YEAR 1664 
TO THE REVOLUTION 6 (Albany, James. B. Lyon 1894) [hereinafter LINCOLN, THE COLONIAL 
LAWS OF NEW YORK].  Lincoln has the date as March 1, 1664 instead of March 1, 1665. 
 418. Albert E. McKinley, The Transition From Dutch to English Rule in New York: A 
Study in Political Imitation, 6 AM. HIST. REV. 693, 704–05 (1901). 
 419. CRAVEN, COLONIES IN TRANSITION, supra note 402, at 74; MICHAEL KAMMEN, 
COLONIAL NEW YORK—A HISTORY 77–78 (1975) [hereinafter KAMMEN, COLONIAL NEW 
YORK] (English on Long Island took issue with absence of full assembly rights in Duke’s 
laws); 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 160–61. 
 420. English on Long Island had a long history of advocacy for representative govern-
ment.  Before the English Conquest of New Netherland, the English in the Dutch territory 
advocated for greater self-governance.  KAMMEN, COLONIAL NEW YORK, supra note 419, at 
39–40 (English migrating to New Netherland brought town meetings, churches, and concept 
of communal land); id. at 49, 52–54 (English demands for political participation under the 
Dutch); id. at 54–55 (Dutch leadership resisted calls for autonomy, appointed town leaders, 
and created upper and lower town citizens).  The English-influenced plea for participation in 
the 1653 Petition of the Commonalty of New Netherland declared: 
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for the right to participate in taxation and enjoy corporate privileges.421 
Similar disputes for full assembly privileges continued throughout the 
Duke’s rule.  By the early 1680s, New York merchants, refusing to pay 
customs, claimed that if they were taxed without consent, it would be a vio-
lation of the Magna Carta, the Petition of Right, and other fundamental 
laws.422  The Duke, to quell the dispute and collect revenue, reluctantly 
granted the inhabitants an assembly and the privileges and immunities en-
joyed by other colonies.423  When the new assembly met, it crafted the 
1683 Charter of Liberties,424 a broad grant of liberties that received some 
 
tis contrary to the first intentions and genuine principles of every well regulated 
government, that one or more men should arrogate to themselves the exclusive 
power to dispose, at will, of the life and property of any individual, and this, by 
virtue or under pretense of a law or order he, or they, might enact, without the 
consent, knowledge or election of the whole Body, or its agents or representatives.  
Hence the enactment, except as aforesaid, of new Laws or orders affecting the 
Commonalty, or the Inhabitants, their lives or property, is contrary and opposed to 
the granted Freedoms of the Dutch Government, and odious to every freeborn 
man, and principally so to those whom God has placed in a free state on newly 
settled lands, which might require new laws and orders, not transcending, but re-
sembling as near as possible, those of Netherland.  We humbly submit that tis one 
of our privileges that our consent or that of our representatives is necessarily re-
quired in the enactment of such laws and orders. 
1 E.B. O’CALLAGHAN, DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF 
NEW YORK 550, 551 (1856) (Resolution 4, Petition of the Commonalty of New Netherland); 
see also 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 154–57 (English in New Netherland); supra note 415 
(discussing Nicolls’s grant of equal privileges and immunities to settlers and Long Island 
promoters in territory of New York and New Jersey). 
 421. 3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 109–12 (discontented English 
claimed Duke’s rule violated liberty of Englishmen); id. at 106–07, 109 (chief complaint 
was taxation without popular participation); DAVID S. LOVEJOY, THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION 
IN AMERICA 108–09 (1972) (English on Long Island upset with heavy taxes and no repre-
sentation).  The Duke dismissed the assemblies of New Jersey and New England as unnec-
essary for New York colonists.  In his view, assemblies were dangerous and destructive to 
the peace of the colony.  3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 112–13. 
 422. 3 JOHN R. BRODHEAD, DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE 
STATE OF NEW YORK 289 (Albany, Weed, Parsons & Co. 1853) (bill against William Dyer 
for collecting customs); LOVEJOY, supra note 421, at 110–12; 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 
162–63 (merchants refused to pay customs; treated payments as violations of fundamental 
laws, e.g., Magna Carta, Petition of Right, and other statutes). 
 423. 3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 110–11 n.2, 113–14 (Duke 
granted equal liberties and an assembly, which Englishmen and fellow plantations enjoy); 2 
OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 164–65. 
 424. A copy of the 1683 legislation can be found in 1 CHARLES Z. LINCOLN, THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK 95–107 (1906) (1683 legislation provided for trial 
by jury, due process, consent in legislation and taxation, individual liberties, religious tolera-
tion, parliamentary privileges, and triennial meetings).  See also 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 
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support but later did not receive confirmation by James II and the Lords of 
Trade.425  The 1683 legislation was perceived as harmful because it granted 
liberal freedoms and recognized the “people” as the source of power.426  
After the death of Charles II, the Duke became King James II, and with an 
eye for consolidation of all of the New England colonies,427 he disallowed 
the 1683 charter and the assembly altogether, placing the power to legislate 
with the governor and council.428  Following the Glorious Revolution and 
James II’s abdication, New York regained its assembly.429 
As a vehicle for change in New York and other colonies, assemblies 
were instrumental in mobilizing settlers and curbing royal and proprietary 
government.430  With the House of Commons’ long history of struggling to 
 
166–68; David S. Lovejoy, Equality and Empire: The New York Charter of Libertyes, 1683, 
21 WM. & MARY Q. 3d 493, 504–05 (1964). 
 425. The Lords of Trade and Plantations was a crown body designated to oversee the 
colonies.  See infra note 470. 
 426. Lovejoy, supra note 424, at 512–15 (belief of Lords of Trade that charter granted 
privileges beyond those of any colony; governed directly by English laws; lodged govern-
ment in governor, council, and “people”; and imposed burdensome obligation of requiring 
frequent meetings); see also 3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 117 n.2 
(discussing use of “people” in various documents); 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 166–68. 
 427. During the mid-1680s, the crown challenged and voided the charters of New Eng-
land colonies to form the Dominion of New England.  3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra 
note 228, at 68 (summarizing policy to consolidate the corporate and proprietary colonies); 
id. at 118 (noting Duke’s goal to consolidate colonies); infra note 475 (briefly discussing 
lawsuits voiding charters in order to consolidate colonies into Dominion of New England); 
VIOLA F. BARNES, THE DOMINION OF NEW ENGLAND 29 (F. Ungar Pub. Co. 1960) (1923). 
 428. 3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 122–23 (loss of local assembly 
especially poignant to English towns in New England); 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 168; 3 
id. at 358–59 (omission of assembly in New York’s instructions); Lovejoy, supra note 424, 
at 513–15.  New England under the Dominion, which included New York as of 1688, also 
lacked a local assembly.  BARNES, supra note 427, at 40–41 (suggesting James II was re-
sponsible for removal of assembly from first draft of Dominion’s commission and instruc-
tions); id. at 41–42 (noting criticisms of assemblies as disruptive and entrenching theocracy 
in Massachusetts); see also infra note 495; cf. supra note 207 (criticisms against the com-
monalty in English towns). 
 429. 3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 137; 3 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 
508. 
 430. LABAREE, supra note 347, at 35–36 (assemblies stronger in eighteenth century; par-
liamentary sovereignty in England not transferable to colonies under crown); id. at 172–74 
(conflict between colonial assembly and crown); id. at 215–17, 267–68 (contest between 
royal prerogative, parliamentary privileges, and local assemblies); id. at 227–28 (weakening 
of crown’s control led to greater efforts to control assembly); id. at 426–28 (as colonial as-
semblies grew in strength, they ignored royal instructions and brought about transformation 
from royal prerogative to government by consent); LOVEJOY, supra note 421, at 78 (efforts 
by Maryland’s assembly to combat proprietor’s power); 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 80–94 
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obtain privileges, colonists had a wealth of perceived precedents to throw 
at the crown or proprietor.  Wielding de jure or de facto revenue authority, 
colonial assemblies mimicked Parliament in taxation and parliamentary 
privileges.431  By the eighteenth century, American colonies had assem-
blies, but these assemblies to a large degree existed or functioned at the 
will of the crown or proprietor.432 
E.  Tenure Clauses in Colonial Charters 
The discussion to this point has focused on charter privileges and im-
munities concerning the colonies’ formation and other aspects of colonial 
governance.  Royal privileges and immunities also regulated tenure in the 
colonies.  Merchants eyeing North America in the sixteenth century did not 
envision a thriving colony but rather a trading post with temporary citizens 
serving trading interests.433  Subsequent royal charters focusing more on 
 
(describing ascent of Maryland’s assembly to state of greater independence); see supra 
notes 408–29 (struggle of assembly in New York proprietorship); see also KAMMEN, 
DEPUTYES & LIBERTYES supra note 341, at 56–68 (describing evolution of colonial assembly 
and its influence in curbing arbitrary government). 
 431. 2 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 301, 336–37, 338, 341–42 (as-
sembly under Baltimore claimed parliamentary privileges based on House of Commons’ 
privileges); 3 id. at 304 (parliamentary privileges served as a model for Penn’s assembly); 
LOVEJOY, supra note 421, at 75–78, 89–92 (assembly’s advocacy for parliamentary privi-
leges in Maryland); see also MARY PATTERSON CLARKE, PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGES IN THE 
AMERICAN COLONIES (1943); LABAREE, supra note 347, at 174–75, 272, 308 (commenting 
that most colonies, under rights of Englishmen, enjoyed revenue authority, excepting Do-
minion of England and New York in late 1680s); id. at 215–16 (parliamentary privileges 
and local assemblies); id. at 274–75 (colonial assemblies wanted same powers as House of 
Commons over revenue); id. at 284, 296–97, 299 (lower assembly refused to pass revenue 
law, objected to upper council’s amendments of money bills); id. at 428–30 (assembly emu-
lated House of Commons; although prerogative was limited in England after Glorious Revo-
lution, crown wanted to keep royal prerogative strong in colonies; colonial assembly re-
sponded with argument that crown cannot do anything in colonies that it cannot do in 
England).  By the time Parliament exercised its authority in taxation, the colonial assembly 
had already asserted its dominance.  LABAREE, supra note 347, at 430–31. 
 432. 2 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 339–41 (Baltimore reduced as-
sembly membership and invoked property requirement to restrict voting eligibility); 3 id. at 
114 (Duke of York briefly conceded liberal assembly rights to New York, but governor re-
tained power to consent to laws and to summon, adjourn, and dissolve assembly for cause); 
id. at 137 (same arrangement for crown after Glorious Revolution); LABAREE, supra note 
347, at 177–78, 179, 190, 214–15, 218, 297–98 (noting that crown frequently reminded roy-
al colonies that assemblies existed by grace and permission of crown); id. at 207–15 (ob-
serving that crown was reluctant to clothe assemblies with same privileges as Parliament). 
 433. See supra Part III (expansion of merchant associations overseas; transformation 
from trading model to colonization model). 
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settlement added clauses concerning tenure.  Promoters desired to settle the 
American wilderness in a similar fashion to the settlements of England, of-
ten mimicking the county, hundred, manor, and borough system in nomen-
clature if nothing else.434 
1. Socage Tenure 
An essential part of the colonization effort was granting and managing 
lands.435  Throughout the colonial period, colonizing agencies rewarded 
colonists with land for bringing additional settlers.436  The colonizing agen-
cy and the crown wanted land settled to help provide a stable and safe envi-
ronment for trade.437  Englishmen wanted land and were willing to face a 
dangerous frontier in exchange for large tracts of land.438 
Most royal charters to colonial promoters contained a variation of the 
tenure clause that provided for holding land in free and common socage, 
“as of our Manor of East Greenwich,” in the County of Kent, not in capite, 
 
 434. 1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 510–11 (land system in New 
England followed that of England); 2 id. at 293–98 (manorial outline of Maryland); 3 id. at 
219 (describing manors in Carolina as large plantations without true manorial features); 1 
OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 12 (Gilbert’s plans mimic English institutions); id. at 21, 85–86, 
92–93 (private plantations in early Virginia); id. at 90–91 (discussing development of bor-
oughs, manors, corporations, and cities in Virginia); id. at 425–26 (agricultural aspect of 
New England town resembled English hamlet and village); 2 id. at 25–26, 33 (manors with 
manorial privileges in Maryland and Carolina); id. at 30 (manors in New Netherland); id. at 
50 (village system in New England and New Netherland). 
 435. HARRIS, supra note 37, at 147–48 (noting that immigration required easy tenures); 
McPherson, supra note 39, at 48 (observing importance of transferring land in colonies). 
 436. HARRIS, supra note 37, at 194 (head right system rewarded individuals for trans-
porting settlers); 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 87 (discussing Virginia’s head right system); 
2 id. at 20–29 (land for settlers); see also supra notes 314–16 and accompanying text (Gil-
bert’s scheme of land for contributions); infra note 458 (Baltimore granted land in exchange 
for money and settlers). 
 437. HARRIS, supra note 37, at 255–60, 362–63 (grants to military officers to set up mili-
tary posts for stability). 
 438. Creating border palatinates with regal privileges was common on the frontiers of 
England.  Some argue England’s palatine earls were clothed with higher privileges and ju-
risdictions in exchange for their service as a barrier to the more conflict-prone borders.  This 
rationale has been applied to colonial frontiers.  2 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 
228, at 197 (warlike America during colonial period resembled an earlier period in Eng-
land); HARRIS, supra note 37, at 255–56 (noting similarities between English palatinates 
near Wales and Scotland and grants to military figures in colonial America).  But see 
LAPSLEY, supra note 62, at 12–13 (noting absence of evidence to support theory that English 
palatinates were created to serve as buffers). 
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and not in knight’s service.439  The Manor of East Greenwich in the County 
of Kent, by the mid-sixteenth century, was a royal manor held of the 
king.440  By the reign of James I, granting crown lands as of the Manor of 
East Greenwich in the County of Kent was mostly generic charter formu-
la.441  References to the royal Manor of East Greenwich and similar tenure 
clauses were deemed necessary to avoid any presumption that the land was 
held in any tenure other than socage tenure, free of knight’s service, and 
not in capite.442 
Other more burdensome tenures would not work.  The tenant in 
capite, for example, was required to receive a license from the crown to 
permit alienation, and if a license had not been obtained prior to the trans-
fer, the grantor had to pay a fine.443  Because settling and transferring land 
would be a necessary component of colonization, colonial promoters en-
deavored to secure language in their charter that the land would not be held 
in capite.444 
As discussed above, the common attribute of socage tenure, like burg-
age tenure, was rent in exchange for most feudal obligations, especially 
military and wardship and marriage burdens.445  Socage tenure was more 
 
 439. Edward P. Cheyney, The Manor of East Greenwich in the County of Kent, 11 AM. 
HIST. REV. 29, 29 (1905) (listing charters that used phrase or a variation of phrase); see also 
2 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 139 n.2; McPherson, supra note 39, at 
35–56 (detailing attributes of Manor of East Greenwich formula); infra note 442 (discussing 
tenure in capite and by knight’s service).  In 1732, Georgia was held in free socage, not in 
capite, as of the manor of Hampton Court in Middlesex—not significantly different from 
East Greenwich.  2 THORPE, supra note 259, at 771; see also Cheyney, supra, at 29. 
 440. C.T. Carr, Our Manor of East Greenwich, 29 L. Q. REV. 349, 351 (1913). 
 441. Cheyney, supra note 439, at 32 (commenting that East Greenwich manor was a 
common reference manor in royal charters). 
 442. Id. at 29–30 (describing late seventeenth-century survey of Manor of East Green-
wich listing customs of manor).  Tenure in capite meant holding of the king directly as ten-
ant in chief.  Land held of the king was presumably in capite unless specified otherwise.  
See McPherson, supra note 39, at 42, 43–44, 45–46 (colonial grants avoided burdens of 
knight’s service and alienation fees accompanying lands held in capite); supra note 40 (dis-
cussing tenure in capite and alienation of land held of king).  Tenants in knight’s service 
owed military services; military tenure was common in England after the Conquest.  See 
supra note 33. 
 443. McPherson, supra note 39, at 44, 45 (noting emergence of reasonable fines for unli-
censed alienation of land held in capite; discussing “not in capite” disclaimer and reference 
to holding of manor); see also supra note 40. 
 444. 2 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 282 (change in tenure from in 
capite to socage and not in capite in Maryland’s charters). 
 445. Settlers wanted land free of common feudal obligations.  William R. Vance, The 
Quest for Tenure in the United States, 33 YALE L.J. 248, 254 (1924) (describing common 
feudal incidents such as escheat for felony or failure of heirs; distress for failure of services; 
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freely alienable and deviseable, and this was a key requirement for a colony 
abroad.446  In many of the original colonies, grants to settlers, whether by 
royal governors or proprietors, were made in free and common socage, of-
ten reserving a quit rent to the promoter.447  Colonists perceived the quit 
rent as a form of land tax to the proprietorship or crown.448  Other than the 
facial grant of socage tenure and the fiction of holding of a manor, the par-
ticular reference to holding as of the Manor of East Greenwich was not 
 
fines, scutages, reliefs, aids, wardship and marriage, and primer seisin); 3 HOLDSWORTH, 
supra note 33, at 51–54 (aspects of socage tenure and exemption from military services and 
wardship and marriage incidents); MASSACHUSETTS BODY OF LIBERTIES (1641), reprinted in 
THE COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS 35 (photo. reprint 1995) (Boston, Rockwell & 
Churchill 1889) (land free from all fines and licenses upon alienation and free from heriots, 
wardships, reliefs, and escheats upon death of ancestor); see also supra note 37 (listing feu-
dal incidents).  Holders of socage tenure owed fealty, escheat, and some form of quit rent.  
Vance, supra note 445, at 255–56 (describing conditions after Charles II’s 1660 tenure act). 
  Socage tenure or socagium meant in the service of soke.  WILLIAM SOMNER & 
WHITE KENNETT, A TREATISE OF GAVELKIND 134–39, 141 (2d ed., London, F. Gyles 1726).  
As discussed above, soke meant “seeking” and was used in a variety of ways in Domesday 
records—frequently as part of the immunity process supplementing unwritten custom by 
expressly authorizing the immunized grantee the privilege to collect the profits of justice 
and customs running on the land.  See supra notes 50–57 and accompanying text (discussing 
royal grants of sake and soke).  As times and conditions changed, many sokemen’s services 
were commuted for rents, a central characteristic of socage tenure.  See VINOGRADOFF, 
ENGLISH SOCIETY, supra note 25, 124–28 (describing soke, sokemen, and socage tenure); id. 
at 235 (socage tenure distinguished from military tenure); supra notes 79–81 and accompa-
nying text (commutation of services).  Initially, socage tenure was not considered free, but 
later socage tenure became mingled with fee farm tenure.  Charles M. Andrews, Introduc-
tion to BEVERLEY W. BOND, JR., THE QUIT RENT SYSTEM IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 14, 
25–27 (1919); 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 52–53 (merger of fee farm and socage ten-
ures). 
 446. McPherson, supra note 39, at 40. 
 447. Id. at 39–45 (describing common colonial tenure clauses).  The Tenure Abolition 
Act of 1660 converted existing tenures into socage tenure.  1660, 12 Car. 2, c. 24, § 4. 
  New Netherland was lost to England in the latter half of the seventeenth century, 
and Charles II granted large tracts of land to his brother, the Duke of York.  When the 
Duke’s appointees took over New Netherland, in line with the socage-tenure theme of other 
colonies and the new law in England, most feudal obligations were waived.  1 LINCOLN, THE 
COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK, supra note 417, at 44 (freedom to alienate, freedom from 
heriots, wardships, escheats, and forfeitures); see also HARRIS, supra note 37, at 213; 2 
OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 40–42. 
 448. Vance, supra note 445, at 259.  Quit rents were a controversial topic in colonial af-
fairs—successfully collected in some colonies but almost non-existent in New England’s 
corporate colonies.  BOND, supra note 445, at 32–33 (detailing collection efforts in various 
colonies); id. at 35 (discussing colonies free of quit rents). 
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considered significant to the colonies.449 
2. Proprietorships and Quia Emptores Terrarum 
Though common in colonial charters, socage tenure was not required 
for all lands.  As described above, the crown granted to proprietors all 
rights, privileges, and jurisdictions of the land.450  Under typical charter 
language, proprietors themselves may have held land of the king in socage 
tenure with compensation and homage or fealty in exchange for services.451  
If the statute of Quia Emptores Terrarum did not apply, promoters had the 
ability to create tenures.452  Quia Emptores Terrarum allowed alienation 
but required the grantee hold the same tenure as the grantor.453  This pre-
vented the alienation and subinfeudation problems in which estates of high 
lords were being reduced in quality and status by intermediary lords creat-
ing new tenures or subinfeudating the land with incidents and customs con-
flicting with those owed to the original high lord.454  When an intermediary 
lord alienated land under the statute, the grantee held as the grantor, thus 
preserving the tenure and services owed to the high lord.455 
A number of colonial charters to proprietors suspended the application 
of Quia Emptores Terrarum, and these proprietors were allowed to subin-
 
 449. Cheyney, supra note 439, at 34–35.  Leadership in early Massachusetts was of the 
opinion that the charter’s reference to holding land as of the Manor of East Greenwich 
meant that, since those of the Manor were influenced by Parliament’s law, the colonists 
must be under Parliament’s law.  1 TOPPAN, supra note 357, at 21 n.48; see also KETTNER, 
supra note 275, at 58 n.35 (at one point, faction argued that tenure clause “holding of the 
Manor of East Greenwich” authorized Parliament’s authority in colony). 
 450. See supra Part IV.C (powers of proprietors; listing proprietorships of American col-
onies). 
 451. See supra Part IV.E.1 (promoters and tenure).  Baltimore’s charter stated: 
To Hold of Us, our Heirs and Successors, Kings of England, as of our Castle of 
Windsor, in our County of Berks, in free and common Soccage, by Fealty only for 
all Services, and not in Capite, nor by Knight’s Service, Yielding therefore unto 
Us, our Heirs and Successors Two Indian Arrows of these Parts, to be delivered at 
the said Castle of Windsor, every Year, on Tuesday in Easter Week: And also the 
fifth Part of all Gold and Silver Ore, which shall happen from Time to Time, to be 
found within the aforesaid Limits. 
3 THORPE, supra note 259, at 1679. 
 452. Quia Emptores Terrarum, 1290, 18 Edw. 1, c. 1; McPherson, supra note 39, at 50–
54 (describing aspects of Quia Emptores Terrarum in colonies). 
 453. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 454. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 455. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
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feudate.456  The feudum to Maryland, for example, was held by Baltimore 
in socage tenure as of the Castle of Windsor in the County of Berkshire, not 
in capite, not in knight’s service, with fealty in exchange for all services.457  
The statute of Quia Emptores Terrarum was expressly excluded, and Bal-
timore could subinfeudate and mimic English feudal institutions.458  At a 
later date, several decades after the charter to Baltimore, William Penn re-
ceived his proprietorship.459  With several exceptions, Penn’s charter was 
modeled after Baltimore’s charter.  In Penn’s grant, the statute of Quia 
Emptores Terrarum not only did not apply to Penn and his heirs but also 
did not apply to their immediate grantees, who could also subinfeudate, 
erect manors, and create subdivisions.460 
F.  Conflict with the Crown 
As noted throughout, whether reviewing colonial assemblies or colo-
nial tenure, English institutions directly or indirectly influenced the colo-
nies.  The institutions of proprietorships and corporate colonies were char-
ter-based rights as the crown granted privileges and immunities to the 
colony.461  The charter was as important to the promoter and colonist as it 
 
 456. See, e.g., 3 THORPE, supra note 259, at 1632–33 (1639 charter to Gorges of Maine); 
5 id. at 2750 (1663 charter to proprietors of Carolina); 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 19; see 
also infra notes 457–60 (proprietorships of Penn and Baltimore). 
 457. 3 THORPE, supra note 259, at 1679.  Baltimore and Penn both held their grant as of 
the Castle of Windsor in the County of Berkshire.  Cheyney, supra note 439, at 29 (listing 
variations of more common Manor of East Greenwich formula).  The crown’s charter speci-
fying that the land was to be held of the Castle of Windsor avoided the presumption that the 
land would be held in capite.  See supra notes 442–44. 
 458. 3 THORPE, supra note 259, at 1684–85 (suspension of Quia Emptores Terrarum in 
Maryland’s charter; ability to create manors with court baron and view of frankpledge); see 
also 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 8–9.  Those who brought settlers to Maryland received 
large tracts of land as manors with rights of court baron and view of frankpledge, paying 
various quit rents to Baltimore.  1 DOYLE, supra note 272, at 285–86.  Smaller land holders 
were also rewarded for bringing additional settlers.  Maryland had about sixty manors aver-
aging about 3,000 acres.  2 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 293–98 (com-
paring Baltimore’s manors with English tenures); 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 25. 
 459. Penn received his charter in 1681.  5 THORPE, supra note 259, at 3035–36. 
 460. Id. at 3042–43 (Quia Emptores Terrarum suspended in Penn’s grant).  The creation 
of manors in Penn’s charter was extended one step, i.e., Penn and his immediate grantees 
could create tenures but no further grantees of grantees were so authorized.  McPherson, 
supra note 39, at 52–53 (Penn’s charter and Quia Emptores Terrarum); see also HARRIS, 
supra note 37, at 237–41 (land distribution in Pennsylvania). 
 461. Parliament also passed legislation affecting the colonies.  Where Parliament ex-
pressly claimed that legislation covered the colonies, there was little debate.  The applica-
tion of preexisting statutes to the colonies gave parties more trouble.  1 GEORGE CHALMERS, 
OPINIONS OF EMINENT LAWYERS ON VARIOUS POINTS OF ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE 194–225 
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was to the borough, gild, and corporation in English municipal history.462  
The charter gave permission, among other things, to travel, inhabit discov-
ered lands, and form a colony.463  The charter held the colony’s powers and 
gave direction for internal administration.464  Charter-based privileges regu-
lated or granted the right to incorporate, enjoy assembly privileges, retain 
English citizenship, and hold and dispose of land.465  Excepting the period 
of the English Civil War and the Commonwealth, there were only a few 
examples of parliamentary legislation concerning the American colonies 
before the turn of eighteenth century.466 
As the colonies became populated with English subjects, and to some 
degree with modified English institutions, conflicts arose between settlers, 
colonial governments, and the crown.  The crown struggled to regulate and 
maintain control of corporations and proprietors.467  As the colonies ma-
 
(London, Reed & Hunter 1814) (legal opinions on the force of English law in colonies); St. 
George Leakin Sioussat, The Theory of the Extension of English Statutes to the Plantations, 
in 1 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 416–30 (1907); see also DANIEL 
J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD 1664–1830, at 68–69 (2005) (describing re-
search around effect of Parliament in colony); KETTNER, supra note 275, at 135–36 (discuss-
ing theories of discovery and conquest and respective implications on force of English law 
in colonies); 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 436, 438 (force of English statutes considered not 
binding and ignored). 
  For a discussion on the effect of English law in the colonies, see Paul Samuel Rein-
sch, The English Common Law in the Early American Colonies, in 1 SELECT ESSAYS IN 
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 367–415 (1907) and 1 WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE 
COMMON LAW IN COLONIAL AMERICA (2008).  When colonists indicated they had the right 
to English common law, they might not mean the idea of common law to a lawyer but rather 
a generic ideal to enjoy the rights Englishmen enjoyed in England.  Julius Goebel, Jr., The 
Courts and the Law in Colonial New York, in ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF EARLY AMERICAN 
LAW 245, 269–70 (David H. Flaherty ed., 1969). 
 462. LABAREE, supra note 347, at 7 (high ranking of royal charter in scheme of colonial 
authority); see also supra Part II.D (borough charters). 
 463. See supra notes 259–60, 267 and accompanying text. 
 464. See supra notes 268–69, 312 and accompanying text. 
 465. See supra Parts III–IV.E (charters to merchant associations and explorers traveling 
overseas and eventually planting colonies). 
 466. Most of Parliament’s acts expressly affecting the colonies in the seventeenth centu-
ry involved commerce and trade.  3 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 513; see also BEER, supra 
note 237, at 341–42 (Long Parliament and Civil War increased Parliament’s role in colonial 
affairs); id. at 343 (during the English Civil War, Parliament took over all legislative and 
executive aspects of the Empire). 
 467. CHARLES M. ANDREWS, THE COLONIAL BACKGROUND OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 16–25 (1931); GREENE, PROVINCIAL AMERICA, supra note 397, at 67–69 (not-
ing increase in assembly’s influence in proprietary and royal governments after Glorious 
Revolution and loss of prerogative in England). 
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tured, ironically the charter’s greatest use was protection from royal inter-
ference.468  Throughout the colonial period, the charter was a safeguard for 
the colonist or promoter and an obstacle to the crown’s control.469  None-
theless, as a colony of the Empire, the crown retained control in a variety of 
ways.470  Because the charter was a royal grant, it was subject to repurchase 
or revocation for abuse.471  When it was displeased with the colony, in the 
same manner as it would with a corporation or municipality, the crown 
would bring quo warranto472 or scire facias proceedings against the colony 
and its charter.473  Some colonies chose to fight the legal proceedings; oth-
 
 468. See, e.g., 1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 445–46 n.3; 2 JOHN 
WINTHROP’S JOURNAL, HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND 314–15 (J.K. Hosmer ed., 1908) (deflect-
ing several royal grievances by appealing to privileges and immunities of charter); 
LABAREE, supra note 347, at 95 (discussing crown’s commission as central authority for 
royal governor except in case of Massachusetts with its 1691 charter to which colonists 
could appeal); cf. 2 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 346 (crown’s charter 
privileges as liberties and rights against arbitrary proprietor). 
 469. 4 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 371–72, 389–91, 402–03 (noting 
crown’s animosity toward private colonies in light of commercial goals). 
 470. LOUISE P. KELLOGG, THE AMERICAN COLONIAL CHARTER 207–10, 256–61, 267–68, 
272–73 (1904) (commissions, veto power, appellate review, and appointment powers).  
When the colonies grew in number and local complexity, the crown delegated royal power 
to a council, commission, or board to handle colonial affairs. CHARLES M. ANDREWS, 
BRITISH COMMITTEES, COMMISSIONS AND COUNCILS OF TRADE AND PLANTATIONS 1622–
1675, at 9–23 (1908) [hereinafter ANDREWS, BRITISH COMMITTEES] (describing commissions 
and committees of the Privy Council from 1622–1675).  In 1634, the crown established a 
formal royal commission for trade and plantations.  1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra 
note 228, at 412.  With royal assent, the commission had power to make laws, ordinances, 
and constitutions concerning public, ecclesiastic, and private affairs in the colonies.  The 
commission and its successors had full power to enforce the laws, review colonial executive 
action, appoint officers, serve as a royal court of appeal, and issue charters for new colonies.  
ANDREWS, BRITISH COMMITTEES, supra, at 16–17; SNOW, supra note 331, at 69–72.  
Throughout the colonial period, a similar body handled colonial affairs.  It was natural for 
these committees to treat all the colonies as one entity to maximize England’s interests, even 
if those interests conflicted with the welfare of the colony.  ANDREWS, BRITISH COMMITTEES, 
supra, at 25. 
 471. See supra notes 30, 120–21 (remarking that royal charters to lords and entities could 
be revoked for abuse or abandonment). 
 472. The king pursued an action of quo warranto against a franchise holder to resume 
charter privileges of those who usurped authority beyond the privileges granted or who ex-
ercised privileges without a charter.  See supra note 121. 
 473. The king pursued an action of scire facias to repeal a charter granted by deceit or 
against the liberty of the subject.  9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 173, at 66–67 (explaining quo 
warranto was appropriate for de facto franchise holders who operated without authority and 
scire facias was appropriate for de jure holder who abused authority); Philip S. Haffenden, 
The Crown and the Colonial Charters, 1675–1688: Part I, 15 WM. & MARY Q. 3d 297, 302 
n.12 (1958).  Toward the end of the seventeenth century, the crown initiated legal proceed-
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ers surrendered their charter and became royal colonies to avoid litigation 
costs.474  The crown took advantage of its ability to revoke charters on sev-
eral occasions, notably toward the end of the seventeenth century, before 
the Glorious Revolution, when it made efforts to consolidate the colonies 
into the Dominion of New England.475 
V. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF ENGLISHMEN AND THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION 
Up to this point, this Article has focused on rights and liberties granted 
by charter.  Charters clothed subjects and entities with a variety of privileg-
es and immunities.476  The seventeenth century produced a different kind of 
liberty, the liberty of the Englishmen—a step removed from, and often hos-
tile to, the crown’s charter.477 
 
ings against proprietors and corporate colonies.  Philip S. Haffenden, The Crown and the 
Colonial Charters, 1675–1688: Part II, 15 WM. & MARY Q. 3d 452, 453–56 (1958); cf. 
JENNIFER LEVIN, THE CHARTER CONTROVERSY IN THE CITY OF LONDON 1660–1688, AND ITS 
CONSEQUENCES 12–16 (1969) (discussing initiation of quo warranto proceedings against 
English cities in latter half of seventeenth century).  Frequent violations of the navigation 
act renewed efforts against the colonies.  CRAVEN, COLONIES IN TRANSITION, supra note 402, 
at 258–61.  In addition to litigation, on several occasions authorities tried to push bills 
through Parliament to abolish crown charters and consolidate the colonies under royal con-
trol.  See KELLOGG, supra note 470, at 284–91, 298–305, 308–10 (bills were introduced in 
Parliament against colonial charters in 1701, 1706, and 1715); see also ANDREWS, BRITISH 
COMMITTEES, supra note 470, at 21–22. 
 474. KELLOGG, supra note 470, at 197, 201–06, 236–37; see also 4 ANDREWS, COLONIAL 
PERIOD, supra note 228, at 394–95, 401–02 (discussing the status of the colonies following 
royal litigation, noting specifically that Maryland, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Pennsyl-
vania ultimately survived royalization efforts while Massachusetts remained in class of it-
self); DUMMER, supra note 373, at 6–11. 
 475.  3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 118–19 (indicating that the 
Duke of York’s motivation for the Dominion of New England was a reason for backing 
away from the 1683 Charter of Liberties; within months of reaching throne, the Duke of 
York authorized quo warranto proceedings against the charter colonies); BARNES, supra 
note 427, at 29–30 (explaining that the Dominion was favored over several independent 
royal colonies because of the expense of having separate royal officials in each colony); 3 
OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 378 (revocation of Massachusetts’s charter); id. at 381–82, 393, 
395–400 (efforts to revoke Rhode Island and Connecticut charters); id. at 383 (royal com-
mission for government of New England); id. at 387, 402–04 (complaints that the commis-
sion for New England did not contain assembly and thus abridged privileges of English-
men). 
 476. For example, many charters gave permission to travel, discover lands, and form 
colonies.  See supra notes 259–60, 267 and accompanying text. 
 477. See generally CHRISTOPHER HILL, THE CENTURY OF REVOLUTION 1603–1714 (1961) 
(providing an account of how the years between 1603 and 1714 shaped modern English so-
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A.  Monopolies and the Liberty of the Subject 
Royal privileges and immunities to merchants and entities historically 
included an element of exclusivity.  One of the main benefits of member-
ship to the gild or regulated company was its monopolistic trading privileg-
es.478  Many merchant associations enjoyed monopoly privileges, and the 
latter part of the sixteenth century saw a variety of royal monopolies.  To-
ward the end of Queen Elizabeth’s reign, representatives in Parliament in-
voked the right to free trade and free use of labor against the crown’s mo-
nopolies and its prerogative.479  In 1602, one subject affected by a 
monopoly on playing cards questioned the validity of the royal patent, a 
dispute which resulted in the famous Case of Monopolies.480  The court 
ruled against the crown’s patent.481 
 
ciety).  Seventeenth-century grievances focused on the king’s arbitrary taxation and the roy-
al prerogative generally.  J.W. GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY 58, 60–61, 70, 80–86 (1955) (discussing the rise of the House of Commons against 
the king in the first half of the seventeenth century); STEPHEN D. WHITE, SIR EDWARD COKE 
AND “THE GRIEVANCES OF THE COMMONWEALTH,” 1621–1628, at 27–274 (1979) (describing 
the parliamentary career of Sir Edward Coke and the common grievances of the common-
wealth voiced during the first half of the seventeenth century); see also infra notes 479–83 
and accompanying text (free subjects and liberty of Englishmen in debates on crown’s mo-
nopolies). 
  Seventeenth-century advocacy was replete with references to ancient statutes, such 
as the Magna Carta, but contained little discussion or concern for the ancient context of 
those statutes.  1 J.W. ALLEN, ENGLISH POLITICAL THOUGHT 1603–1660, at 28–29 (1938); 
GOUGH, supra, at 66; HULSEBOSCH, supra note 461, at 28–35 (describing the rise of “fun-
damental law” in the first half of the seventeenth century); 3 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 11–
12 (noting colonists’ reliance on birthright privileges of Englishmen which were supposedly 
secured by the Magna Carta, common law, and several fundamental statutes); POCOCK, su-
pra note 292, at 47–48 (discussing use of ancient statutes out of context); see also infra note 
503 (identifying several fundamental ancient statutes). 
 478. See supra notes 164–65, 175, 233, 262 and accompanying text. 
 479. THEODORE K. RABB, JACOBEAN GENTLEMAN: SIR EDWIN SANDYS 1561–1629, at 89–
96, 236–40 (1998) (discussing the Magna Carta, free trade, property, and free use of labor in 
Commons debates against monopolies); 1 SCOTT, supra note 164, at 119–24 (commenting 
on legislation initiated by merchants advocating for free trade); Thomas B. Nachbar, Mo-
nopoly, Mercantilism, and the Politics of Regulation, 91 VA. L. REV. 1313, 1329–32 (2005) 
(noting that Queen Elizabeth acquiesced to criticisms by revoking some of her monopolies).  
Similar to the reaction to mortmain legislation, see sources cited supra note 220, merchants 
sought incorporation in the seventeenth century to avoid emerging restrictions on royal mo-
nopolies.  UNWIN, supra note 198, at 301–03, 317–19 (noting that parliamentary legislation 
regulating royal monopolies contained exemptions for certain corporations). 
 480. Darcy v. Allen, (1603) 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B.); 11 Co. Rep. 84b; see also Na-
chbar, supra note 479, at 1328 (analyzing the case). 
 481. Nachbar, supra note 479, at 1327. 
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An outcome of the litigation and debates on monopolies was the plea 
for the “liberty of the subject.”482  Sir Edwin Sandys, an early figure in 
American history and an opponent of monopolies, especially charter privi-
leges to large trading companies, argued in 1604 that 
All free Subjects are born inheritable, as to their Land, so also to the free 
Exercise of their Industry, in those Trades whereto they apply themselves, 
and whereby they are to live. Merchandize being the chief and richest of all 
other, and of greater Extent and Importance than all the rest, it is against the 
natural Right; and Liberty of the Subjects of England to restrain it into the 
Hands of some few, as now it is; for although there may be now some Five 
or Six Thousand Persons, counting Children and Prentices, free of the sev-
eral Companies of the Merchants, in the whole; yet apparent it is, that the 
Governors of these Companies, by their monopolizing Orders, have so 
handled the Matter, as that the Mass of the whole Trade of all the Realm is 
in the Hands of some Two Hundred Persons at the most, the rest serving for 
a Shew only, and reaping small Benefit.483 
Once such a grand concept of “liberty of subject” was introduced, ad-
vocates in Parliament, echoed by pamphleteers throughout the colonial pe-
riod, carried the “Englishmen” torch far and wide to serve various needs.  
Advocacy was initially directed against royal privileges, though it became 
more general by the parliamentary debates over the Petition of Right.484  
These grievances came together in Leveller writings of the 1640s.485  In 
 
 482. Darcy, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1262–63 (describing the monopoly as “against the common 
law, and the benefit and liberty of the subject”); Nachbar, supra note 479, at 1333–36 (ana-
lyzing Coke’s report on Darcy).  Lipson cited the 1497 merchant adventurer statute, 12 Hen. 
7 c. 6, as the first instance of merchants claiming “Englishmen’s liberty.”  1 LIPSON, supra 
note 71, at 575; see also CARUS-WILSON, supra note 228, at 172–75; supra note 246 and 
accompanying text. 
 483. 1 H.C. JOURN. (1604) 214–15 (U.K.), available at http://www.british-
history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=8252#sec3293; see also RABB, supra note 479, at 93–94. 
 484. WHITE, supra note 477 at 219–74 (explaining that, by the late 1620s, the Commons’ 
view on liberty and rights of subjects had expanded beyond monopolies to include arbitrary 
acts by the crown, imprisonments without cause, forced loans, and martial law); see also 
FRANCES HELEN RELF, THE PETITION OF RIGHT 19, 27–29 (1917) (describing the debates 
leading up to the Petition of Right). 
 485. Early Leveller writings include, e.g., JOHN LILBURNE, ENGLAND’S BIRTH RIGHT 
JUSTIFIED (1645); JOHN LILBURNE, LONDON’S LIBERTY IN CHAINS DISCOVERED (1646); JOHN 
LILBURNE, FOUNDATIONS OF FREEDOM; OR AN AGREEMENT OF THE PEOPLE: PROPOSED AS A 
RULE FOR FUTURE GOVERNMENT IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FIRM AND LASTING PEACE 
(1647).  For background on the Leveller writings, see Rachel Foxley, John Lilburne and the 
Citizenship of ‘Free-Born Englishmen,’ 47 HIST. J. 849, 853, 856–861 (2004) and DON M. 
WOLFE, LEVELLER MANIFESTOES OF THE PURITAN REVOLUTION (1944).  The House of 
Commons provided additional support for claims invoking the privileges, rights, and liber-
ties of Englishmen during its advocacy concerning monopolies, the privileges of Parliament, 
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opposition to royal, parliamentary, or monopolistic forces, Leveller writ-
ings of the mid-seventeenth century championed the birthright liberties, 
privileges, and immunities of the freeborn Englishmen.486 
B.  Englishmen in the Colonies 
Across the Atlantic, pleas for the “privileges and immunities of Eng-
lishmen” were of great importance to colonists and colonial governance.  
As noted above, colonial charters to explorers and colonists contained a 
denization clause preserving English citizenship, removing alienage disa-
bilities, and granting colonists the privileges and immunities of Englishmen 
as if they were born in England.487  With the language of colonial charters, 
reinforced by parliamentary advocacy and popular pamphlets, pleas for the 
liberties, privileges, and immunities of Englishmen became a part of the 
lexicon of the American colonist.  A few years after Baltimore’s 1632 char-
ter, Maryland’s assembly proposed “[a]n Act for the Liberties of the Peo-
ple”: 
Be it Enacted By the Lord Proprietarie of this Province of and with the ad-
 
and the Petition of Right.  KAMMEN, DEPUTYES & LIBERTYES, supra note 341, at 71–85; see 
supra note 484. 
 486. Leveller advocacy for greater coverage of ancient charter privileges and immuni-
ties, such as London’s, might have contributed to the absorption of privileges and immuni-
ties language associated with the rights of freeborn Englishmen.  See, e.g., LILBURNE, 
LONDON’S LIBERTY IN CHAINS DISCOVERED, supra note 485 (relying on London’s ancient 
charter privileges and immunities to support free elections and greater participation in Lon-
don’s government). 
  Part II discussed a variety of borough franchises, privileges, and immunities from 
crown to recipient.  While other individuals and entities also received privileges, the privi-
leges and liberties of major towns, especially London, became not only a benchmark for 
other towns but also a standard for the privileges and liberties of the common subject. 
  The larger communities, the city and the nation, began to assert their rights 
over the partial interests of family or trade or class, and to demand that these 
should cast off the devices of feudal faction and subordinate their differences to 
the rule of a common authority. 
  In this object the city, as was natural, succeeded in advance of the nation.  The 
struggle of factions in London was a kind of rehearsal on a small scale of that 
larger conflict in which the feudal privileges of the nobility were to batter them-
selves to pieces on the fields of Towton and Bosworth. 
UNWIN, supra note 198, at 155–56; see also NORTON, supra note 33, at 51 (explaining that 
burgage tenure and mercantile liberties helped free towns and noting that once boroughs 
participated in Parliament, burghal liberty eventually spread similar liberties throughout 
whole nation); id. at 52–53, 66–69 (remarking that liberties of London were sacred and that 
London and the crown had symbiotic relationship). 
 487. See supra Parts III.B, III.C (describing the charters to Warde and Gilbert). 
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vice and approbation of the freemen of the same that all the Inhabitants of 
this Province being Christians (Slaves excepted[)] Shall have and enjoy all 
such rights liberties immunities priviledges and free customs within this 
Province as any naturall born subjects of England hath or ought to have or 
enjoy in the realm of England by force or vertue of the common law or 
State Law of England (saveing in such Cases as the same are or may be al-
tered or changed by the Laws and ordinances of this Province).488 
Not long after Maryland’s legislation, in 1646, Dr. Robert Child and 
fellow petitioners challenged Massachusetts’s political restrictions that lim-
ited freemanship to church members.489  Child argued that Massachusetts 
failed to settle according to the laws of England and that colonists were de-
nied the liberties of freeborn Englishmen.490  Child, as memorialized by his 
brother, claimed there must be a “comfortable enjoyment of our Lives, Lib-
erties and Estates, according to our due Naturall rights, as Free-born sub-
jects of the English nation.”491 
Several additional examples fill colonial record books.  Following the 
English Civil War, loyal Virginians surrendering to the commissioners of 
the Commonwealth of England claimed the rights of freeborn Englishmen, 
including freedom from taxation without consent and the right to the same 
privileges as enjoyed in other colonies.492  After the Restoration, colonists 
 
 488. An Act for the Liberties of the People (1638), in 1 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND, 
PROCEEDINGS AND ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF MARYLAND, JANUARY 1637/8-
SEPTEMBER 1664, at 41 (William Hand Browne ed., Baltimore, Maryland Historical Society 
1883); see also 2 JOHN LEEDS BOZMAN, HISTORY OF MARYLAND 115 (Baltimore, James Lu-
cas & E.K. Deaver 1837) (discussing the Act); David S. Bogen, The Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause of Article IV, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 794, 804–05, n.35 (1987). 
 489. 1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 489–91 (discussing Child’s peti-
tion and noting that it helped liberalize restrictions on non-freemen); GEORGE L. KITTREDGE, 
DOCTOR ROBERT CHILD THE REMONSTRANT 1–146 (1919) (providing a detailed discussion 
of Dr. Robert Child’s life from birth to death). 
 490. See generally JOHN CHILDE, NEW ENGLAND’S JONAS CAST UP AT ENGLAND (Boston, 
Wm. Parsons Lunt 1647) (providing a description of Dr. Child’s petition). 
 491. Id. at 9; 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 257–63 (providing an account of Dr. Robert 
Child’s petition).  Dr. Child’s actions and remonstrance may have been influenced by 
Coke’s publications, Leveller pamphlets, or the not-too-distant debates concerning the Peti-
tion of Right.  See supra notes 479–85. 
 492. 1 WILLIAM W. HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE 363–65 (Richmond, Geo. Cochran 
1823) (including Virginia’s articles of capitulation).  In these articles, Virginians made the 
following claims: their surrender was voluntary and not a conquest; they should enjoy the 
privileges and freedoms of the people that belong to England; their land tenure system 
should be retained; they should suffer no taxation without the assembly’s consent; they 
should have equivalent commercial rights toward foreign nations as other English-born sub-
jects; and generally, that they should enjoy the same privileges enjoyed in other jurisdic-
tions.  Id.; 1 DOYLE, supra note 272, at 221–24; cf. GREENE, PROVINCIAL AMERICA, supra 
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in Maryland’s lower house, seeking to curb Baltimore’s veto power and ar-
bitrary taxation, grieved unsuccessfully in the “publick grievances of 1669” 
for the privileges of Englishmen.493  Toward the end of the seventeenth 
century, colonists in New York, having been treated less favorably than 
other colonists in neighboring colonies or Englishmen generally and having 
been promised such privileges, fought with the Duke of York for full as-
sembly rights.494  After briefly receiving such rights, subsequent loss of the 
local assembly in New York and other colonies forming the Dominion of 
New England likewise evoked claims of violations of Englishmen’s 
rights.495  Similar efforts were employed by colonists in Carolina at the turn 
of the eighteenth century.496  By the end of the seventeenth century, advo-
cacy for colonial self-government and participation in taxation, long con-
sidered privileges of Englishmen, was commonplace.497 
 
note 397, at 70–72 (discussing the rights and liberties demanded by Virginians after the Glo-
rious Revolution). 
  In the latter half of the seventeenth century, following struggles with Northern Neck 
proprietors and suffering English taxation, Virginians wanted a charter to incorporate and 
protect their rights—in particular, protection from taxation without consent.  LOVEJOY, su-
pra note 421, at 35–40.  Under the proposal, no taxes would be raised except by the com-
mon consent of the governor, council, and burgesses.  Id. at 38.  Virginians claimed taxation 
by consent was a privilege of Englishmen and had been the custom of the colony for fifty 
years.  Id. at 39, 78; 1 DOYLE, supra note 272, at 218–19 (describing the principle of partic-
ipation in taxation as a “colonial liberty”). 
 493. LOVEJOY, supra note 421, at 74–78. 
 494. The Duke, to appease colonists, allowed an assembly and assured colonists that they 
would receive privileges and immunities equal to those of settlers in other colonies.  See su-
pra notes 408–29 and accompanying text. 
 495. BARNES, supra note 427, at 50, 87–90 (noting claim that taxation without represen-
tation violated the rights of Englishmen and specifying ancient statutes securing such 
rights); CRAVEN, COLONIES IN TRANSITION, supra note 402, at 219–20 (colonists challenged 
the Dominion’s authority over taxation, among other issues); LOVEJOY, supra note 421, at 
180–86 (taxation without representation in Dominion violated rights of Englishmen); 3 
OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 387, 393, 402–04; see also supra note 475 (describing the Do-
minion of New England’s formation). 
 496. 3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 235 & n.2 (deputies of assembly 
fought for the rights and liberties of Englishmen). 
 497. See generally HENRY CARE, ENGLISH LIBERTIES OR THE FREE-BORN SUBJECT’S 
INHERITANCE (John Carter 1774) (1680) (citing the Magna Carta, the Habeas Corpus Act, 
other important statutes, and the powers of Parliament); WILLIAM PENN, THE EXCELLENT 
PRIVILEDGE OF LIBERTY & PROPERTY BEING THE BIRTH-RIGHT OF FREE-BORN SUBJECTS OF 
ENGLAND (n.p. 1687) (discussing the Magna Carta, the Confirmation of the Charters of Lib-
erties of England, De Tallagio Non Concedendo, the patent granted by the King to William 
Penn, and the Charter of Liberties granted by William Penn to the freemen and inhabitants 
of Pennsylvania); see also supra notes 487–96.  For additional reading, consult the materials 
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Legal import aside, colonists’ pleas for the “privileges and immunities 
of English subjects” had the political effect of leveraging desirable aspects 
of English law in force in England or soliciting the rights of freer neighbor-
ing colonies.498  In this sense, use of the language functioned like the “liber 
burgus,” “liberum burgagium,” and charter-association language of the 
twelfth- and thirteenth-century borough charter, converging boroughs to the 
freedoms of a free or common mother town.499  The goal of the mesne bor-
ough was to gain borough status, a court, burgage tenure, or otherwise free 
itself of a lord and obtain the liberties of a free borough.  The objective of 
American colonists was to obtain or protect its assembly and associated 
privileges copied from the House of Commons, typically from a proprietor 
but also, to a lesser degree, from the crown.500  Arbitrary taxation by the 
crown and feudal authorities was a grievance throughout both periods and, 
when joined by parliamentary taxation in the eighteenth century, ultimately 
contributed to the American Revolution.501 
C.  American Revolution 
As the discussion above demonstrates, the patriots of the American 
Revolution inherited privileges and immunities language from various 
sources, and when they felt they were denied rights enjoyed by neighbors 
or fellow Englishmen, the claim for equal privileges and immunities was a 
 
cited in 3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 304–05 & n.3 (listing pamphlets 
and treatises discussing the rights of Englishmen). 
 498. GREENE, PROVINCIAL AMERICA, supra note 397, at 67–77, 80 (noting that especially 
after Glorious Revolution, colonial assemblies were identifying events in England to claim 
benefits of Englishmen); see also supra notes 487–97 (explaining that colonists, especially 
those under proprietorships, leveraged “privileges and immunities” of others for gain).  For 
a discussion on English law in the colonies, see supra notes 461, 466. 
 499. See supra Part II.D (discussing borough charters and association with mother towns 
and free boroughs); supra notes 143–50 (references to common mother towns with desired 
liberties, typically royal towns); supra notes 223–24 (describing the liberating influence of 
gild and collective forces in medieval municipality). 
 500. See supra note 431 (discussing parliamentary privileges and participation in taxa-
tion and legislation). 
 501. See supra note 69 (Parliament’s taxation of palatinate without approval of bishop’s 
assembly); supra note 206 (greater borough community fought for participation in borough 
assessments); supra note 382 (taxation by select body of assistants in Massachusetts 
prompted change in which freemen elected deputies to attend General Court); supra notes 
419–29 (New York colonists, taxed without representation, fought for consent in taxation); 
supra note 492 (Virginians and taxation); infra note 506 (English taxation of colonies and 
American Revolution). 
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natural response.502  Grieved colonists often argued that such language 
meant that they too enjoyed the benefit of binding English common and 
statutory law such as the Magna Carta, the Petition of Right, and other fun-
damental statutes securing, for example, trial by jury and taxation by con-
sent or representation.503 
The various strands of privileges and immunities language (charter 
privileges and immunities, denization or membership privileges and im-
munities, and birthright privileges and immunities of freeborn Englishmen) 
came together briefly in the pre-Revolution grievances of the colonies.504  
 
 502. See, e.g., RICHARD BLAND, THE COLONEL DISMOUNTED (1764), reprinted in 1 
PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1750–1776, at 301, 320–21 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 
1965) (arguing that colonists, born free, were entitled to all the “liberties and privileges of 
English subjects,” including the right to be free of legislation by English Parliament reach-
ing into the internal governance of the colonies); THOMAS FITCH, REASONS WHY THE 
BRITISH COLONIES, IN AMERICA, SHOULD NOT BE CHARGED WITH INTERNAL TAXES (1764), 
reprinted in 1 PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, supra, at 386–407 (liberty and 
privilege of being taxed only with consent; birthright to enjoy English law; colonists have 
“the same general and essential privileges of the British constitution” (quotation at 388)). 
 503. GOUGH, supra note 477, at 61–63 (1628 House committee finding liberty of subject 
safeguarded by the Magna Carta and several fundamental statutes in force in England); 3 
OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 11–12 (noting colonists’ reliance on birthright privileges of Eng-
lishmen secured by the Magna Carta, common law, and several fundamental statutes); see 
also supra note 477 and accompanying text (rise of fundamental law in early seventeenth 
century); supra notes 488–502 and accompanying text (colonial use of birthright privileges); 
infra notes 504–09 and accompanying text (grievances of American Revolution). 
 504. See October 14, 1774 Declarations and Resolves, in 1 JOURNALS, supra note 14, at 
63–73.  Similar privileges and immunities language can be found in colonists’ responses to 
the Stamp Act: 
That His Majesty’s Liege Subjects in these Colonies, are entitled to all the inher-
ent Rights and Liberties of his Natural born Subjects, within the Kingdom of 
Great-Britain. . . .  That it is inseparably essential to the Freedom of a People, and 
the undoubted Right of Englishmen, that no Taxes be imposed on them, but with 
their own Consent, given personally, or by their Representatives. . . .  That the 
People of these Colonies are not, and from their local Circumstances cannot be, 
Represented in the House of Commons in Great-Britain. . . .  That the only Repre-
sentatives of the People of these Colonies, are Persons chosen therein by them-
selves, and that no Taxes ever have been, or can be Constitutionally imposed on 
them, but by their respective Legislature. 
Resolutions of the Stamp Act, Cont. Cong., (October 7–24, 1765), at paras. II–V, reprinted 
in PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION: SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS ON THE STAMP ACT CRISIS, 1764–
1766, at 62–63 (Edmund S. Morgan ed., 1959) [hereinafter PROLOGUE].  Likewise, the Vir-
ginia colonists stated 
[t]hat the first Adventurers and Settlers of . . . Virginia brought with them . . . all 
the Liberties, Privileges, Franchises, and Immunities, that have at any Time been 
held, enjoyed, and possessed, by the people of Great Britain. . . .  That by two roy-
al Charters, granted by King James the First, the Colonists . . . are . . . entitled to 
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Just prior to Independence, in one of the colonists’ formal grievances, the 
October 14, 1774 Declaration and Resolves, members of the Continental 
Congress described the controversies facing the colonists.505  Taxation 
without representation or consent, this time by Parliament, was one of the 
foremost complaints and directly or indirectly pervaded most of the colo-
nists’ grievances.506  In Resolution 2 of the Declarations and Resolves, col-
onists urged that “our ancestors, who first settled these colonies, were at the 
time of their emigration from the mother country, entitled to all the rights, 
liberties, and immunities of free and natural-born subjects, within the realm 
of England.”507  Resolution 3 followed with a declaration indicating that 
subjects did not lose these rights by emigrating from England to the colo-
nies but that they “and their descendants now are . . . entitled to the exer-
cise and enjoyment of all such of them, as their local and other circum-
stances enable them to exercise and enjoy.”508  Subsequent resolutions 
specifically claimed the benefit of English common and statutory law.  Af-
ter declaring the general benefit of English law as modified by local cir-
cumstances, colonists grieved in Resolution 7 that they were “likewise enti-
tled to all the immunities and privileges granted and confirmed to them by 
royal charters, or secured by their several codes of provincial laws.”509 
 
all Liberties, Privileges, and Immunities of Denizens and natural Subjects, to all 
Intents and Purposes, as if they had been abiding and born within the Realm of 
England. . . .  That his Majesty’s liege People . . . have . . . enjoyed the inestimable 
Right of being governed by such Laws, respecting their internal Polity and Taxa-
tion, as are derived from their own Consent, with the Approbation of their Sover-
eign . . . . 
Virginia Resolves of May 1765, reprinted in PROLOGUE, supra, at 47–48.  Pennsylvania also 
responded to the Stamp Act by stating 
[t]hat the inhabitants of the Province are entitled to all the Liberties, Rights and 
Privileges of his Majesty’s Subjects in Great-Britain, or elsewhere, and that the 
Constitution of Government in this Province is founded on the natural Rights of 
Mankind, and the noble Principles of English Liberty, and therefore is, or ought to 
be, perfectly free. . . .  That it is the inherent Birth-right, and indubitable Privilege, 
of every British Subject, to be taxed only by his own Consent, or that of his legal 
Representatives, in Conjunction with his Majesty, or his Substitutes. 
Resolves of the Pennsylvania Assembly on the Stamp Act, September 21, 1765, reprinted in 
PROLOGUE, supra, at 51. 
 505. See October 14, 1774 Declarations and Resolves, in 1 JOURNALS, supra note 14, at 
63–73. 
 506. See id. at 63–64, 68–69. 
 507. Id. at 68 (Resolution 2). 
 508. Id. (Resolution 3). 
 509. Id. at 69 (Resolution 7).  Additional complaints included admiralty courts, lack of 
trial by jury, dependent judges, quartering troops, suspending assemblies, ignoring petitions 
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Colonial grievances were ultimately unsuccessful, and in 1776, the 
American colonies declared Independence and entered into war with Eng-
land. 
D.  Privileges and Immunities Language in the Articles of Confederation 
and Article IV of the U.S. Constitution 
After declaring Independence, the former colonies no longer needed to 
reference the privileges and immunities of freeborn English subjects.510  
States were in the process of adopting their own constitutions, and they 
confederated under the Articles of Confederation to enjoy a harmonious re-
lationship amongst themselves.511  Citizenship concerns—especially con-
cerning intercolonial discriminations in trade, travel, and commerce—
remained an important issue, and a residue of privileges and immunities 
language ultimately made it into the text of the Articles of Confederation 
and the U.S. Constitution.512 
Prior to Independence, colonists depended upon the benefits of Eng-
lish citizenship, and the former colonies struggled to fill the void left by 
this parental relationship in post-Independence governance.  Anticipating 
interstate conflict, the July 12, 1776 draft of the Articles of Confederation 
provided: 
Art VI.  The Inhabitants of each Colony shall henceforth always have the 
same Rights, Liberties, Privileges, Immunities and Advantages, in the other 
Colonies, which the said Inhabitants now have, in all Cases whatever, ex-
cept in those provided for by the next following Article. 
Art VII.  The Inhabitants of each Colony shall enjoy all the Rights, Liber-
ties, Privileges, Immunities, and Advantages, in Trade, Navigation, and 
Commerce, in any other Colony, and in going to and from the same[,] from 
and to any Part of the World, which the Natives of such Colony or any 
 
from local assemblies, trying colonists in England, closing the port of Boston, standing ar-
mies, and the right to assemble and petition the king.  Id. at 63–73. 
 510. Indeed, Chalmers points out this would have been hypocritical.  2 CHALMERS, supra 
note 461, at 412 (noting that Americans who had renounced their English citizenship could 
not argue for the privileges and immunities of Englishmen); see also KETTNER, supra note 
275, at 183–209 (indicating that questions of allegiance remained despite separation). 
 511. For the colonies’ state constitutions adopted in 1776 or shortly thereafter, see the 
state’s listing in 1 THORPE, supra note 259, at iii–xiv (including Delaware (1776), Maryland 
(1776), Massachusetts (1780), New Hampshire (1776), New Jersey (1776), North Carolina 
(1776), Pennsylvania (1776), South Carolina (1776), Virginia (1776), Georgia (1777), New 
York (1777) and Vermont 1777)).  See also May 10, 1776 Declarations and Resolves, in 4 
JOURNALS, supra note 14, at 341–42 (John Adam’s proposal for states to form their own 
governments). 
 512. See infra notes 523, 527. 
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Commercial Society, established by its Authority shall enjoy. 
Art VIII. Each Colony may assess or lay such Imposts or Duties as it thinks 
proper, on Importations or Exportations, provided such Imposts or Duties 
do not interfere with any Stipulations in Treaties hereafter entered into by 
the United States assembled, with the King or Kingdom of Great Britain, or 
any foreign Prince or State.513 
Reviewing the proposed language, one sees a division between the 
more general sixth and the more specific seventh and eighth articles.  The 
fact that the proposed sixth article links the seventh with “said Inhabitants 
now have . . . except in those provided for by the next following Article” 
suggests that the sixth article was a broad declaration of principle for the 
status quo except for the more specific concerns addressed in the next arti-
cles.  The sixth article, proposed within days of Independence, seems to be 
an effort to replace or convert the claim to the status of natural-born Eng-
lishmen, prominent in the years leading up to the Revolution, into an Arti-
cle of governance for the Confederation.514  Before Independence, Eng-
lishmen status served various functions in the colonies.515  Drafters did not 
want fellow colonists to be aliens in the other colonies.  In other words, as a 
starting point, colonists, post-Independence, retained all the rights, liberties, 
privileges, immunities, and advantages of natural-born Englishmen in the 
other colonies without the natural-born Englishmen language.516  As a dec-
 
 513. July 12, 1776 Declarations and Resolves, in 5 JOURNALS, supra note 14, at 546–48 
(strikethrough in original), see also Bogen, supra note 488, at 817–22 (discussing the pro-
posed articles).  In its July 1776 Plan of Treaties with Louis the Sixteenth, the Continental 
Congress discussed similar anti-discrimination concepts: 
Art. I:  The Subjects of the most Christian King shall pay no other Duties or Im-
posts in the Ports, Havens, Roads, Countries, Islands, Cities, or Towns of the said 
united States, or any of them, than the Natives thereof, or any Commercial Com-
panies established by them or any of them, shall pay, but shall enjoy all other the 
Rights, Liberties, Priviledges, Immunities, and Exemptions in Trade, Navigation 
and Commerce in passing from one Part thereof to another, and in going to and 
from the same, from and to any Part of the World, which the said Natives or 
Companies enjoy. 
July 18, 1776 Declarations and Resolves, in 5 JOURNALS, supra note 14, at 576–77, 768. 
 514. See supra notes 504–09 and accompanying text. 
 515. KETTNER, supra note 275, at 69, 91–93, 117–21 (noting that those traveling to the 
colonies sought English naturalization beforehand to avoid restrictions in trade, travel, and 
land ownership in colonies); id. at 74–75 (discussing Parliament’s 1740 act naturalizing al-
iens residing in colonies); id. at 93–96 (emphasizing that status as an Englishmen was im-
portant to avoid disabilities under navigation acts and that colonial naturalization was not a 
substitute for Englishmen status); id. at 98–99 (observing that colonial naturals under local 
naturalization acts without English citizenship faced the threat of forfeiture). 
 516. For example, the Continental Congress stated 
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laration of principle, the proposed sixth article led to the real object: pre-
vention of local restrictions and discriminations in trade, navigation, and 
commerce.  The proposed seventh and eighth articles addressed the sub-
stance of the drafters’ initial interstate concerns and replaced English regu-
lations by placing inhabitants of each colony or state on the same basis as 
natives with respect to rights in trade, navigation, and commerce. 
Both the proposed sixth and seventh articles were omitted from the se-
cond draft.517  On November 11, 1777, the committee formed to consider 
new articles reintroduced both the general and substantive anti-
discrimination privileges and immunities language.518  In the reintroduc-
tion, the more general clause (albeit with residency language) again intro-
duced the more specific clauses.  For the general sentence, drafters even 
throw in “natural born free citizens” as further evidence confirming its re-
placement of the former “natural-born” or “freeborn” Englishmen con-
cept.519  Following the general statement, the rest of the proposed third 
draft, like the proposed seventh and eighth articles of the first draft, ad-
dressed substantive restrictions concerning anticipated discriminations in 
travel, imposts, and duties: 
And for the more certain preservation of friendship and mutual intercourse 
between the people of the different States in this Union, the Citizens of eve-
ry State, going to reside in another State, Shall be entitled to all the rights 
and privileges of the natural born free Citizens of the State to which they go 
to reside; and the people of each State Shall have free egress and regress for 
their persons and property to and from every other State, without hinder-
ance, molestation or imposition of any kind.  Provided, that if Merchandize 
of any sort be imported for purposes of traffick within any State, that the 
person So importing Shall be liable to the Same imposts and duties as the 
people of the State are by law liable to where Such importations are made, 
and none other.  And provided also that the benefit of this Article Shall ex-
 
(2) That our ancestors, who first settled these colonies, were at the time of their 
emigration from the mother country, entitled to all the rights, liberties, and im-
munities of free and natural-born subjects, within the realm of England . . . . 
(3) That by such emigration they by no means forfeited, surrendered, or lost any 
of those rights, but that they were, and their descendants now are, entitled to the 
exercise and enjoyment of all such of them, as their local and other circumstances 
enable them to exercise and enjoy. 
October 14, 1774 Declarations and Resolves, in 1 JOURNALS, supra note 14, at 68; see also 
supra note 504 and accompanying text. 
 517. See August 20, 1776 Declarations and Resolves, in 5 JOURNALS, supra note 14, at 
672, 676. 
 518. See November 11, 1777 Declarations and Resolves, in 9 JOURNALS, supra note 14, 
at 885, 888. 
 519. Id. 
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tend to the property of the United States, and of any particular State, in the 
Same manner as to the property of an Individual in any State.520 
The edits to this draft produced a version similar to the final version: 
And the better to secure and perpetuate mutual Friendship and Intercourse 
between the People of the different States in this Union, Agreed “that, The 
free Inhabitants of each of these States, Paupers Vagabonds and fugitives 
excepted, shall be entitled to all Priviledges and Immunities of free Citizens 
in all and every of said the respective States (saveing to the Inhabitants of 
the respective States the Admission of their own Inhabitants and the Sole 
Management of their own municipal Affairs).  And the People of  each 
States, shall have free Ingress and Egress for their Persons  and Property to 
and from every other State, to trade and traffick, without any Hindrance or 
Imposition of any Kind whatsoever, provided that if any Merchandise or 
Commodity be imported into any State for the purpose of Traffick therein, 
the Person so importing shall be liable to the same Imposts and Duties as 
the People of the State are by Law liable to where such Importations are 
made and none other, provided also that the Benefit of this Article shall Ex-
tend to the property of the United States and of any particular State in the 
same Manner as to the property of an Individual.521 
In this intermediate draft, drafters retained the general-specific dichot-
omy and removed the residency language.  The next draft adds back the 
residency language but retains the general-specific division.522  Making ad-
 
 520. Id. (footnotes omitted).  The contemplated use of “natural born free citizens” and 
proposals for the same import customs as natives pay suggest that the drafters were consult-
ing denization charters and naturalization acts which typically removed alien customs for 
covered parties importing merchandize into a state.  See supra note 285 and accompanying 
text. 
 521. November 11, 1777 Declarations and Resolves, in 9 JOURNALS, supra note 14, at 
888 (strikethrough in original) (footnotes omitted). 
 522. The proposed revisions read: 
And the better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse between 
the people of the different States in this Union, the Inhabitants of every State[,] 
Paupers Vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted[,] going to reside in an-
other State shall be entitled to all the rights and priviledges of the natural born free 
Citizens of the State to which they go to reside: And the people of  each State 
shall have free Ingress and Egress for their persons and property to and from every 
other state without hinderance, or imposition of any kind, Provided that if Mer-
chandise be imported into any State for purpose of traffick therein, the person so 
importing shall be liable to the same imposts and duties as the people of the State 
are by law liable to where such importations are made, and none other, And pro-
vided also that the benefit of this article shall extend to the property of the United 
States, and of any particular State, in the same manner as to the property of an In-
dividual. 
Id. at 889 (footnotes omitted). 
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ditional revisions, the final draft of Article IV of the Articles of Confedera-
tion provided: 
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse 
among the people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants 
of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice ex-
cepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in 
the several States; and the people of each State shall free ingress and re-
gress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges 
of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions, and re-
strictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively, provided that such re-
strictions shall not extend so far as to prevent the removal of property im-
ported into any State, to any other State, of which the owner is an 
inhabitant; provided also, that no imposition, duties or restriction shall be 
laid by any State, on the property of the United States, or either of them.523 
Tracing the progress from earlier drafts to the final draft, one sees the 
drafters struggling with awkward language prohibiting interstate discrimi-
nations in trade and commerce as the former colonies replaced the role of 
English citizenship and English trade restrictions in the confederated colo-
nies.524  The final draft of Article IV of the Articles maintained the specific 
attributes with respect to non-discrimination in trade, commerce, duties, 
and imposts but also contained general language securing free inhabitants 
all the “privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States.”525 
Government under the Articles suffered many defects.  Within ten 
years, the Framers met to forge the United States Constitution.  Unlike the 
Articles, the Constitution created a union of states with greater national 
powers in raising revenue and regulating commerce among the states and 
foreign entities.526  In the transformation from Article IV of the Articles to 
the Constitution, the Framers retained only a variation of the broader lan-
guage: “[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and 
Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”527  Other specific and sub-
 
 523. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV, para. 1. 
 524. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison) (noting potential embarrassing problems 
with privileges and immunities language present in Article IV of Articles where a free in-
habitant in their domiciled state can compel citizenship rights in the domicile state by re-
ceiving citizenship rights in another state, which the domicile state must recognize under 
Article IV of the Articles). 
 525. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV, para. 1. 
 526. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 30 (Alexander Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 
(James Madison).  Many other grievances of the American Revolution were addressed in the 
text of the Constitution.  See generally U.S. CONST. (taxation powers, naturalization, regula-
tion of interstate commerce, habeas corpus, separation of powers, trial by jury, etc.). 
 527. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; see also ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. 
IV, para. 1 (“[F]ree inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives 
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stantive anti-discrimination concerns formerly found in Article IV of the 
Articles were swept into the Constitution’s structural modifications as the 
states granted Congress greater authority in regulating, among other na-
tional issues, interstate commerce.528  In this light, the residual language 
may be viewed as serving a citizenship function nominally related to the 
former “privileges and immunities of Englishmen” concept, leaving more 
specific substantive concerns to the structural modifications of Article I of 
the U.S. Constitution.  This explains, perhaps, why the Framers adopted the 
residual sentence with almost no debate while Article I’s provisions dealing 
with interstate harmony and commerce received significant debate.529 
The interpretation of the remaining language of Article IV of the Con-
stitution, separated from its more specific attributes in Article I, has been 
troubled.530  Attempting to reconcile the confusion, some commentators 
and courts have argued that privileges and immunities language of Article 
IV protects natural law.531  Others have argued that the language confers 
specific rights such as the right to travel532 or fundamental law in gen-
 
from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the 
several States.”). 
 528. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (granting congressional power to impose uniform 
imposts and duties; to regulate commerce among the states; to provide uniform naturaliza-
tion and bankruptcy laws; to enact necessary and proper laws); id. § 9 (prohibition on taxing 
exports from states; prohibition against giving preferences to ports; prohibition on requiring 
ships to land and pay duties in states); id. § 10 (prohibition on state taxation of imports and 
exports beyond inspection fees unless approved by Congress; prohibition on tonnage duties 
unless approved by Congress). 
 529. Compare, e.g., JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 
OF 1787, at 394, 545 (A. Koch ed., 1966) (passage of Privileges and Immunities Clause with 
almost no debate), with id. at 31, 43–45, 143–45, 302–05, 466–69, 498–508, 532–33, 543–
45, 547–52, 568–69 (significant debate over interstate concerns and general balance be-
tween federal and state powers when discussing enhanced congressional powers under pro-
posed Constitution). 
 530. DAVID S. BOGEN, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION 21–44 (2003) (discussing cases and interpretation of Article IV be-
fore enactment of Fourteenth Amendment). 
 531. See, e.g., Chester James Antieau, Paul’s Perverted Privileges or the True Meaning 
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article Four, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 1, 5, 7–8 
(1967) (emphasizing point that founders believed in natural rights as context for “true” in-
terpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause); Kenyon D. Bunch, The Original Un-
derstanding of the Privileges and Immunities Clause: Michael Perry’s Justification for Ju-
dicial Activism or Robert Bork’s Constitutional Inkblot?, 10 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 321, 
323–25, 342–49 (2000) (discussing different camps of scholarship on meaning of clause, 
ranging from “all rights” to “fundamental rights”); see also Ward v. Maryland 79 U.S. (12 
Wall.) 418, 430 (1871). 
 532. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501, 503 (1999) (finding a right to travel in 
privileges and immunities language). 
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eral.533 
Particular questions on the meaning and intent of the privileges and 
immunities language of Article IV of the Constitution remain unanswered.  
But it is clear that the several structural changes expanding the role of the 
national legislature and limiting the states, perhaps combined to some de-
gree with the remaining privileges and immunities language, carved from 
the states’ broad powers a national citizenship for citizens to enjoy the 
Constitution and federal law regulating naturalization, taxation, interstate 
commerce, and other national affairs.534 
E.  Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
Privileges and immunities language was also used in post-Civil War 
documents.535  The Thirteenth Amendment ended slavery, but former 
slaves lacked civil status.  To grant citizenship rights to recently freed 
slaves and negate the slave codes, the Reconstruction Congress adopted the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 (CRA).536  The CRA provided 
 
 533. See, e.g., Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 
3,230) (describing privileges and immunities as “fundamental” and difficult to enumerate, 
but which include protection by government and enjoyment of life, liberty, property, happi-
ness, and safety subject to necessary governmental restraints); Douglass v. Stephens, 1 Del. 
Ch. 465, 470–74 (1821) (holding clause includes all basic natural rights for welfare and 
good required by person in society including right to contract, sue, and enjoy and defend 
life, liberty, and property); Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535, 554 (Md. 1797) (opinion 
of Chase, J.) (Judge Jeremiah T. Chase arguing “privileges and immunities” includes the 
right to own and enjoy property as well as personal rights).  Justice Stephen Field also 
struggled with the language in a case arising under Article IV.  Field described the clause as 
guaranteeing freedom from alienage disabilities before going on to describe the clause as 
prohibiting discriminatory legislation, securing equal protection, ensuring freedom to travel, 
and protecting free enjoyment of property and pursuit of happiness in the other states.  Paul 
v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1869).  But see Antieau, supra note 531, at 22 (criti-
cizing Field’s interpretation as too narrow and limited to laws of a reference state as op-
posed to natural law in general).  See generally Richard L. Aynes, Ink Blot or Not: The 
Meaning of Privileges and/or Immunities, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1295 (2009) (advocating 
several categories of rights protected under privileges and immunities language) 
 534. See generally supra notes 511–33 and accompanying text. 
 535. For literature on antebellum use of privileges and immunities language, see Kurt T. 
Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part I: “Privileges and Immuni-
ties” as an Antebellum Term of Art, 98 GEO. L.J. 1241 (2010).  For a discussion on citizen-
ship language in documents concerning territories acquired after the Revolution, see gener-
ally Matthew J. Hegreness, An Organic Law Theory of the Fourteenth Amendment: The 
Northwest Ordinance as the Source of Rights, Privileges, and Immunities, 120 YALE L.J. 
1820 (2011). 
 536. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1981–1982 (2006)). 
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[t]hat all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign 
power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of 
the United States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard 
to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, 
shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United States, 
to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to in-
herit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and 
to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of per-
son and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to 
like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, 
ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary not withstanding.537 
Concerns over the constitutionality of the CRA motivated Congress to 
include privileges or immunities language in Section One of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to constitutionalize the civil rights legislation.538  Section One 
provides that 
[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the ju-
risdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside.  No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws.539 
 
 537. Id. 
 538. Thomas H. Burrell, Justice Stephen Field’s Expansion of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment: From the Safeguards of Federalism to a State of Judicial Hegemony, 43 GONZ. L. 
REV. 77, 88–99 (2007) (citing legislative history supporting the position that the amendment 
was intended to constitutionalize the civil rights bill). 
 539. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the amend-
ment accents the Citizenship Clause the same way “citizenship rights” accents “citizenship” 
in the phrase “newly freed slaves enjoyed citizenship and citizenship rights” under Recon-
struction legislation.  Comparing the CRA of 1866 and Section One of the Fourteenth 
Amendment side by side, the “privileges or immunities” language in Section One matches 
“shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to make and 
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, 
and convey real and personal property” in the CRA.  See supra note 537; infra note 544.  
The same comparison can be made with the Equal Protection Clause and corresponding lan-
guage in the CRA. 
  Earlier drafts of CRA language protected newly freed slaves from all discrimination 
in civil rights and immunities.  Sen. Trumbull, the principal author of the CRA, defined 
“civil rights” in the early draft as “the right to make and enforce contracts, to sue and be 
sued, and to give evidence, to inherit, purchase, sell, lease, hold, and convey real and per-
sonal property, and to full and equal benefit to all laws and proceedings for the security of 
person and property.”  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475 (1866) (statement of Sen. 
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With the ratification of the amendment, former slaves, now citizens, 
enjoyed the privileges and immunities of state and national citizenship.  
Under Section Five of the amendment, Congress was authorized to enforce 
citizenship rights through enforcement legislation.540 
Citizenship language, whether enumerated in the CRA or referred to 
generically in privileges and immunities language, followed a general 
recognition theme from disability to membership status.  Aspects of citi-
zenship rights granted to former slaves in the CRA had strong similarities 
to the English denization privileges granted to aliens541 and the incorpora-
tion rights granted to a community.542  The transition involved a move from 
a non-recognized, disabled person or entity to a member or citizen privi-
leged with rights to sue and be sued, as well as rights to buy, sell, inherit, 
and enjoy property. 
F.  Judicial Interpretation versus Legislative Enforcement 
When debating the language of the CRA or Section One of the Four-
teenth Amendment, some congressmen discussed earlier court precedents 
interpreting privileges and immunities language of Article IV; others dis-
cussed broad definitions by commentators such as Sir William Black-
stone.543  Many in the 39th Congress equated the privileges and immunities 
 
Trumbull); id. at 476 (similar list of “fundamental” rights to define “rights of citizens”); see 
also infra note 541 (noting strong similarity between CRA clause and denization language 
removing alienage disabilities and granting rights to own property and to sue and be sued). 
 540. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by ap-
propriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”). 
 541. The clause from the CRA, as noted above, is remarkably similar to the specific al-
ienage disabilities removed in denization and naturalization provisions.  And for those char-
ters that did not enumerate removed alienage disabilities, the citizenship grant might substi-
tute generic privileges and immunities language for citizenship rights.  Compare supra notes 
273–85 (denization removed common alienage disabilities and allowed endenized to enjoy 
franchises, liberties, and privileges as other Englishmen enjoy—to sue and be sued as other 
lieges, and to buy, sell, hold, and enjoy land), with notes 306–11 (more generic language 
securing denization status). 
 542. See supra Part II.G (observing that borough incorporation resulted in corporate 
rights to sue and be sued, contract, buy and sell land, make bylaws, and elect leaders). 
 543. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham) (not-
ing Article IV as source of “privileges and immunities” in early draft of amendment); id. at 
1117–18 (statement of Rep. Wilson) (discussing, in reference to CRA, Article IV, Black-
stone, and Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230) (de-
scribing “privileges and immunities” as fundamental and difficult to enumerate)); id. at 
1122 (statement of Rep. Rogers) (citing Corfield in discussion of meaning of privileges and 
immunities); id. at 2765 (statement of Sen. Howard) (discussing Corfield when introducing 
final draft of amendment to Senate for vote); see also BOGEN, supra note 530, at 44–53.  See 
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language of Section One to corresponding language of the CRA.544 
Given the absence of direct intent or instruction for judicial use of the 
phrase, courts have struggled with its implementation.  As a result, the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has re-
mained dormant for much of its life.545  Following the Supreme Court’s in-
terpretation of the scope of the Second Amendment’s Right to Bear Arms 
in District of Columbia v. Heller,546 commentators have argued that courts 
should judicially resuscitate the Privileges or Immunities Clause to incor-
porate the Second Amendment as a fundamental right protected against 
state infringement.547  In light of the broader history of privileges and im-
munities discussed above, one questions the merit of substantive, self-
executing constructions of the language.  Such constructions of broad lan-
guage essentially leave the judiciary free to “interpret” the privileges and 
immunities of American citizens in lieu of express enforcement legislation. 
Colonial history produced distinct but related sources of privileges and 
immunities language: direct charter privileges and immunities, charter den-
ization language, and reference language to leverage the perceived rights of 
freeborn Englishmen.  To the extent the latter two sources differ (though it 
is unlikely colonists at the Revolution perceived such a distinction) most 
colonial advocacy for fundamental law fell under the reference concept as 
colonists sought to enjoy the benefits of several English statutes in the col-
onies.548  If these fundamental statutes are taken as representative of colo-
nists’ claims, the underlying rights sought by colonists were mostly crea-
tions of the state, whether royal privileges and immunities or ancient 
 
generally John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 
1385 (1992). 
 544. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 575–77 (1871) (statement of Sen. 
Trumbull) (emphasizing amendment’s first section was a “copy of the civil rights act”); see 
also supra note 539 (noting structural similarities between CRA and Section One and com-
paring privileges and immunities language with CRA language protecting rights to sue, be 
sued, contract, and enjoy property).  Bingham frequently defined privileges and immunities 
language and Section One by referring to the Bill of Rights.  See infra note 556. 
 545. See Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (interpreting Privileges or 
Immunities Clause narrowly); see also Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 503 (1999) (discussing 
Privileges or Immunities Clause of Section One). 
 546. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 547. See briefs cited supra note 1. 
 548. See supra notes 503–09 (advocates felt that the phrase “privileges and immunities 
of Englishmen” meant several English laws applied in the colonies).  Once Independence 
became likely, colonists and pamphleteers may have substituted the “inalienable rights of 
man” or elements of natural law in place of rights of Englishmen.  See BAILYN, supra note 
502, at 50–51 (commenting on pamphlets discussing natural, inalienable rights of man de-
rived from common law decisions, statute law, and colonial charters). 
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statutory law enacted or confirmed by Parliament.549  In either case, in 
drafting the United States Constitution, the Framers replaced Parliament 
and the crown and incorporated perceived fundamental law into the express 
language of the written document itself. 
After declaring independence from England, states crafted their own 
constitutions to replace either the crown’s instructions or charter privileges 
and immunities, whichever was applicable based on the form of the colo-
ny.550  As discussed above, the Articles of Confederation and Articles I and 
IV of the Constitution solidified the relationship between broad state pow-
ers and emerging federal power.  The relationship ultimately culminated in 
a surrender of a segment of inherent state authority, that in which the indi-
vidual states were not competent, to the federal government.551  With the 
transformation, states retained autonomy within their respective spheres but 
conceded enhanced federal power to regulate national concerns and inter-
state commerce among other things. 
Reconstruction legislation and the three post-Civil War amendments 
to the Constitution also addressed the balance of federal and state powers—
though this time over slavery and not commerce.552  As noted above, the 
39th Congress proposed Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment in part 
to constitutionalize the CRA.  The final version included privileges and 
immunities language based in large part on the language of Article IV.553 
In the incorporation argument, advocates argue that privileges or im-
munities language of Section One protects fundamental law and that certain 
protections in the Bill of Rights are fundamental and thus protected under 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause itself.554  There are two main obstacles 
to this argument.  First, a majority of the Reconstruction congressmen, after 
debates and revisions, supported a limited Fourteenth Amendment, and it is 
not clear that a constitution-amending majority would have supported the 
federal intrusion that incorporation might impose.  Second, accepting ar-
guendo the shared intent to protect some quantum of fundamental rights 
 
 549. Throughout most of the colonial period, the crown regulated colonial affairs 
through charter privileges and immunities.  Retaining English citizenship in the colonies did 
not necessarily mean English law applied in the colonies.  See supra note 461 (literature dis-
cussing effect of English law in colonies). 
 550. See supra note 511 (following Independence, states adopted their own constitu-
tions). 
 551. See supra Part V.D. 
 552. See supra Part V.E (referring to adoption of civil rights legislation and Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
 553. See supra note 543 (noting Article IV’s influence on Section One of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
 554. See briefs cited supra note 1. 
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and the Bill of Rights, the debates do not indicate any support for judicial 
enforcement of Section One outside of Section Five’s enforcement authori-
ty. 
The 39th Congress, the body primarily responsible for the Reconstruc-
tion legislation at issue, generally supported reform but varied significantly 
on the scope of reform and the extent that Congress would be permitted to 
invade the states to achieve that reform.555  Following John Bingham, a Re-
publican congressman from Ohio and the principal author of the language 
ultimately becoming Section One, a handful of members of the 39th Con-
gress advocated, to a greater or lesser degree, that the protections of the Bill 
of Rights should be secured against state infringement.556  Initial drafts of 
legislation called for congressional enforcement of life, liberty, and proper-
ty and equal privileges and immunities.557  Revisions, however, scaled back 
the scope of the amendment to give Congress a supervisory enforcement 
role.558  Reconstruction congressmen generally supported some degree of 
civil rights for newly freed slaves but fractured sharply over coverage of 
political rights, for example, voting and jury service, and over social rights, 
for example, interracial marriage and public desegregation.559 
It is not necessary, however, to solve the exact degree and scope of the 
39th Congress’s intentions for Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Even if one places the protection of the Bill of Rights within the intended 
scope of Section One, there is little evidence that the 39th Congress intend-
 
 555. See infra note 559. 
 556. Bingham introduced the amendment with the desire to protect the Bill of Rights 
against state infringement. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034, 1089–92 (1866) 
(statements of Rep. Bingham).  Throughout the debates, Bingham maintained his aim to 
protect the Bill of Rights against state infringement and was followed by others in that gen-
eral goal.  See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of Sen. 
Howard) (claiming several rights listed in Bill of Rights are protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment).  See generally Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause, Part II: John Bingham and the Second Draft of the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 GEO. 
L.J. 329 (2011) (examining the legislative history of Section One). 
 557. Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 
69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 29–56 (1955) (analyzing original language and revisions). 
 558. Id.  The 39th Congress also made similar revisions to the CRA. 
 559. For example, Sen. Trumbull stated: 
The bill is applicable exclusively to civil rights.  It does not propose to regulate 
the political rights of individuals; it has nothing to do with the right of suffrage, or 
any other political right; but is simply intended to carry out a constitutional provi-
sion, and guaranty to every person of every color the same civil rights. 
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 599–600 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull).  See 
generally Burrell, supra note 538, at 83–124 (discussing civil-political rights dichotomy in 
39th Congress). 
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ed for the judiciary to achieve this change absent congressional enforce-
ment legislation.  The legislative history of the amendment is replete with 
references to congressional enforcement.  The absence of any role for the 
judiciary in implementing Section One is compelling.560 
Bingham began his effort to secure passage of the amendment by dis-
cussing Congress’s power, the Supremacy Clause, and congressional en-
forcement.561  One of the earlier drafts of what would become Section One 
proposed that 
Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and 
proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities 
of citizens in the several States, and to all persons in the several States 
equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property.562 
As noted above, the final provision provides 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor de-
ny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws . . . .  
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article.563 
The argument supporting judicial enforcement of Section One is that 
by changing the language from the initial draft to the form “no State shall,” 
drafters intended to create an absolute prohibition on the states, one the 
courts could enforce outside of Section Five.564  In support of this theory, 
commentators cite to debates recommending Bingham create an absolute 
ban on discrimination against any class of citizens, one beyond congres-
sional control.  In February 1866, Giles Hotchkiss noted Bingham’s initial 
draft was too conservative and suggested that protection should extend be-
yond the caprice of Congress.565  Hotchkiss was worried that a faction of 
rebels and their northern sympathizers would gain control of future Con-
gresses, undo legislative advances, and, by the amendment as initially pro-
 
 560. See Burrell, supra note 538, at 101–05 (arguing Section One was not intended to be 
self-executing). 
 561. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034, 1088–90 (1866) (statement of Rep. 
Bingham). 
 562. Id. at 1034. 
 563. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5. 
 564. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 
YALE L.J. 1193, 1218–19 (1992) (arguing in support of incorporation in part by the use of 
“no State shall” language); Michael Kent Curtis, The Bill of Rights and the States: An Over-
view From One Perspective, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3, 14–15, 30–33 (2009). 
 565. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095 (1866) (statement of Rep. Hotchkiss). 
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posed, establish uniform laws for life, liberty, and property.  Hotchkiss 
commented that Bingham’s initial draft language 
provides that Congress may pass laws to enforce these rights.  Why not 
provide by an amendment to the Constitution that no State shall discrimi-
nate against any class of its citizens; and let that amendment stand as part 
of the organic law of the land, subject only to be defeated by another con-
stitutional amendment . . . [?]566 
The language ultimately becoming Section One was in the form “no 
State shall” and thus resembled Hotchkiss’s suggestion to remove congres-
sional enforcement.567  But when viewing the amendment as a whole, the 
final language discounts his general suggestion by retaining congressional 
enforcement of the amendment.  The final text and the clear balance of de-
bates—including the shared understanding after the revisions—weigh 
against such an absolutist interpretation and in favor of congressional en-
forcement of Section One.568  A better interpretation of the change in Bing-
 
 566. Id. 
 567. Lash, Part II, supra note 556, at 396 (suggesting a connection between second draft 
of amendment and Hotchkiss’s earlier prompting for an amendment beyond congressional 
enforcement). 
 568. In the first draft, Bingham’s proposed language expressly advanced congressional 
enforcement.  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (statement of Rep. Bingham) (argu-
ing that the amendment would “enable the whole people of every State, by congressional 
enactment, to enforce obedience to these requirements”); id. at 1090 (statement of Rep. 
Bingham) (arguing that, through the amendment, “Congress is . . . vested with power to hold 
[the states] to answer before the bar of the national courts for the violation of their oaths and 
of the rights of their fellow-men”).  Rep. Woodbridge argued: 
  What is the object of the proposed amendment?  It merely gives the power to 
Congress to enact those laws which will give to a citizen of the United States the 
natural rights which pertain to citizenship.  It is intended to enable Congress by its 
enactments when necessary to give to a citizen of the United States, in whatever 
State he may be, those privileges and immunities which are guarantied to him un-
der the Constitution of the United States.  It is intended to enable Congress to give 
to all citizens the inalienable rights of life and liberty . . . and property. 
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1088 (1866); id. at 1094 (statement of Rep. Hale) (ask-
ing Bingham whether the proposed amendment conferred “upon Congress a general power 
of legislation for the purpose of securing to all persons in the several States protection of 
life, liberty, and property”—to which Bingham answered in the affirmative). 
  After the revision into the “no State shall” form, Bingham and others continued to 
emphasize the role of congressional enforcement of Section One.  CONG. GLOBE, 39th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (statement of Rep. Stevens) (“This amendment supplies that defect, 
and allows Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the States”); id. at 2542 (statement 
of Rep. Bingham) (stating that the amendment will provide the power “by congressional 
enactment . . . to protect by national law the privileges and immunities of all citizens”); id. 
at 2765–66 (statement of Sen. Howard) (following an argument similar to Bingham’s); see 
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ham’s second draft is an effort to address the 39th Congress’s concerns 
over giving Congress plenary power to enact uniform laws in life, liberty, 
and property.  Drafters wanted this general power to remain with the states, 
provided those states did not abuse their authority.  Shortly after Bingham 
introduced the initial language, Representative Hale challenged the draft in 
the form “Congress shall” and expressed concern for states’ general civil 
and criminal legislation.569  He stated: 
 What is the effect of the amendment which the committee on reconstruc-
tion propose[s] for the sanction of this House and the States of the Union?  
I submit that it is in effect a provision under which all State legislation, in 
its codes of civil and criminal jurisprudence and procedure, affecting the 
individual citizen, may be overridden, may be repealed or abolished, and 
the law of Congress established instead.  I maintain that in this respect it is 
an utter departure from every principle ever dreamed of by the men who 
framed our Constitution. . . . 
 [I]t is  a grant of the fullest and most ample power to Congress to make 
all laws ‘necessary and proper to secure to all persons in the several States 
protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property[.]’570 
Hale also objected to the effect of the amendment on non-rebellion states.  
He continued 
[I]f we confer upon the Federal Congress powers, in such vague and gen-
eral language as this amendment contains, to legislate upon all matters per-
taining to the life, liberty, and property of all the inhabitants of the several 
States, I put it to the gentleman, whom I know sometimes at least to be dis-
posed to criticise this habit of liberal construction, to state where he appre-
hends that Congress and the courts will stop in the powers they may arro-
gate to themselves under this proposed amendment.571 
Hale sympathized with the goals of Reconstruction legislation but felt the 
proposed language was dangerous to existing federalism principles: 
[T]here are other liberties as important as the liberties of the individual citi-
zen, and those are the liberties and rights of the States.  I believe that what-
ever most clearly distinguishes our Government from other Governments in 
the extent of individual freedom and the protection of personal rights we 
owe to our decentralized system, to the fact that the functions of govern-
 
also infra notes 575–84 and accompanying text (citing and quoting Bingham’s post-
ratification understanding of congressional enforcement of Section One). 
 569. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1063 (1866) (statement of Rep. Hale) (com-
menting on an early version of amendment and states’ rights). 
 570. Id. (statement of Rep. Hale). 
 571. Id. at 1065 (statement of Rep. Hale).  Hale went on to point out the breadth of the 
courts’ interpretation of “necessary and proper” language found in both the Constitution and 
the proposed draft. 
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ment with which the citizen has immediate relation are brought home to 
him, that he operates immediately upon them and they immediately upon 
him, instead of there being that long chain of communication which in a 
centralized government must extend from the fountain of power, whether 
despotic or republican, whether executive or legislative, to the citizen.572 
While Hotchkiss proposed to remove the caprice of Congress, others 
proposed to alter the amendment to conform to Hale’s criticisms above by 
removing congressional power to legislate for life, liberty, and property in 
the first instance and substituting supervisory congressional enforcement.573  
Representative Delano summarized this suggestion as follows: 
 I said in the outset that I wanted to see the provisions of this bill adopted 
or enforced upon the South, and it was with this thought before me that I 
introduced, at an early day of the session, an amendment to the Constitution 
requiring each State to provide for the security of life, liberty, and property, 
and the rightful pursuit of happiness, and giving to Congress power to en-
force these rights where the States withheld them.  That, in my estimation, 
is a better theory of proceeding on this subject than the one introduced by 
my colleague, which proposes to vest that power in Congress at once; be-
cause I want Congress to exercise no more power over the local legislation 
of the States than is absolutely necessary, and I would not allow it to go in 
the first instance to secure these rights, but allow it to go only when the 
States refuse to apply and give such security under the fundamental law of 
the nation. . . . 
 [I]f we do anything upon this subject at all, we had better do it by taking 
up the amendment to the Constitution offered by my colleague, [Mr. Bing-
ham,] now postponed till April, modifying it in the form I have suggested, 
and making it the fundamental law, and then proceeding to secure the rights 
of these persons in a way in which we shall not be trampling down or en-
dangering the fundament law of the land.574 
The final draft follows a form in line with Delano’s suggestion. 
After the Fourteenth Amendment’s passage, Bingham concurred with 
those who felt Section One protected the Bill of Rights but emphasized 
 
 572. Id. at 1088 (statement of Rep. Woodbridge) (assuring other members of limited 
reach of amendment and protection for state sovereignty).  When discussing the scope of 
Section One, Bingham also maintained the importance of states laws and local government.  
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 84–85 (1871) (statement of Rep. Bingham). 
 573. See infra note 574. 
 574. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 158–59 (statement of Rep. Delano dur-
ing debates on CRA) (taking issue with Bingham’s initial version and suggesting an ap-
proach similar to the final version wherein Congress was authorized to exercise remedial 
powers). 
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Congress would play this enforcement role.575  During the debate, Bingham 
was asked why he changed the language from “Congress shall” in the ini-
tial draft to “no State shall.”  Bingham answered that the amendment as 
adopted was more complete and comprehensive than the initial draft.  
Quoting Sections One and Five, Bingham responded “[t]hat is the grant of 
power.  It is full and complete.”576  Bingham continued 
There is not a line or a letter in the fourteenth amendment that looks to the 
protection of the rights of [affected citizens] . . . but the provisions of the 
first and fifth sections . . . .  The power to enforce this provision by law is 
as full as any other grant of power to Congress.  It is, ‘the Congress shall 
have power, by appropriate legislation’ to enforce this and every other pro-
vision of this article.577 
Bingham further explained that he changed the language to “no State 
shall” to aid in the enforcement of the Bill of Rights against the states.578  
Bingham repeated his belief that Section One was defined by the first eight 
amendments and that the language “‘no State shall make or enforce any 
 
 575. Bingham summarized his view of Section One: 
The question as presented here and now may be stated thus: is it competent for 
Congress to provide by law for the better enforcement of the Constitution and 
laws of the United States and the better security of the life, liberty, and property of 
the citizens of the United States in the several States of the Union?  The Constitu-
tion is not self-executing, therefore laws must be enacted by Congress for the due 
execution of all the powers vested by the Constitution in the Government . . . or 
any officer thereof. 
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 81; id. at 83 (“The powers of the States have 
been limited and the powers of Congress extended by the last three amendments of the Con-
stitution.  These last amendments . . . do, in my judgment, vest in Congress a power to pro-
tect the rights of citizens against States, and individuals in States, never before granted.”). 
 576. Id. at 83. 
 577. Id. 
 578. Incorporation theory frequently makes use of the 39th Congress’s discussion of 
Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), in which the 
Court held that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the states.  The argument states that the 
amendment in the “no State shall” form overturned the federalism limitation in Barron and 
thus authorized courts to apply the Bill of Rights against the states.  Some members of the 
39th Congress certainly intended to enforce the Bill of Rights against the states and felt that 
Section One accomplished this task.  But the 39th Congress’s discussion of Barron and the 
inability to apply the Bill of Rights against the states does not mean that the “no State shall” 
form as adopted in the final draft was a grant of judicial power to effect this goal through 
incorporation.  Bingham discussed Barron in a similar manner when the draft under consid-
eration was in the form “Congress shall.”  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089–90 
(1866).  Barron was simply a symbol of antebellum federalism that some members of the 
39th Congress wanted to alter with additional congressional powers to enforce the Bill of 
Rights against the states.  CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 84 (Bingham discuss-
ing Barron in a post-amendment debate). 
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law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States’ [creates] an express prohibition upon every State of the Un-
ion, which may be enforced under existing laws of Congress, and such oth-
er laws for their better enforcement as Congress may make.”579 
Under the text of the final draft of the amendment, as reinforced by 
Bingham’s understanding, Congress was to enforce the privileges or im-
munities language through Section Five.580  Bingham believed that the 
states had not adequately enforced the Constitution and federal law in their 
own tribunals.  The amendment remedied the problem but also protected 
state laws.581  Bingham resolved the ambiguity in the form change from 
“Congress shall” to “no State shall” by explaining that the language of the 
Reconstruction amendments was both negative and positive, that it restrict-
ed the states with the negative but affirmatively gave Congress the power 
to enforce the negative restriction: 
 Let gentlemen consider the last three amendments and the new limitations 
thereby imposed upon the power of the States, and the new powers thereby 
vested in Congress.  The first of these (the thirteenth) provides that invol-
untary servitude, or slavery, shall not exist in the United States.  That is 
negative.  Then we have the further provision that Congress shall have 
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, this amendment.  That is af-
firmative.  Do gentlemen undertake to say to-day that this does not impose 
a new limitation upon the power of the States, and grant a new power to 
Congress? . . .  
 I rather think not.  Let any State try the experiment of again enslaving 
men, and we will see, whether it is not competent for the Congress of the 
United States to make it a felony punishable by death to reduce any man, 
white or black, under color of State law, to a system of enforced human 
servitude or slavery. . . . 
 Will gentlemen undertake to tell the country that we cannot enforce by 
positive enactment that negative provision, the thirteenth article . . . ?582 
Summarizing his answer to the question about the form change to “no 
State shall,” Bingham declared 
[B]y virtue of these amendments, it is competent for Congress to-day to 
provide by law that no man shall be held to answer in the tribunals of any 
 
 579. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 84. 
 580. Id. at 84 (“[T]his House may safely follow the example of the makers of the Consti-
tution and the builders of the Republic, by passing laws for enforcing all the privileges and 
immunities of citizens of the United States, as guarantied by the amended Constitution and 
expressly enumerated in the Constitution.”). 
 581. Id. at 84–85 (Bingham noting importance of local government and federalism). 
 582. Id. at 85. 
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State in this Union for any act made criminal by the laws of that State 
without a fair and impartial trial by jury.  Congress never before has had 
the power to do it.  It is also competent for Congress to provide that no citi-
zen in any State shall be deprived of his property by State law or the judg-
ment of a State court without just compensation therefor.  Congress never 
before had the power so to declare.  It is competent for the Congress of the 
United States to-day to declare that no State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the freedom of speech, the freedom of the press, or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble together and petition for redress 
of grievances, for these are of the rights of citizens of the United States de-
fined in the Constitution and guarantied by the fourteenth amendment, and 
to enforce which Congress is thereby expressly empowered.583 
Bingham’s post-ratification understanding was shared by his contem-
poraries in the 39th Congress.  Senator Howard, whose speech before the 
Senate is frequently cited by proponents of incorporation, also described 
the scope of the final form of Section One in terms of the Bill of Rights.584  
Like Bingham and the 39th Congress, Howard emphasized that additional 
congressional power was necessary for the enforcement of the guarantees 
of Section One: 
The great object of the first section of this amendment is, therefore, to re-
strain the power of the States and compel them at all times to respect these 
great fundamental guarantees.  How will it be done under the present 
amendment?  As I have remarked, they are not powers granted to Congress, 
and therefore it is necessary, if they are to be effectuated and enforced, as 
they assuredly ought to be, that additional power should be given to Con-
gress to that end.  This is done by the fifth section of this amendment, 
which declares that ‘the Congress shall have power to enforce by appropri-
ate legislation the provisions of this article.’  Here is a direct affirmative 
delegation of power to Congress to carry out all the principles of all these 
guarantees, a power not found in the Constitution.585 
Under the final draft and understanding of the amendment, Congress 
managed Reconstruction through enforcement legislation.  The text and 
debates discussing congressional enforcement make sense.  The alternate 
theory for judicial enforcement is at odds with the amendment’s context.  
Because the 39th Congress was bitterly divided over post-slavery issues 
and the rights of citizens, it is highly unlikely they would have cast aside 
their differences and provided for a self-executing ban on state “discrimina-
tion,” leaving it to the courts to determine the details and definitions—
details and definitions over which even they could not presently agree. 
 
 583. Id. 
 584. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765–66 (1866). 
 585. Id. at 2766. 
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As noted above, the Articles of Confederation failed at creating a 
harmonious relationship among the states.  The states met to forge a 
stronger but limited federal government.  In so doing, the Framers banned 
the states, in absolute terms, from many activities.  In Article I, Section 10, 
Clause 1, Framers employed the “no state shall” form to create direct pro-
hibitions on the states entering treaties, granting letters of marque and re-
prisal, coining money, emitting bills of credit, and passing bills of attainder, 
among other things.586  Unlike Framers’ intentions concerning a more easi-
ly executable provision barring states from entering treaties and coining 
money, the 39th Congress did not have a consensus on Reconstruction 
goals, and Hotchkiss’s proposal for an absolute ban declaring that “no State 
shall discriminate against any class of its citizens”587—independent of con-
gressional development—would have been meaningless to an amending 
majority internally conflicted on post-slavery issues and the scope of de-
sired reform.  To the contrary, the overwhelming evidence confirms that 
the drafters had no vision for the courts independently enforcing Section 
One.  While the text of the Fourteenth Amendment called for congressional 
enforcement and Congress initially pursued enforcement legislation, within 
a few decades of the amendment’s ratification the courts had taken over the 
role of enforcing Section One.588 
Courts have struggled with interpreting privileges and immunities lan-
guage precisely because the language is legislative language not self-
executing language.589  One can speak about the importance of individual 
rights and label those rights fundamental.  Fundamental law was important 
throughout English and colonial history, and the Framers had the oppor-
 
 586. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.  Framers rejected the request to provide direct prohi-
bitions on import and export duties and imposts (Art. 1, § 10 cl. 2) beyond congressional 
oversight and potential regional biases.  MADISON, supra note 529, at 394, 543–44 (Madison 
unsuccessfully proposing to transfer language providing “no state shall . . . lay imposts or 
duties on imports” from the proposed Article XIII (Art. 1, § 10 cl. 2), where Congress could 
license such duties and imposts, into Article XII (Art 1, § 10, cl. 1), similar “no state shall” 
language without authorization for congressional approval).  In a post-amendment debate on 
Section One, Bingham confusingly analogized to the direct state limitations found in Art. I, 
§ 10, cl. 1 (no state shall enter into treaties, emit bills of credit, pass bills of attainder, ex 
post facto laws, etc.).  This discussion, taken in itself, might suggest a self-executing ban on 
the states, but Bingham clarified that, unlike § 10, cl. 1, the amendment provided an affirma-
tive role in Section Five for Congress to enforce the provisions of the amendment, including 
Section One.  CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 83–84 (1871). 
 587. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095 (1866). 
 588. Burrell, supra note 538, at 128–57 (discussing early dissenting ideology and tracing 
its capture of majority opinion by 1880s). 
 589. See supra Parts II–IV (discussing concept of royal privileges and immunities and 
tracing influence of crown’s charter on colonies). 
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tunity to expressly provide for fundamental law in the written Constitution.  
Further, one can distill a goal to protect fundamental rights in the Recon-
struction debates leading up to the adoption of Section One.  But as con-
ceived, the protection of the amendment’s perceived fundamental rights in-
tended by one, a few, or a majority of the 39th or later Congresses was to 
be articulated, defined, limited, or not adopted through the congressional 
enforcement provision, Section Five of the amendment.  In giving privileg-
es and immunities language independent life to protect “fundamental” law, 
modern commentators advocating for substantive interpretations of the lan-
guage seem to be guilty of conflating a reference to a body of laws with the 
law-making authority itself. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This story of privileges and immunities presented the medieval con-
cept behind the language and traced the concept’s influence on the colo-
nies.  Royal privileges and immunities, through a kaleidoscope view, repre-
sent the background of the privileges and immunities language of Article 
IV and the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Article began by discussing several medieval English institutions.  
During the medieval period, burdens and obligations accompanied the oc-
cupancy of land.  From these burdens, the king granted immunities and 
privileges.  With the Norman Conquest, feudal tenure swept across Eng-
land; feudal tenure involved a reciprocal relationship between lord and ten-
ant.  The crown granted franchises to lords in exchange for greater financ-
ing and a hand in running government.  Enfranchised lords stood in the 
king’s place with respect to granted immunities. 
Anglo-Norman England was an agricultural society.  Both the king 
and lord held manors.  Next to the manor, boroughs protected by the king’s 
peace were centers of administration catering to merchants and trade.  As 
an institution for trade, the borough fostered gilds and mercantile commu-
nities.  For this reason, among others, the crown frequently granted privi-
leges and immunities to boroughs.  The privileged borough grew as a 
community with freedoms of self-governance and financial independence.  
When overseas trade developed, voyaging merchants received charter 
privileges and immunities regulating international trade and permitting 
self-governance overseas.  Charters to merchant associations often bor-
rowed from borough and gild institutions. 
With the allure of far western lands, explorers began voyaging great 
distances for new trade and riches.  Prior to this time, most foreign settle-
ment involved a trading post to service the trade.  After the discovery of the 
New World, merchant voyagers received charters granting extensive feudal 
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jurisdictions and monopolies in discovered lands.  Colonization soon fol-
lowed. 
The European colonization of the New World grew rapidly during the 
sixteenth century.  After conceptualizing colonization in Ireland, several 
early proprietors such as Gilbert and Raleigh received charters to conquer 
and colonize North America.  Colonies served the crown; adventurers in 
turn received land, governance, and trading rights protected by the crown 
and the English flag. 
Royal charters controlled most colonial development.  Throughout the 
colonial period, to a greater or lesser degree, the right to travel, right to dis-
cover and inhabit foreign lands, right to governance, right to incorporate, 
and the right to trade were examples of charter-based privileges from the 
crown to colonists and promoters.  Supported by charter clauses, settlers 
migrating to the colonies were to remain Englishmen and enjoy the privi-
leges and immunities of Englishmen as if they were born in England.590 
After initial failures, settlement efforts in North America found suc-
cess.  In the first few decades of the seventeenth century, several colonies 
were planted along the East Coast.  Colonial institutions mimicked English 
institutions.  To facilitate land use, the crown granted to colonizing agen-
cies easy tenure clauses holding land in free and common socage, not in 
capite, as of the Manor of East Greenwich in the County of Kent.  Socage 
tenure was a system of tenure very similar to burgage tenure of English 
boroughs. 
The American colonies were managed locally with supervision by the 
crown and promoter in England.  Given the shared governance across the 
seas, events in England typically affected the colonies—especially those 
concerning the crown.  Challenging royal monopolies and other regal acts, 
seventeenth-century pamphleteers and advocates in Parliament advanced 
the rights and liberties of Englishmen through debates and popular writ-
ings.  Similar language and advocacy permeated the colonies and influ-
enced colonists’ relations with the crown and proprietors.  The colonial as-
sembly, armed with the plea for the privileges and immunities of 
Englishmen, was an essential vehicle in the transformation of the colonial 
subject.  The phrase had the political effect of leveraging English law or the 
privileges of other colonies.591  With the language serving as a meme for a 
body of fundamental law, colonists converged around free principles and 
invoked the rights of freer societies around them, much like medieval Eng-
land’s baronial burgesses coalescing to the free borough and seeking rights 
 
 590. See supra notes 273–85, 306–11 (denization language to Warde, Gilbert, and those 
immigrating to America). 
 591. See supra Part IV.D; supra notes 430, 498. 
113
Burrell: A Story of Privileges and Immunities: From Medieval Concept to th
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2011
BURRELL.DOCX 1/9/12  12:00 PM 
120 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:7 
of incorporation.592 
The plea for the “privileges and immunities of Englishmen” served an 
important role throughout the colonies but especially during the American 
Revolution with the reoccurring claim for the right to participate in legisla-
tion and taxation.  By the eve of the American Revolution, colonists at-
tributed a broad degree of rights to the phrase.  Following Independence, 
colonists no longer needed to reference the privileges of Englishmen.  
States crafted their own constitutions to replace charter privileges and im-
munities or the crown’s instructions.  With Article IV of the Articles of 
Confederation, the nation of former colonies as a whole replaced the role of 
English citizenship and English regulation of intercolonial affairs in travel, 
trade, and commerce.  Defective on many grounds, the Articles were re-
placed by the Constitution.  The Constitution advanced the efforts of Arti-
cle IV of the Articles by expanding Congress’s role to regulate, among oth-
er things, interstate affairs and naturalization.  With Article I’s structural 
changes, the Framers established a body of general citizenship rights 
among the states. 
Following the American Civil War, the Reconstruction Congress 
adopted the CRA to negate the slave codes and grant citizenship rights to 
recently freed slaves.  Citizenship rights granted to former slaves had simi-
larities to denization clauses, to the freedoms granted to individuals sup-
pressed by feudal obligations, and to the corporate rights granted to com-
munities.  The transformation involved a move from a non-recognized 
person or entity to a citizen with the right to sue and be sued, to buy and 
sell property, and to enjoy associated civil rights.593  Concerns over the 
constitutionality of the Act motivated Congress to propose Section One of 
the Fourteenth Amendment with privileges and immunities language to 
constitutionalize the CRA. 
The interpretation of privileges and immunities language has been 
problematic.  Modern commentary has suggested the phrase protects some 
degree of rights ranging from personal rights to fundamental law.594  Given 
the broader history of royal privileges and immunities discussed above, one 
questions the merit of substantive, self-executing constructions of the lan-
guage.  Such constructions leave the judiciary free to interpret, and perhaps 
create, “privileges and immunities”—concepts historically derived from 
state authority. 
 
 592. See supra notes 147–50, 499 (liber burgus and charter association); supra notes 
415, 423 (influence of freer colonies). 
 593. See supra notes 541–42 (comparing citizenship rights to newly freed slaves, deniza-
tion provisions, and incorporation rights). 
 594. See supra note 1. 
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